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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the dissertation is to establish a framework with which to assess the prospective
gains from regional monetary integration among five neighboring countries in East Africa:
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The neo-classical theory assumes that
economic and monetary union would stimulate additional growth in such a union as a whole,
with the trickle-down effects of overall development, and would enhance factor mobility,
solving the problem of regional disparity automatically. Past experiences of African
regionalism have shown that countries that participated in a monetary union were able to
pursue credible monetary policies. This economic performance has been credited to their
monetary policy discipline. Since countries in East Africa are small both in terms of their
individual populations and the respective sizes of their economies, the study concludes that
regional integration is a useful way of increasing their economic clout and bargaining power on
the global scene.
Key words: Monetary integration; economic integration; regionalism; currency union;
optimum currency areas; exchange rate arrangements; convergence criteria; payment system;
informal cross-border trade; East Africa.
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1CHAPTER I.  INTRODUCTION
1 . 1 .  R e s e a r c h  B a c k g r o u n d
The  mean ing  o f  mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion  wi th in  a  r eg ion  appea r s  t o  be
in t e rp re t ed  d i f f e r en t l y  by  d i f f e r en t  peop l e .  The  de f in i t i on  g iven  by
Werne r  (1970)  i s  among  the  f i r s t  i n t e rp re t a t i ons  o f  mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion
in  modern  t imes .  I t  i den t i f i e s  a  f i r s t  s e t  o f  cond i t ions ,  ca l l ed  “necessa ry
cond i t i ons”  by  De lo r s  (1989) ,  t o  de f ine  a  mone ta ry  un ion :
·  with in  the  a rea  o f  mone ta ry  un ion ,  cu r renc ies  mus t  be  fu l ly  and
i r r eve r s ib ly  conve r t i b l e  i n to  one  ano the r ;
·  par  va lue  mus t  be  i r r evocab ly  f ixed ;
·  f l uc tua t ion  marg ins  a round  these  pa r i t i e s  mus t  be  e l imina t ed ;
·  cap i t a l  movement s  mus t  be  comple te ly  f r ee .
The  second  se t  o f  cond i t ions  iden t i f i ed  by  Werner  conce rns  the
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  o f  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h i s  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n
shou ld  invo lve  a l l  dec i s ions  conce rn ing  l i qu id i ty ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,
in t e rven t ion  on  the  exchange  marke t s ,  management  o f  r e se rves ,  and  the
f ix ing  o f  cu r r ency  pa r i t i e s  v i s - à -v i s  t he  r e s t  o f  t he  wor ld .
The  de f in i t i on  g iven  by  Corden  (1972)  i s  amongs t  t he  p ionee r ing
in t e rp re t a t i ons  o f  mone ta ry  i n t eg ra t i on .  He  desc r ibes  i t  a s  an
ins t i t u t iona l  o r  l ega l  mone ta ry  l i nk  be tween  s t a t e s  and  de f ines  th i s
ins t i tu t iona l  s t ruc tu re  a s  an  exchange  r a t e  un ion ;  o the r s  a re  more
f l ex ib l e ,  de f in ing  mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion  in  t e rms  o f  a  va r i e ty  o f
in s t i t u t iona l  a r r angemen t s .
Gros  and  Thygesen  (1982)  a rgue  tha t  s ince  the re  a r e  d i f f e r en t
i n t e rp re t a t i ons  o f  mone t a ry  un ion ,  t he r e  a r e  d i f f e r en t  deg ree s  o f
mone t a ry  i n t eg ra t i on  t ha t  app rox ima te  t o  d i f f e r en t  i n t e rp r e t a t i ons  o f
moneta ry  un ion .
2P a d o a - S c h i o p p a  ( 1 9 8 8 )  s u g g e s t s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c a t e g o r i s a t i o n  o f
mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion :
E x c h a n g e  r a t e  u n i o n s :  exchange  r a t e s  be tween  the  pa r t i c ipan t s  a r e
i r r evocab ly  f ixed  and  marg ins  o f  f luc tua t ions  a re  no t  pe rmi t t ed .
However ,  mone ta ry  po l i c i e s  need  no t  be  coord ina ted .  As  a  r e su l t ,  some
fo rms  o f  cap i t a l  con t ro l s  a r e  needed  t o  i n f luence  domes t i c  l i qu id i t y
cond i t i ons .
Pseudo  exchange  ra t e  un ions :  t h i s  t e rmino logy  i s  due  to  Corden  (1972) .
These  invo lve  f ixed  exchange  r a t e s  among  the  member s ,  f r e e  cap i t a l
movemen t s  and  p l edges  o f  po l i cy  coo rd ina t i on ,  bu t  no  fo rma l  i n t eg ra t i on
of  mone ta ry  po l i c i e s .
Mone tary  i n t egra t ion :  t h i s  a r r angemen t ,  wh ich  i s  t yp i ca l ly  u sed
in t e rchangeab ly  wi th  t he  concep t  o f  cu r r ency  a reas ,  i nvo lves  exchange
ra t e  un i f i ca t ion :  i . e .  an  i r r evocab ly  f ixed  exchange  r a t e  and  the  absence
of  marg ins  o f  f luc tua t ion .  Mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion  a l so  inc ludes  fu l l  and
i r r eve r s ib l e  conve r t ib i l i t y  o f  cu r r enc i e s  ( i . e . ,  t he  absence  o f  exchange
con t ro l s ) ;  f i nanc i a l  marke t  i n t eg ra t ion ;  t he  comple t e  l i be ra l i s a t i on  o f
m o v e m e n t s  o n  c u r r e n c y  t r a n s a c t i o n s ;  a n d  a  c o m m o n  ( u n i o n - w i d e )
mone ta ry  po l i cy .  Consequen t ly ,  mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion  co r re sponds  to  t he
a r r angemen t  t ha t  ha s  been  env i saged  t o  be  i n  p l ace  a t  t he  beg inn ing  o f
the  th i rd  s t age  o f  mone ta ry  un i f i ca t ion  in  the  European  Union ,  a s
embedded  in  the  Maas t r i ch t  T rea ty .  I n  t u rn ,  f i nanc i a l  i n t eg ra t i on
invo lves  more  than  ju s t  t he  l i be ra l i s a t ion  o f  cap i t a l  t r ansac t ions .  As
Robson  (1985)  obse rves ,  f i nanc i a l  i n t eg ra t i on  a l so  en t a i l s  t he  conce r t ed
adop t ion  o f  measures  to  ha rmoni se  na t iona l  f inanc ia l  r egu la t ions  and
s t ruc tu re s  o f  i n s t i t u t i ons .  I t  shou ld  be  po in t ed  ou t  t ha t  a l t hough  some
wr i t e r s  ( e .g . ,  Ing ram,  1973 ,  and  Masson  and  Ta l lo r ,  1972)  p re sume  tha t
the  above  i t ems  a re  cons i s t en t  w i th  “ i r r evocab ly”  f ixed  exchange  r a t e s ,
th i s  ou tcome  i s  by  no  means  a  ce r t a in ty ,  a s  wi l l  be  d i scussed  in  chap te r
th ree .
Mone tary  un i f i ca t ion :  t h i s  concep t  i nvo lves  mone t a ry  i n t eg ra t i on  p lu s  a
s ing le  cu r rency  and  a  common cen t ra l  bank .  Here ,  t he  use  o f  the
s t anda rd  in s t rumen t s  o f  mone ta ry  po l i cy  i s  cons igned  to  the  communi ty
and  exe rc i sed  so le ly  by  i t s  mone ta ry  au thor i ty ,  l eav ing  no  independence
fo r  member  s t a t e s .  Mone ta ry  un i f i ca t ion  a l so  imp l i e s  t ha t  r e spons ib i l i t y
3fo r  exchange  r a t e  po l i cy  w i th  o the r  cu r r enc i e s  and  fo r  t he  ba l ance  o f
payment s  o f  the  communi ty  l i e s  wi th  the  mone ta ry  au thor i ty  o f  the
communi ty ,  wh ich  con t ro l s  t he  poo l  o f  fo r e ign  exchange  r e se rves .
I t  i s  thus  impor tan t  to  no te  tha t  in tegra t ion  i s  des i rab le ,  no t  as  an  end  in
i t s e l f ,  bu t  because  the re  a r e  some  f i e ld s  i n  wh ich  s t a t e s  a r e  t oo  sma l l  t o
be  v iab le  dec i s ion  un i t s  in  the  g loba l i s ing  wor ld .  In  some cases  th i s  i s
because  e f f i c i ency  demands  a  l a rge r  marke t  t han  t he  s t a t e  can  p rov ide ;
in  o the r s  because  sp i l l ove r s  beyond  na t iona l  bounda r i e s  have  become
c r i t i c a l l y  impor t an t ;  and  i n  s t i l l  o the r s  because  t he  sma l l  s t a t e s  c a r ry
l i t t l e  we igh t  on  t he  wor ld  s cene  un l e s s  t hey  ac t  t oge the r .  Where  such
fac to r s  a s  these  ind ica te  the  des i r ab i l i t y  o f  cen t r a l i s ing  dec i s ion -
mak ing ,  i n t eg ra t ion  shou ld  be  encouraged .  Bu t  where  no  such  r a t iona le
ex i s t s ,  c en t r a l i s a t i on  shou ld  be  r e s i s t ed  and  ind iv idua l  coun t r i e s ,  o r
r eg ions ,  shou ld  be  encouraged  to  deve lop  in  the i r  own  ind iv idua l  way .
In i t i a l l y ,  t he  t e rm “mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion”  wi l l  mos t ly  r e f e r  t o  mone ta ry
un ion  in  th i s  d i s se r t a t ion .
1 .2 .  Problem s ta tement
The  cha l l enge  i s  how to  ach ieve  mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion  be tween  coun t r i e s
wi th  s e r ious  economic  and  po l i t i ca l  p rob lems .  Fo r  i n t eg ra t ion  to  be
succes s fu l ,  Af r i can  coun t r i e s  need  t o  pu t  t he i r  houses  i n  o rde r  and  open
up  the i r  economies  ex t e rna l ly  by  r emov ing  the  obs t ac l e s  t o  t r ade  posed
b y  p o o r  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p o l i c i e s ,  t a r i f f s ,  p o o r  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n
in f r a s t ruc tu r e  and  d ive rgen t  r egu l a t i ons .
1 . 3 .  R e s e a r c h  o b j e c t i v e s
The  ma in  ob jec t ive  o f  t he  d i s se r t a t i on  i s  t o  de f ine  and  d i scus s  mone ta ry
in t eg ra t ion  wi th  r e fe rence  to  the  o ld  l i t e r a tu re  and  the  “new”  one  and  to
es t ab l i sh  i t s  r e l evance  to  the  t a sk  a t  hand .
4The  seconda ry  ob j ec t i ve  i s  t o  ana lyse  t he  succes s  o r  t he  f a i l u r e  o f
ex i s t ing  mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion  in  Af r i ca  and  d raw ou t  l e s sons  tha t  w i l l
he lp  the  implemen ta t ion  o f  mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion  in  Eas t  Af r i ca .
The  th i rd  ob jec t ive  i s  t o  r e sea rch  the  f eas ib i l i t y  o f  mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion
in  Eas t  Af r i ca  and  the  benef i t s  and  cos t s  r e l a t ive  to  tha t  in teg ra t ion ,  and
to  iden t i fy  the  coun t r i e s  tha t  a re  p romis ing  to  ga in  o r  to  lo se  f rom
giv ing  up  mone ta ry  independence .
The  fou r th  ob jec t ive  i s  t o  ana lyse  the  s t ages  towards  the  success fu l
implementa t ion  o f  a  mone ta ry  un ion .
1 .4 .  Research  methodo logy
This  d i s se r t a t ion  i s  o f  a  qua l i t a t ive  na tu re ,  i n  the  sense  tha t  l i t e r a tu re
rev iews  wi l l  be  used  to  s tudy  mone ta ry  and  economic  in teg ra t ion .
In t e rp re t a t i ons  o f  h i s to r i ca l  and  cu r r en t  even t s ,  i nc lud ing  quan t i t a t i ve
da ta ,  fo rm the  e s sence  o f  the  s tudy .  In t e rv iews  wi l l  be  ca r r i ed  ou t
toge the r  w i th  s t a f f  o f  Af r i can  r eg iona l  o rgan i sa t i ons  and  d i f f e r en t
cen t r a l  banks  in  Eas t  Af r i ca  to  ob ta in  r eg ion  spec i f i c  i n fo rma t ion  in
o rde r  t o  d i s cus s  t he  r e l evance  and  f ea s ib i l i t y  o f  e conomic  and  mone t a ry
in tegra t ion  in  Eas t  Af r ica .
1 . 5 .  S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  d i s s e r t a t i o n
Chap te r s  two  and  t h r ee  r ev i ew  the  l i t e r a tu r e  on  economic  and  mone t a ry
in t eg ra t i on ,  w i th  spec i f i c  a t t en t i on  t o  t he  t heo ry  o f  op t imum cu r r ency
a reas .  These  chap te r s  examine  the  cos t s  and  bene f i t s  fo r  s t a t e s  o f
jo in ing  an  economic  and  mone ta ry  a r r angemen t .
Chap te r s  four  and  f ive  focus  on  the  ana lys i s  o f  r eg iona l  economic  and
mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion  in  Af r i ca ,  w i th  an  emphas i s  on  the  Eas t  Af r i can
mone ta ry  i n t eg ra t i on ,  wh i l e  chap te r  s i x  d i s cus se s  some  economic
po l i c i e s  r ega rd ing  the  bes t  s t r a t eg ie s  fo r  imp lemen t ing  mone ta ry  un ion .
The  f ina l  chap te r  o f f e r s  some  conc lud ing  r emarks .
51 . 6 .  V a l u e  o f  t h e  d i s s e r t a t i o n
The  ove ra l l  pu rpose  o f  t he  d i s se r t a t ion  i s  t o  enhance  the  unde r s t and ing
and  apprec ia t ion  o f  an  impor tan t  i n t eg ra t ion  a r r angement  in  Eas t  Af r i ca .
Economic  in t eg ra t ion  in  Af r i ca  has  su f fe red  f rom a  t endency  to  be  ove r
ambi t i ous ,  and  fo r  t h i s  r ea son  the  bu i ld ing  o f  an  Eas t  Af r i can  mone ta ry
un ion ,  wh ich  p rov ides  va luab le  l e s sons  f rom pas t ,  ex i s t ing  and
prospec t ive  in t eg ra t ion ,  i s  impor t an t .  Th i s  d i s se r t a t ion  wi l l  t hus  be  o f
use  bo th  to  o the r  academics  in t e re s t ed  in  the  f i e ld  and  a s  a  t oo l  fo r
po l i cy  maker s  invo lved  in  the  a rea  o f  mone ta ry  a r r angemen t  and  po l i cy .
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2 . 1 .  I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economic  in t eg ra t ion  a s  a  t e rm has  o f t en  been  used  in  d i s cus s ion  by
economis t s  a l though  up  to  da te  the re  has  no t  been  a  p rec i se  consensus  a s
to  i t s  mean ing .  Some  au thors  inc lude  soc ia l  in t eg ra t ion  in  the  concep t ;
o the r s  subsume  d i f f e r en t  fo rms  o f  i n t e rna t iona l  coope ra t ion  unde r  t h i s
head ing ,  and  the  a rgumen t  has  a l so  been  advanced  tha t  t he  mere
ex i s t ence  o f  t r ade  r e l a t i ons  be tween  independen t  na t iona l  economies  i s  a
s ign  of  in tegra t ion .
Wol f  (2001)  a rgues  tha t  ne i the r  the  marke t s  fo r  goods  and  se rv ices  nor
the  marke t s  fo r  f ac to r s  o f  p roduc t ion  appea r  more  in t eg ra t ed  today  than
they  were  a  cen tu ry  ago .  He  adds  tha t  cu r ren t  i n t eg ra t ion  i s  un ique  due
to  the  f a l l i ng  cos t s  o f  t r anspor t  and  communica t ion ,  and  l i be ra l i s ing
economic  po l i c i e s .  Shor t - t e rm cap i t a l  t oday  i s  much  more  mob i l e  than
be fo re .  Pub l i c  i n f r a s t ruc tu re  p ro j ec t s  a r e  f i nanced  by  fo re ign  cap i t a l
(Dol la r  & Kraay ,  2002)  and  a  l a rge  p ropor t i on  o f  fo re ign  d i r ec t
inves tment  i s  in  se rv ices  and  manufac tu r ing .  Th is  l eads  to  the  new
concep t  o f  g loba l i s a t i on ,  wh ich  inc ludes  f ac to r s  such  a s  t he  un i f i ca t i on
of  cap i t a l  marke t s ,  t he  i n t e rna t iona l i s a t ion  o f  p roduc t ion  and
d i s t r ibu t ion  ne tworks  and  the  mega- revo lu t ion  in  communica t ion  and
t ranspor t  t echno logy .
Coun t r i e s  and  bus inesses  wi l l  have  to  become  g loba l  p l aye r s  in  o rde r  to
s t ay  compe t i t i ve  and  ach ieve  g rowth  (K o s m i c k i ,  2 0 0 1 ) .  G l o b a l i s a t i o n
has  become  the  mos t  impor t an t  economic ,  po l i t i c a l ,  and  cu l tu ra l
phenomenon  nowadays .  Th i s  s ec t ion  wi l l  f ocus  on  the  de f in i t i on  o f
ce r t a in  t e rms ,  t he  d i f f e r en t  fo rms  o f  i n t e rna t iona l  economic  in t eg ra t ion
and  the  bene f i t s  and  cos t s  invo lved  in  be ing  a  g loba l  p l aye r .
72 . 2 .  E c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  d e f i n e d
Accord ing  to  Ba la s sa  (1961) ,  economic  in t eg ra t ion  i s  bo th  a  p roces s  and
a  s t a t e  a f f a i r .  Rega rded  a s  a  p rocess ,  i t  encompasses  measures  des igned
to  abo l i sh  d i s c r imina t i on  be tween  economic  un i t s  be long ing  t o  d i f f e r en t
na t ion  s t a t e s ;  v i ewed  a s  a  s t a t e  a f f a i r  i t  c an  be  r ep resen ted  by  the
absence  o f  va r ious  fo rms  o f  d i sc r imina t ion  be tween  na t iona l  economies .
A t t empt ing  t o  make  a  more  p rec i s e  de f in i t i on ,  he  p roposes  a  d i s t i nc t i on
be tween  in t eg ra t ion  and  coope ra t ion .  He  con tends  tha t  whereas
coope ra t ion  inc ludes  ac t ions  a imed  a t  l e s sen ing  d i sc r imina t ion ,  t he
process  o f  economic  in t eg ra t ion  compr i ses  measures  tha t  i nc lude  the
supp re s s ion  o f  some  fo rms  o f  d i s c r imina t i on .  Fo r  example ,  i n t e rna t i ona l
ag reemen t s  on  t r ade  po l i c i e s  be long  t o  t he  a r ea  o f  i n t e rna t i ona l
coope ra t ion ,  wh i l e  t he  r emova l  o f  t r ade  ba r r i e r s  i s  an  ac t  o f  economic
in tegra t ion .
Economic  i n t eg ra t i on ,  a l so  o f t en  t e rmed  r eg iona l i sm ,  i s  de f ined  by
Robson  (1998 :1 )  a s  “ the  i n s t i t u t i ona l  combina t i on  o f  s epa ra t e  na t i ona l
economies  i n to  l a rge r  economic  b locs  o r  communi t i e s” .  I t  c an  be  seen  a s
a  me thod  to  p romote  e f f i c i ency  in  r e source  use  on  a  r eg iona l  bas i s .  I t
a l so  i nvo lves  t he  e l imina t ion  o f  a l l  ba r r i e r s  t o  t he  f r ee  movemen t  o f
goods  and  f ac to r s  o f  p roduc t i on  w i th in  t he  i n t eg ra t ed  a r ea .  Robson
(1998 :6 )  p roposes  tha t  i t  can  be  v iewed  as  “a  s t a t e  o r  p rocess  fo r
enab l ing  i t s  pa r t i c ipan t s  to  ach ieve  a  va r i e ty  o f  common goa l s  more
e f f ec t ive ly  by  jo in t  o r  i n t eg ra t ed  ac t ion  than  they  cou ld  by  un i l a t e ra l
measu res” .
In  these  de f in i t ions ,  one  f inds  the  p rocess  o f  in t eg ra t ion  to  be  one
invo lv ing  na t ion-s ta tes ,  which  a re  supposed  to  ac t  in  un i son  fo r  the
pa r t i cu la r  pu rposes  o f  i n t eg ra t ion .  Th i s  w i l l  de f in i t e ly  invo lve  some ,  i f
no t  t o t a l ,  l o s s  o f  sove re ign ty  to  the  ex ten t  o f  the  fo rm o f  economic
in teg ra t ion  invo lved .
I t  shou ld  be  no ted ,  a t  any  r a t e ,  t ha t  r eg iona l  i n t eg ra t ion  migh t  a l so
inc lude  coun t r i e s  wh ich  a re  no t  i n  geograph ica l  p rox imi ty .  Thus ,
8reg iona l  i n t eg ra t i on  a s  a  concep t  may  be  s t r e t ched  fu r the r  t o  cove r  a
va r i e ty  o f  soc io -economic  ac t iv i t i e s  o f  coun t r i e s  wh ich  a r e  no t  so  c lo se
to  each  o the r ,  bu t  wh ich  r ea l i se  the  bene f i t s  o f  mutua l  dependence  and
in te rac t ion .
Reg iona l  in t eg ra t ion  i s  by  no  means  a  subs t i tu t e  fo r  sound  domes t i c
economic  po l i c i e s  and  i s  un l ike ly  to  succeed  in  the i r  absence .  In  o rde r
to  ach ieve  in tegra t ion  one  shou ld  l eave  mat te r s  to  f ree  marke t  fo rces  and
compe t i t i on .  Speed ing  up  economic  in t eg ra t ion  speeds  up  g loba l i sa t ion .
Reg iona l  economic  in t eg ra t i on  can  be  s een  a s  a  r e su l t  o f  economic
g loba l i s a t ion  (K o s m i c k i ,  2 0 0 1 ) .
2 .3 .  G loba l i sa t ion  de f ined
Accord ing  t o  Wood  (2000 :1 ) ,  g loba l i s a t i on  i s  de f ined  a s  “ in t e rna t i ona l
economic  in t eg ra t ion” .  I t  i s  ve ry  o f t en  l i nked  to  co rpora t e  power .  Wol f
(2001)  exp la ins  a  g loba l i s ed  economy as  “one  in  wh ich  ne i the r  d i s t ance
nor  na t iona l  bo rde r s  impede  economic  t r ansac t ions” .  K o s m i c k i  ( 2 0 0 1 )
s t a t e s  t ha t  “g loba l i s a t i on  shou ld  be  unde r s tood  a s  t he  expans ion  o f
in t e r r e l a t ed  economic  and  soc i a l  ac t i v i t y  beyond  na t iona l  bo rde r s  and
towards  more  wor ld -encompass ing  d imens ions” .  He  a l so  s t a t e s :
“g loba l i s a t ion  i s  f r equen t ly  unde r s tood  a s  a  b road  sca l e  l i be ra l i s a t ion
based  on  the  i n t roduc t ion  o f  wor ld - sca l e  marke t  r e l a t i ons ,  t he  abo l i t i on
o f  r e s t r i c t i ons  i n  i n t e rna t iona l  t r ade  and  c r ea t ion  o f  a  s ing l e  g loba l
marke t” .
G loba l i s a t i on  cou ld  be  s een  a s  a  cho i ce  t o  enhance  a  coun t ry ’ s  economic
we l l  be ing  (Wol f ,  2001) .  The  open ing  up  o f  t r ade  and  cap i t a l  f l ows
enr i ches  mos t  c i t i zens  in  the  shor t  run  and  a lmos t  a l l  c i t i zens  in  the
long  run .  I t  i s  fundamen ta l ly  a  commerc ia l  r a the r  t han  a  po l i t i ca l
phenomenon .  G loba l  i n t eg ra t ion  can  a l so  be  v i ewed  a s  a  subs t i t u t e  fo r  a
deve lopmen t  s t r a t egy .  G loba l i s a t ion  i s  a l so  a  p roces s  t ha t  i n t eg ra t e s  a l l
economic  sec to r s  and  economies  in to  one  vas t  g loba l  economy tha t  i s
open  to  a l l  en t r ep reneur i a l  con tende r s  and  i s  i nc lus ive  o f  a l l  coun t r i e s .
92 .4 .  Forms  o f  e conomic  in t egra t ion
To in teg ra t e  independen t  coun t r i e s  in to  a  r eg iona l  marke t  invo lves  a
p rocess  wi th  a  number  o f  d i f f e ren t  s t ages ,  each  more  d i f f i cu l t  t han  the
p rev ious .  Each  s t ep  r equ i r e s  more  l o s s  o f  au tonomy .  The  type  o f
economic  in t eg ra t ion  tha t  may  be  chosen  and  the  ex t en t  t o  wh ich
coun t r i e s  w i l l  be  invo lved  in  t ha t  s cheme  depends  on  many  f ac to r s  such
as  t he  l eve l  o f  economic  deve lopmen t ,  t he  s imi l a r i t y  o f  po l i t i c a l  sy s t ems
and  soc io -cu l tu ra l  va lues  which  a re  l ike ly  to  f ac i l i t a t e  no t  on ly
economic  i n t eg ra t i on  bu t  a l so  i n t eg ra t i on  be tween  peop le s  o f  d i f f e r en t
coun t r i e s  ( Da l t rop ,  1986) .
Usua l ly ,  e conomic  i n t eg ra t i on  i s  conce rned  wi th  t he  d i s c r imina to ry
remova l  o f  a l l  t r ade  imped imen t s  be tween  pa r t i c ipa t ing  coun t r i e s  and
wi th  the  e s t ab l i shmen t  o f  ce r t a in  e l emen t s  o f  coope ra t ion  and
coord ina t ion  be tween  them.  The  f r ee  movement  o f  goods  and  se rv ices
requ i re s  no t  on ly  the  r emova l  o f  t a r i f f s  and  quo tas ,  bu t  a l so  the
e l imina t ion  o f  non- t a r i f f  ba r r i e r s  t ha t  i nc lude  s t a t e  subs id i e s ,  an t i -
compe t i t i ve  bus ines s  s t r a t eg i e s ,  domes t i c  f i s ca l  a r r angemen t s ,
d i s c r imina to ry  pub l i c  pu rchas ing ,  bo rde r  con t ro l s  e t c .
Seve ra l  fo rms  o f  economic  i n t eg ra t i on  may  be  i den t i f i ed  i n  t e rms  o f  a
r eg ion  o r  na t ion ’ s  p rog res s  t owards  economic  in t eg ra t ion ,  wh ich  may  a t
t imes  ove r l ap  bu t  may  no t  necessa r i ly  cons t i t u t e  s t ages  in  a  p rocess .
2 .4 .1 .  S e c t o r i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n
This  invo lves  the  r emova l  o f  ba r r i e r s  t o  t r ade  in  the  ou tpu t  o f  a  s ing le
indus t r i a l  s ec to r .  A  we l l -known example  was  the  e s t ab l i shmen t  o f  a
common marke t  fo r  coa l  and  s t ee l  i n  the  fo rmer  European  Coa l  and  S tee l
Communi ty  (1951) .  The  l a t t e r  i s  now incorpora ted  in to  the  Trea ty  o f
European  Union .  Canada  and  the  Un i t ed  S ta t e s  a l so  had  an  ag reemen t  fo r
sec to r i a l  i n t eg ra t ion ,  i n  wh ich  on ly  a  l imi t ed  number  o f  indus t r i a l
p roduc t s  were  g iven  p re fe ren t i a l  t r ea tmen t .  Th i s  ag reemen t  i s  now pa r t
o f  the  Nor th  Amer ican  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA) .  The  advan tage
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of  such  an  agreement  i s  tha t  i t  bu i lds  up  a  founda t ion  fo r  wider
in tegra t ion .
2 . 4 . 2 .  F r e e  t r a d e  a r e a
In  a  f r ee  t r ade  a rea ,  member  s t a t e s  ag ree  to  r emove  a l l  imped imen t s  to
t r ade ,  t ha t  i s ,  t a r i f f  and  non - t a r i f f  ba r r i e r s ,  among  t hemse lve s  bu t  e ach
re t a ins  the  f r eedom to  de t e rmine  the  l eve l  and  na tu re  o f  t a r i f f s  aga ins t
th i rd  pa r t i e s .  Good  examples  a r e  t he  Nor th  Amer i can  F ree  Trade
Agreemen t  (NAFTA)  and  the  Common  Marke t  fo r  Eas t e rn  and  Sou the rn
Af r i ca  (COMESA) .
In  l e s s  deve loped  coun t r i e s ,  a  f r ee  t r ade  a r ea  runs  t he  r i sk  o f  c r ea t i ng  an
oppor tun i ty  fo r  non-members  t o  t ake  advan tage  o f  t he  wide r  marke t  by
br ing ing  in  the i r  goods  th rough  a  member  s t a t e  wi th  low ta r i f f  r a t e s .  To
ave r t  t h i s  dange r ,  “Ru le s  o f  Or ig in”  a r e  o f t en  u sed  a s  a  dev i ce  t o
uncove r  t he  o r ig in  o f  pa r t i cu l a r  goods  and  whe the r  t hey  a r e  e l i g ib l e  fo r
t a r i f f  r educ t ion .
2 .4 .3 .  Customs  unions
This  fo rm of  in t eg ra t ion  has  some  cha rac te r i s t i c s  o f  a  f r ee  t r ade  a rea  in
the  sense  tha t  member  s t a t e s  ag ree  to  r emove  a l l  r e s t r i c t ions  to  t r ade .
Bu t  they  a l so  have  a  common ex te rna l  t a r i f f  be tween  member  pa r t i e s  to
app ly  a  common  l eve l  o f  p ro t ec t ion  aga ins t  goods  coming  f rom th i rd
coun t r i e s .  The  ex i s t ence  o f  a  common  t a r i f f  wa l l  aga in s t  any  t h i rd
pa r t i e s  makes  the  fo rmula t ion  o f  ru l e s  o f  o r ig in  unnecessa ry .  The
common  ex te rna l  t a r i f f  can  be  s e t  a t  any  des i r ed  l eve l  w i th  t he  pu rpose
o f  max imis ing  the  soc i a l  we l f a r e  o f  t he  pa r t i c ipa t ing  coun t r i e s  a s  a
group .
2 . 4 . 4 .  C o m m o n  m a r k e t
Accord ing  to  Robson  (1998) ,  t h i s  h ighe r  fo rm inc ludes  a  common
ex te rna l  t a r i f f ,  t a r i f f - f r ee  movemen t  o f  goods  and  se rv i ces  and  f r ee
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m o v e m e n t  o f  l a b o u r ,  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n s ,  c a p i t a l  a n d  e n t e r p r i s e .  C o m m o n
marke t s  u sua l l y  have  a  sup ra -na tu ra l  au tho r i t y  whose  dec i s ions  a r e
b ind ing  on  a l l  member  s ta tes .  A  good  example  i s  the  European  Union .
2 . 4 . 5 .  M o n e t a r y  u n i o n
Robson  (1998)  exp la ins  t ha t  t h i s  fo rm o f  r eg iona l  i n t eg ra t ion  r equ i r e s
the  adop t ion  o f  a  s ing le  cu r r ency ,  a  cen t r a l  bank  and  a  mone ta ry  po l i cy .
I t s  fo rma t ion  a l so  r equ i r e s  t he  ha rmon i sa t ion  o f  exchange  r a t e
mechan i sms  and  the  imp lemen ta t ion  o f  s t ruc tu ra l  ad jus tmen t
p rogrammes  wi th  member -coun t r i e s .  The  new cen t ra l  bank  requ i res  an t i -
in f l a t iona ry  c reden t i a l s  and  i s  r e spons ib l e  fo r  po l i cy  coord ina t ion  and
prese rv ing  reg iona l  economic  s t ab i l i ty .  The  Euro- space  i s  a  good
example .
2 .4 .6 .  Economic  and  monetary  un ion
This  i s  a  fo rm o f  i n t eg ra t ion  wi th  a  common  marke t ,  a  common  cu r rency
and  the  in t eg ra t ion  o r  ha rmonisa t ion  o f  a  r ange  o f  po l i c i e s  in  o the r
a r ea s .  The  economic ,  f i nanc i a l  and  soc i a l  po l i c i e s  o f  t he  pa r t i c ipa t i ng
gove rnmen t s  a r e  coo rd ina t ed  t h rough  a  s i ng l e  un i t ,  wh ich  a l so  hand le s
economic  re l a t ions  wi th  o the r  coun t r i e s .  A  common bank  may  o r  may  no t
be  adop ted  t o  con t ro l  t he  supp ly  o f  t he  common  cu r r ency  and  to
de te rmine  the  un ion’ s  in t e res t  r a t e s .  A  good  example  i s  t he  European
Union  wi th  i t s  European  Cen t ra l  Bank  (ECB) .
2 .4 .7 .  C o m p l e t e  e c o n o m i c  u n i o n
Thi s  i s  a  common  marke t  t ha t  i nvo lves  comple t e  un i f i ca t ion  o f  mone ta ry
and  f i s ca l  po l i c i e s .  I n  t h i s  fo rm o f  r eg iona l  i n t eg ra t i on ,  a  con t ro l  o rgan
i s  i n t roduced  to  exe rc i se  au thor i ty  ove r  mone ta ry  and  f i s ca l  po l i c i e s  so
tha t  member  s t a t e s  e f fec t ive ly  become  reg ions  o f  one  na t ion .
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2 .4 .8 .  Comple te  economic  and  po l i t i ca l  in t egra t ion
In  th i s  case ,  members  o f  the  un ion  v i r tua l ly  become one  na t ion .  The
cen t r a l  au tho r i ty  t ha t  i s  c r ea t ed  fo r  ove r see ing  mone ta ry  and  f i s ca l
po l i c i e s  does  no t  j u s t  end  a t  t h i s  bu t  i s  a l so  answerab le  t o  a  cen t r a l
pa r l i amen t ,  wh ich  exe rc i se s  the  sove re ign ty  o f  a  na t ion ’ s  gove rnmen t .
Th i s  i s  in  f ac t  the  h ighes t  fo rm of  r eg iona l  economic  in tegra t ion .
2 .5 .  Advantages  and  prob lems  o f  e conomic  in tegra t ion
Accord ing  to  i n t e rna t iona l  t r ade  t heo ry ,  t he  advan tages  o f  economic
in t eg ra t ion  a re  r e l a t ed  to  i nc reased  p roduc t iv i ty  and  e f f i c i ency .
Inc reased  marke t  s i ze  wou ld  f ac i l i t a t e  t he  expans ion  o f  p roduc t ion ,
based  on  economies  o f  s ca l e ,  spec ia l i s a t ion ,  and  compara t ive
advan tages .  However ,  one  o f  t he  p rob lems  o f  economic  in t eg ra t ion  i s
t ha t  t a r i f f  r educ t ion  may  no t  neces sa r i l y  con fe r  t r ade  p re f e r ences  on
pa r tne r  s t a t e s .  Ano the r  p rob lem i s  r e l a t ed  to  unequa l  d i s t r i bu t ion  o f
cos t s  and  bene f i t s  among  member  coun t r i e s .  Then ,  pa r t i c ipa t ion  in
economic  in t eg ra t ion  wi l l  depend  on  the  we igh t  t ha t  can  be  g iven  to  i t s
advan tages  o r  p rob lems  and  wi l l  d i f f e r  f rom coun t ry  to  coun t ry .
2 . 5 . 1 .  A d v a n t a g e s  o f  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n
Advan tages  o f  e conomic  i n t eg ra t i on  can  be  summar i s ed  a s  fo l l ows :
·  More  e f f i c i en t  d iv i s i on  and  a l l oca t i on  o f  c ap i t a l  and  l abou r  be tween
member  coun t r i e s ,  wh ich  shou ld  make  the  in teg ra ted  economy more
compe t i t i ve  in t e rna t iona l ly ,  w i th  modes t  i n t e re s t  r a t e s ,  a  f i rm
cur rency  and  low in f la t ion .
·  Grea t e r  cu r r ency  s t ab i l i t y  s imp l i f i e s  bus ine s s  dec i s i on -mak ing .
·  A s ing le  cu r r ency  wi l l  improve  mone ta ry  coope ra t ion  in  t he  bank ing
sec to r s ,  l ead ing  to  more  e f f i c i en t  paymen t s  and  c l ea r ing  sys t ems .
·  The  bene f i t s  o f  a  cu r r ency  t ha t  becomes  an  i n t e rna t i ona l  med ium o f
exchange  a re :  g rea te r  l i qu id i ty ,  a  lower  cos t  o f  cap i t a l ,  t he
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e l imina t ion  o f  cu r rency  r i sk ,  h ighe r  r e tu rns  fo r  domes t i c  save r s ,  and
se ignorage  fees  fo r  the  na t iona l  government .
·  Reduced  inves to r  r i sk  th rough  d ive r s i f i ca t ion .
·  A broade r  cho ice  o f  p roduc t s  and  t echno logy .
·  A reduc t ion  o f  dependence  on  p r imary  p roduc t  expor t s  fo r
deve lop ing  coun t r i e s ,  due  to  an  inc rease  in  the  number
manufac tu r ing  indus t r i e s .
·  Improved  a l loca t ion  o f  r e sou rces  and  h ighe r  l i v ing  s t anda rds ,  due  to
inc reased  inves tmen t ,  j ob  c rea t ion ,  and  g rowth .  H ighe r  g rowth  r a t e s
in  deve lop ing  coun t r i e s  have  t r ans la t ed  in to  h igher  incomes  fo r  the
poor .
·  Cos t  sav ings  tha t  wi l l  be  ga ined  th rough  no t  us ing  severa l  cu r renc ies
and  hav ing  to  conve r t  t hem a t  d i f f e r en t  pa r i t i e s .  Movemen t s  i n
exchange  r a t e s  wi l l  no t  a f f ec t  bus iness  t r ansac t ions  wi th in  the
communi ty .
·  I t  c r ea t e s  compe t i t i on  among  gove rnmen t s .  Coun t r i e s  w i th
uncompe t i t i ve  economies  w i l l  no t  su rv ive ,  a s  shown  by  the  f a t e  o f
the  USSR (Wol f ,  2001) .  Th i s  compe t i t i on  p reven t s  gove rnmen t s  f rom
be ing  au toc ra t i c  and  inc reases  t he  i ncen t ive  t o  p rov ide  s e rv i ce s
va lued  by  t axpaye r s .  Any  spec i f i c  deg ree  o f  i n t e rna t i ona l  i n t eg ra t i on
imposes  cons t r a in t s  on  the  ab i l i t y  o f  government s  to  t ax ,  r ed i s t r ibu te
income ,  and  in f luence  mac roeconomic  cond i t i ons .
·  Transpa rency  in  t r ad ing  unde r  an  economic  and  mone ta ry  un ion
shou ld  l ead  to  p r i ce  homogen i sa t ion  and  in  genera l  to  a  r educ t ion  in
pr ice  l eve l s .
·  Financ ia l  mi sbehav iou r  by  member  s t a t e s  w i l l  be  r educed ,  because
they  wi l l  no  longer  have  con t ro l  over  the i r  mone ta ry  po l i cy .
·  Economic  in t eg ra t ion  magn i f i e s  the  d i f f e rence  be tween  good  and  bad
coun t r i e s .
·  In t e rna t iona l  economic  in t eg ra t ion  acce l e ra t e s  t he  marke t ’ s
r e sponses  t o  po l i cy  by  inc reas ing  the  r ange  o f  a l t e rna t ive  op t ions
ava i l ab l e  t o  t hose  a f f ec t ed .  Fo r  example ,  a  gove rnmen t  c an  pu r sue  an
in f l a t i ona ry  po l i cy  ove r  a  l ong  pe r iod  and  boos t  t he  economy,  bu t  i f
a  coun t ry  i s  open  to  in t e rna t iona l  cap i t a l  f lows ,  the  r eac t ion  o f  the
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coun t ry ’ s  c r ed i to r s  i s  more  b ru t a l .  Th i s  r e sponse  w i l l  o f t en  show
i t se l f  in  a  co l l aps ing  exchange  ra t e ,  a s  happened  in  Eas t  As ia  in  1997
and  1998  (Wol f ,  2001) .
·  I t  enhances  t he  common  we l f a r e ,  a s  can  be  s een  wi th  t he  European
in t eg ra t ion .  The  inc reased  marke t  sha re  t ha t  accompan ie s  t r ade
expans ion  may  enab le  more  p roduc t s  t o  be  p roduced  p ro f i t ab ly ,  so
genera t ing  inc reased  we l fa re  ga ins  f rom inc reased  p roduc t  d ive r s i ty .
·  A reg ion’ s  in f ra s t ruc tu re  may  be  improved ,  fo r  example  t r anspor t
sys t ems .
2 . 5 . 2 .  P r o b l e m s  o f  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n
·  The  r educ t ion  o f  t a r i f f s  among  member s  o f  a  r eg iona l  economic
a r r angemen t ,  wh i l e  ma in t a in ing  h ighe r  t a r i f f s  fo r  t h i rd  coun t ry
impor t s ,  w i l l  p roduce  t r ade  p re fe rences  i f  t a r i f f s  i nc lus ive  o f  impor t
p r i ce s  a r e  t he  e f f ec t ive  de t e rminan t  o f  impor t  sou rc ing .  Howeve r ,  i n
many  coun t r i e s  domes t i c  cu r r enc i e s  a r e  no t  conve r t i b l e  and  sou rc ing
of  impor t s  depends  more  on  secur ing  impor t  l i cences  and  fo re ign
exchange  a l l oca t ion  (Wor ld  Bank ,  1991) .
·  The  fo rma t ion  o f  a  cus toms  un ion  wi th  a  h ighe r  common  ex te rna l
t a r i f f  may  be  used  to  suppor t  impor t - subs t i tu t ing  indus t r i a l i sa t ion  a t
the  r eg iona l  l eve l  ( t r ade  d ive r s ion ) .
·  In  economic  in t eg ra t ion  a s  a  cus toms  un ion ,  t he  l a t t e r  w i l l  con fe r
more  bene f i t s  on  the  more  deve loped  member  coun t r i e s ,  wh ich  wi l l
a t t r ac t  i nc reased  inves tmen t  in  manufac tu r ing .  The  l e s s  deve loped
member  coun t r i e s  may  su f fe r  f rom a  lower  l eve l  o f  indus t r i a l
deve lopmen t  because  mos t  o f  t he  manufac tu red  consumer  goods  wi l l
be  supp l i ed  by  the  more  advanced  member  coun t r i e s .
·  In  Af r i ca ,  cus toms  du t i e s  accoun t  fo r  a  l a rge  pe rcen tage  o f  t o t a l
gove rnmen t  r evenues .  La rge - sca l e  t r ade  d ive r s ion  unde r  a
p re fe ren t i a l  t r ade  a r r angemen t  may  d ra s t i ca l ly  r educe  gove rnmen t
revenues ,  wh ich  may  no t  eas i ly  be  r ecouped  by  o the r  t ax  measures .
·  The  f r ee  movemen t  o f  goods  and  se rv i ces  makes  the  r egu la t ion  o f
cap i t a l  f lows  more  d i f f i cu l t ,  bu t  no t  imposs ib le .  I t  i s  becoming
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inc reas ing ly  more  d i f f i cu l t  t o  co l l ec t  i n fo rma t ion  on  income  and
spend ing .  Th i s  impac t s  on  t ax  co l l ec t ion .
·  Curren t ly ,  g loba l  power  l i e s  in  the  hands  o f  economic  g ian t s  tha t
fo rce  the  weaker  g loba l  p l aye r s  to  accep t  so lu t ions  tha t  a re  no t
op t ima l ly  su i t ed  to  the i r  needs ,  wh i l e  the  s t ronger  p l aye r s  a re  more
succes s fu l  i n  push ing  t he i r  demands  t h rough .  I nc r ea s ing  r egu l a to ry
measures ,  improv ing  l eg i s l a t ion ,  and  in t roduc ing  more  democracy  to
in te rna t iona l  r e l a t ions  may  he lp  to  so lve  th i s  p rob lem.
·  In te rna t iona l  economic  in teg ra t ion  i s  be l i eved  to  l ead  to  the  fu r the r
impove r i shmen t  o f  many  poor  r eg ions .  Pove r ty  i s  a  mu l t i d imens iona l
phenomenon ,  encompass ing  no t  on ly  a  l ack  o f  adequa te  income ,  bu t
a l so  a  l ack  o f  acces s  t o  bas i c  soc i a l  s e rv i ce s  and  gene ra l  soc i a l
exc lus ion .  Dol l a r  and  K r a a y  ( 2 0 0 2 )  s t a t e  t h a t  t h o s e  g l o b a l i s a t i o n
measures  such  a s  t r ade  and  inves tmen t  f lows  a re  no t  sys t ema t i ca l ly
l inked  to  income inequa l i ty  wi th in  economies .  Th i s  l eads  to  the
deba te  a s  to  whe the r  g loba l i sa t ion  i s  l ead ing  to  the  c rea t ion  o f  a  new
wor ld  where  peop le  a r e  den ied  acces s  t o  t he  bene f i t s  o f  t he  new
globa l  economy.
·  A coun t ry  may  a l so  expe r i ence  t he  po t en t i a l  l o s s  o f  po l i t i c a l
sove re ign ty  ove r  ce r t a in  i s sues  such  a s  t he  fu tu re  d i r ec t i on  o f
in t e re s t  r a t e s ,  nomina l  exchange  r a t e  ad jus tmen t s ,  t axa t ion  and
spend ing  p rog rammes .
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CHAPTER III.  THEORY OF MONETARY INTEGRATION
3 . 1 .  O p t i m u m  C u r r e n c y  A r e a s  ( O C A )
The  ra t iona le  fo r  any  mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion  i s  p rov ided  by  the  gene ra l
f r amework  o f  t he  t heo ry  o f  op t imum cu r r ency  a r ea  (Munde l  1961) .
Accord ing  to  Gando l fo  (1995) ,  t h i s  compr i se s  a  g roup  o f  coun t r i e s
which  have  a  common cur rency  ( in  which  case  fu l l  mone ta ry  in tegra t ion
preva i l s )  o r  wh ich ,  t hough  ma in ta in ing  d i f f e ren t  na t iona l  cu r renc ie s ,
have  pe rmanen t ly  and  r ig id ly  f ixed  exchange  r a t e s  among  themse lves
and  fu l l  conve r t i b i l i t y  o f  t he  r e spec t ive  cu r r enc i e s  i n to  one  ano the r ;
in s t ead ,  t he  exchange  r a t e s  v i s - à -v i s  non  pa r tne r  coun t r i e s  a re  f l ex ib le .
T h e  p r o b l e m  c o n s i s t s  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  o p t i m u m  d o m a i n  o f  a  c u r r e n c y
a rea  and ,  spec i f i c a l l y ,  whe the r  t he  adhes ion  o f  a  coun t ry  t o  a  cu r r ency
area  ( to  be  se t  up  o r  a l r eady  ex i s t ing)  o r  i t s  r emain ing  in  one  i s
benef ic ia l .
The  op t imum in  cu r r ency  pa r t i c ipa t ion  i s  de f ined  by  MacKinnon  (1963)
as  a  s ing le  cu r rency  a rea  wi th in  wh ich  mone ta ry - f i s ca l  po l i cy  and
f l ex ib l e  ex t e rna l  exchange  r a t e  can  be  u sed  t o  g ive  t he  bes t  r e so lu t i on  o f
th r ee  ( some t imes  con f l i c t i ng )  ob j ec t i ve s :  ( 1 )  t he  ma in t enance  o f  f u l l
employmen t ;  (2 )  t he  ma in t enance  o f  ba l anced  in t e rna t iona l  paymen t s ;
(3 )  t he  ma in tenance  o f  a  s t ab le  in t e rna l  ave rage  p r i ce  l eve l .  However ,
j o in t  cons ide ra t ion  o f  a l l  t h r ee  ob jec t ives  i s  no t  u sua l ly  ca r r i ed  ou t .
T h e r e  a r e  t w o  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  t h e  s t u d y  o f  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  o p t i m u m  c u r r e n c y
areas .  The  f i r s t  i s  t he  t r ad i t iona l  approach ,  wh ich  a t t empts  to  s ing le  ou t
one  o r  more  cha rac te r i s t i c s  o f  a  r eg ion  tha t  wou ld  ind ica te  the
des i r ab i l i t y  o r  p re fe rab i l i t y  o f  a  cu r rency  a rea  encompass ing  tha t  r eg ion .
The  second  i s  t he  cos t -bene f i t  app roach ,  wh ich  be l i eves  t ha t
pa r t i c ipa t ion  in  a  cu r rency  a rea  has  bo th  bene f i t s  and  cos t s ,  so  tha t
op t ima l i t y  has  t o  be  eva lua t ed  by  a  cos t -bene f i t  ana lys i s .
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This  chap te r  wi l l  dea l  wi th  the  two  approaches  in  two  sec t ions .  The
rema inde r  o f  t he  chap te r  examines  t he  cos t s  and  bene f i t s ,  compared .
3 .1 .1 .  T h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h
In  t he  t r ad i t i ona l  app roach ,  d i f f e r en t  au tho r s  have  s ing l ed  ou t  s eve ra l
c r i t e r i a  a s  c ruc ia l  fo r  a  r eg ion  to  be  an  op t imum cur rency  a rea .
3 . 1 . 1 . 1 .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  f a c t o r  m o b i l i t y
Professor  Munde l  (1961)  was  the  f i r s t  wr i t e r  to  pe rce ive  the  key  e lement
o f  an  op t imum cur rency  a rea  a s  be ing  a  h igh  degree  o f  f ac to r  mob i l i t y .
Coun t r i e s  be tween  which  th i s  mob i l i t y  i s  h igh  can  pa r t i c ipa te  in  a
cu r r ency  a r ea ,  wh i l s t  exchange  r a t e s  shou ld  be  f l ex ib l e  be tween
coun t r i e s  wi th  low fac to r  mobi l i ty  be tween  them.  Assume ,  fo r  example ,
tha t  t he re  i s  a  dec l ine  in  the  expor t s  o f  a  r eg ion  to  the  r e s t  o f  t he  same
coun t ry  because  o f  a  f a l l  i n  the  demand  by  the  r e s t  o f  the  coun t ry  fo r  the
ou tpu t  o f  an  indus t ry  loca ted  in  tha t  r eg ion .  The  reg ion’s  income and
consumpt ion  dec rease  and ,  t o  ea se  the  t r ans i t i on  to  a  s i t ua t ion  o f  l ower
rea l  income,  i t  i s  necessa ry  fo r  the  reg ion  to  ob ta in  ou t s ide  f inanc ing  to
be  ab le  to  consume  more  than  the  va lue  o f  i t s  ou tpu t  (h igh  mob i l i t y  o f
cap i t a l ,  pos s ib ly  s t imu la t ed  by  po l i cy  i n t e rven t ion ) .  Fu r the rmore ,  t he
unemployed  worke r s  can  move  to  o the r  r eg ions  and  f ind  a  job  the re
(h igh  mob i l i t y  o f  l abour ) .  A  s imi l a r  p rocess  wou ld  t ake  p l ace  a t  t he
in te rna t iona l  l eve l .  I t  i s  a l so  c l ea r  tha t ,  i n  the  absence  o f  the  pos tu la t ed
fac to r  mob i l i t y ,  t he  e l imina t ion  o f  t he  imba lances  desc r ibed  above
wou ld  r equ i r e  exchange  r a t e  va r i a t i ons .
However ,  t he  u se fu lnes s  o f  f ac to r  mob i l i t y  a s  an  ad jus tmen t  mechan i sm
is  doub ted  by  Lany i  (1969)  and  Corden  (1972)  among  o the r s .  The i r  ma in
ob jec t ion  i s  an  impor t an t  and  somewha t  obv ious  one :  t ha t  l abour  i s
s imp ly  no t  mob i l e  ove r  any  cons ide rab le  d i s t ance ,  even  wi th in  coun t r i e s ,
and  canno t  be  expec t ed  t o  become  so  i n  t he  nea r  fu tu re .  Con t inen t s ,  even
reg ions ,  a r e  t oo  cu l tu r a l l y ,  r ac i a l l y ,  and  c l ima t i ca l l y  d ive r se  t o  pe rmi t
18
th i s .  These  wr i t e r s  a rgue  in s t ead  tha t  economic  ad jus tmen t  by  exchange
ra te  change  o r  macroeconomic  po l i cy  i s  s t i l l  f a r  more  v iab le .
3 .1 .1 .2 .  Degree  o f  openness
Accord ing  to  MacKinnon  (1963 ) ,  t he  deg ree  o f  opennes s  o f  an  economy
i s  measu red  by  the  r e l a t i ve  impor t ance  o f  t he  s ec to r s  p roduc ing
in t e rna t iona l ly  t r aded  goods  o r  t r adab le  (bo th  expor t ab le  and
impor t ab le )  goods  and  the  sec to r s  p roduc ing  non- t r aded  goods .  A
coun t ry  where  t r aded  goods  a r e  a  h igh  p ropor t ion  o f  t o t a l  domes t i c
ou tpu t  can  p ro f i t ab ly  pa r t i c ipa te  in  a  cu r rency  a rea ,  wh i l s t  i t  shou ld
adop t  f l ex ib le  exchange  r a t e s  in  the  oppos i t e  case .  Assume  tha t  a  h igh ly
open  economy  incu r s  a  ba l ance  o f  paymen t s  de f i c i t :  i f  t h i s  i s  cu red  by
an  exchange  r a t e  dep rec i a t i on ,  t he  change  in  r e l a t i ve  p r i ce s  w i l l  c ause
resources  to  move  f rom the  non- t raded  goods  sec to r  to  the  t r aded  goods
sec to r ,  so  as  to  mee t  the  inc reased  ( fo re ign)  demand  fo r  expor t s  and  the
h igher  (domes t i c )  demand  fo r  impor t  subs t i tu tes .  Th i s  impl ies  huge
d i s tu rbances  ( amongs t  wh ich  a re  poss ib l e  in f l a t iona ry  e f f ec t s )  i n  the
non- t r aded  goods  sec to r  because  o f  i t s  r e l a t i ve  sma l lnes s .  In  t h i s
s i tua t ion  i t  wou ld  be  more  e f fec t ive  to  adop t  f ixed  exchange  ra te s  and
expend i tu re - r educ ing  po l i c i e s ,  wh ich  r educe  impor t s ,  and  to  f r ee  fo r
expor t a t i on  a  su f f i c i en t  amoun t  o f  expo r t ab l e  goods ,  p r ev ious ly
consumed  domes t i ca l l y .
Argumen t s  aga ins t  t he se  c r i t e r i a  fo r  t he  deg ree  o f  openness  a r e  adduced
by  Mach lup  (1966) .  He  po in t s  ou t  t ha t  openness  r educes  t he  employmen t
impac t  o f  t i gh t  f i nanc ia l  po l i cy  and  thus  ju s t i f i e s  po l i cy  ad jus tmen t
r a the r  t han  exchange  r a t e  ad ju s tmen t  t o  d i s tu rbances .  T igh t  po l i cy
a f fec t s  impor t  demand  more  a s  openness  inc reases  and  thus  f ewer  o f  the
nega t ive  e f f ec t s  o f  t he  de f l a t ion  a re  f e l t  l oca l ly .  In s t ead ,  t he  t i gh t
po l i cy  i s  t r ans l a t ed  i n to  an  e f f ec t i ve  ba l ance  o f  paymen t s  (BOP)
ad jus tmen t .
Tower  and  Wi l l e t t  (1976)  d i scuss  th ree  r easons  why  deva lua t ion  wou ld
inc rease  expend i tu re  and  thus ,  t h rough  the  mul t ip l i e r ,  nu l l i fy  i t s  BOP
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ef fec t .  F i r s t ly ,  they  a rgue  tha t  loca l  wea l th  wi l l  inc rease  more  fo r
deva lua t ion ,  the  g rea te r  the  l eve l  o f  openness  i s .  Th i s  fo l lows  f rom the
fac t  tha t  wea l th  ho lders  in  open  coun t r i es  a re  l ike ly  to  ho ld  a  l a rger
p ropor t ion  o f  fo re ign  a s se t s  t han  o the rwise ,  t o  min imise  the  r i sks
invo lved  i n  t he  pu rchas ing  power  f l uc tua t i ons  common  to  open
economies .  Second ly ,  wea l t h  w i l l  a l so  i nc r ea se  a f t e r  deva lua t i on  t h rough
the  e f f ec t  o f  deva lua t i on  on  t he  s t ock  o f  phys i ca l  c ap i t a l ,  t h e  va lue  o f
which  wi l l  r i se  i f  i t  i s  mos t ly  impor ted .  These  e f fec t s  o f  wea l th  can  be
expec ted  to  s t imu la t e  expend i tu re  r ega rd ing  any  BOP improvemen t .
F ina l l y ,  Tower  and  Wi l l e t t  po in t  ou t  t ha t  i nves tmen t  expend i tu r e  can
a l so  be  expec ted  to  r i s e  a f t e r  a  deva lua t ion  i f  impor t ed  inves tmen t  goods
make  up  a  l a rge  p ropor t ion  o f  inves tmen t s  and  i f  i nves tmen t  p l ans  a re
re la t ive ly  f ixed .
M c K i n n o n ’ s  a r g u m e n t  h a s  b e e n  c r i t i c i s e d  o n  t w o  p o i n t s .  F i r s t l y ,  C o r d e n
(1972)  a rgues  tha t  McKinnon’s  idea  o f  the  p r i ce  ins t ab i l i ty  o f  exchange
ra t e  va r i a t ion  i s  cond i t iona l  on  the  a s sumpt ion  o f  ex te rna l ,  o r  wor ld
p r i ce  s t ab i l i t y .  I f  p r i ce  in s t ab i l i t y  i s  t he  case  then  f l ex ib l e  r a t e s  a re
more  des i r ab l e .  Second ly ,  McKinnon  has  no t  demons t r a t ed  tha t  t he re  i s  a
pos i t i ve  ga in  in  adop t ing  f ixed  exchange  r a t e ,  on ly  tha t  t he  cos t  o f  i t s
adopt ion  i s  l e ss .
3 . 1 . 1 . 3 .  P r o d u c t  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n
A coun t ry  wi th  h igh  p roduc t  d ive r s i f i ca t ion  wi l l  a l so  expor t  a  w ide
r a n g e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p r o d u c t s .  I f  t h e  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  e v e n t s  w h i c h
in f luence  the  who le  r ange  o f  expor t s  ( fo r  example  a  gene ra l i s ed
in f l a t ion  wh ich  causes  t he  p r i ce s  o f  a l l  domes t i ca l ly  p roduced  goods  to
inc rease )  a r e  exc luded ,  i n  t he  no rma l  cou r se  o f  even t s  commodi t i e s  w i th
a  good  o r  exce l l en t  expor t  pe r fo rmance  wi l l  ex i s t  be s ide  commodi t i e s
wi th  a  poo r  expo r t  pe r fo rmance .  I t  i s  s e l f - ev iden t  t ha t  t he se  o f f s e t t i ng
e f fec t s  w i l l  be  ve ry  f eeb le  o r  wi l l  no t  occur  a t  a l l  when  expor t s  a re
concen t ra ted  in  a  ve ry  l imi ted  number  o f  commodi t i e s .  On  average ,  the
to ta l  expor t s  o f  a  coun t ry  wi th  a  h igh  p roduc t  d ive r s i f i ca t ion  wi l l  be
more  s t ab le  than  those  o f  a  coun t ry  wi th  a  low one .  S ince  the  va r i a t ions
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in  expor t s  i n f luence  the  ba lance  o f  paymen t s  and  so  -  ce t e r i s  par ibus  -
g ive  r i s e  t o  p r e s su re s  on  t he  exchange  r a t e ,  i t  f o l l ows  t ha t  a  coun t ry
wi th  h igh  p roduc t  d ive rs i f i ca t ion  wi l l  have  a  l e s se r  need  fo r  exchange
ra t e  changes  and  so  w i l l  be  ab l e  t o  t o l e r a t e  f i xed  exchange  r a t e s ,  wh i l s t
the  con t ra ry  ho lds  fo r  a  coun t ry  hav ing  low p roduc t  d ive r s i f i ca t ion .
3 .1 .1 .4 .  F i n a n c i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n
This  pa r t i a l ly  ove r l aps  wi th  the  c r i t e r i a  o f  i n t e rna t iona l  f ac to r  mob i l i t y ,
bu t  i s  e spec i a l ly  conce rned  wi th  cap i t a l  f l ows  a s  an  equ i l i b ra t ing
e lemen t  o f  paymen t s  imba lances .  I f  t he re  i s  a  h igh  degree  o f
in t e rna t iona l  f inanc ia l  i n t eg ra t ion ,  no  need  wi l l  ex i s t  fo r  exchange  r a t e
changes  i n  o rde r  t o  r e s to re  ex t e rna l  equ i l i b r ium,  because  s l i gh t  changes
( in  the  appropr i a t e  d i r ec t ion )  i n  i n t e re s t  r a t e s  w i l l  g ive  r i s e  t o  e f f i c i en t
exchange  r a t e s  w i th in  the  a rea  where  f inanc ia l  i n t eg ra t ion  ex i s t s .  I t  goes
wi thou t  s ay ing  tha t  a  cond i t ion  fo r  f inanc ia l  i n t eg ra t ion  i s  t he
e l im ina t i on  o f  a l l  k inds  o f  r e s t r i c t i ons  on  i n t e rna t i ona l  c ap i t a l
m o v e m e n t s .  S c i t o v s k y  ( 1 9 6 9 )  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a d j u s t m e n t  i s  a c h i e v e d  b y
wea l th  t r ans fe r r a l  l e s s  pa in fu l ly  when  the  deg ree  o f  cap i t a l  mob i l i t y  i s
h ighe r .  Th i s  i s  because  the  t r ans fe r  o f  a s se t s  r equ i red  to  co r rec t
imba lances  i s  ach ieved  wi th  f ewer  p r i ce  and  in t e re s t  r a t e  ad jus tmen t s  in
e i ther  count ry .
Fur the r ,  Ing ram (1973)  spec i f i e s  tha t  in t eg ra t ion  shou ld  app ly  to  long-
t e rm secur i t i e s  i f  t h i s  means  o f  ad jus tmen t  i s  t o  have  any  mean ingfu l
e f fec t .  I f  cap i t a l  f lows  a re  mos t ly  shor t - t e rm,  the  reg ion  wi l l  l ack  the
fundamen ta l  a s se t  marke t  s t ruc tu re  r equ i r ed  t o  p roduce  mean ing fu l
cap i t a l  f l ow  ad jus tmen t ,  s i nce  sho r t - t e rm secu r i t i e s  a r e  t r ans fe r r ed  too
read i ly  and  ho ld ing  them depends  on  shor t  run  in t e res t  r a t e  f luc tua t ions .
Thus  the re  may  ex i s t  no  t rue  l i nk  be tween  the  a s se t  marke t s  o f
coun t r i e s ,  a lbe i t  t ha t  sho r t - t e rm in t eg ra t ion  i s  appa ren t .
The  c r i t e r ion  o f  f inanc ia l  i n t eg ra t ion  i s  no t  accep ted  by  a l l  a s  a
compe l l ing  r eason  fo r  t he  fo rma t ion  o f  cu r r ency  a rea .  F l eming  (1971)
a rgues  tha t  under  a  f ixed  exchange  r a t e  and  in  the  absence  o f  exchange
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con t ro l ,  h igh  cap i t a l  mob i l i ty  may  l ead  to  ha rmfu l  specu la t ive  shor t -
t e rm  cap i t a l  f l ows ,  wh ich  agg rava t e  i n f l a t i on  o r  dep re s s ion  cond i t i ons .
Th i s  wi l l  be  the  case  where  changes  in  des i r ed  inves tmen t  exceed  o r  f a l l
sho r t  o f  changes  in  des i r ed  sav ing ,  exace rba t ing  in f l a t iona ry  o r  demand
de f i c i en t  cond i t i ons .  I sh iyama  (1975 )  po in t s  ou t  a  f u r t he r  p rob l em wi th
cap i t a l  f l ow  ad jus tmen t :  t ha t  o f  t he  pos s ib i l i t y  o f  a  l ack  o f  enough
accep tab le  a s se t s  t o  enab le  cap i t a l  f l ows  o f  t he  r equ i r ed  magn i tude .
3 . 1 . 1 . 5 .  I n t e r  r e g i o n a l  p r i c e  a n d  w a g e  f l e x i b i l i t y
In  t he  p r e sence  o f  exchange  r a t e  f l ex ib i l i t y ,  some  o the r  me thod  o f
re l a t ive  r ea l  i ncome  ad jus tmen t  i s  r equ i red  to  p romote  payment
ad jus tmen t .  Cap i t a l  mob i l i t y  has  a l r eady  been  examined  a s  one  me thod ,
and  l abour  migra t ion  i s  an  ind i rec t  way  o f  ach iev ing  the  same  th ing .
Tower  and  Wi l l e t t  (1976)  sugges t  t ha t  t h rough  encourag ing  wage  and
pr i ce  f l ex ib i l i t y  ac ross  r eg ions ,  i t  i s  poss ib l e  to  e f f ec t  a  change
( inc rea se  o r  dec rease )  i n  t he  r ea l  i ncome  o f  a  r eg ion  r e l a t i ve  t o  ano the r
wi thou t  chang ing  the  apparen t  r ea l  income  wi th in  the  a rea ,  t hus
min imis ing  the  consumpt ion  and  employmen t  cos t s .  The  r e l a t i ve  change
in  rea l  income wi l l  fo rce  a  change  in  impor t  expend i tu re ,  co r rec t ing  the
paymen t s  imba lance  i n  t he  des i r ed  d i r ec t i on .  Fo r  example ,  a  wor sen ing
t r ade  ba l ance  due  t o  dec l i n ing  expo r t  s ec to r  demand  wi l l  be  f avou rab ly
reduced  i f  p r i ces  r a the r  than  ou tpu t s  in  the  expor t  s ec to r  d rop  and
t r ans l a t e  t h rough  to  t he  r e s t  o f  t he  economy as  a  dec l ine  in  agg rega te
demand  ( th rough  the  e f f ec t s  o f  expor t  s ec to r  wage  r educ t ions ) .  The
dec l ine  in  aggrega te  demand  wi l l  t hen ,  i t  i s  hoped ,  e f fec t  a  r educ t ion  in
impor t s ,  a l t hough  impor t s  need  no t  dec l ine  by  a s  such  a s  the  in i t i a l
imba lance  i f  fo re ign  expor t  demand  i s  r ea sonab ly  e l a s t i c  ( s ince  pa r t  o f
the  de f i c i t  w i l l  be  r emoved  by  the  inc rease  in  expor t  demand) .
3 . 1 . 1 . 6 .  S i m i l a r i t y  i n  r a t e s  o f  i n f l a t i o n
Very  d i f f e ren t  i n f l a t ion  r a t e s  do ,  i n  f ac t ,  cause  apprec iab le  va r i a t ions  in
t e rms  o f  t r ade  and  so ,  i n so fa r  a s  these  in f luence  the  f lows  o f  goods ,  g ive
r i s e  t o  cu r r en t - accoun t  d i s equ i l i b r i a ,  wh ich  may  r equ i r e  t he  o f f se t t i ng  o f
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exchange  r a t e  va r i a t ions .  When  on  the  con t r a ry ,  t he  r a t e s  o f  i n f l a t ion  a re
iden t i ca l  o r  ve ry  s imi la r  the re  wi l l  be  no  e f fec t  on  the  t e rms  o f  t r ade  and
s o  -  ce ter i s  par ibus  -  an  equ i l i b r a t ed  f l ow o f  cu r r en t - accoun t
t r ansac t ions  wi l l  t ake  p l ace  (wi th  f ixed  exchange  r a t e s )  w i th in  the  a rea .
Whi le  the  log ic  beh ind  s imi la r i ty  in  r a t e s  o f  in f l a t ion  i s  compe l l ing ,  i t
may  no t  be  an  impor t an t  one  i f  i n f l a t ion  r a t e  equa l i sa t ion  i s  r e l a t ive ly
eas i ly  ach ieved ,  a s  i s  sugges t ed  by  Pa rk in  (1972) .  Pa rk in  a rgues  tha t  t he
p r imary  cause  o f  i n f l a t i on  r a t e  d ive rgence  i s  d i f f e r en t i a l  mone ta ry
expans ion  and ,  s ince  he  be l i eves  in  a  h igh  l eve l  o f  p r i ce  and  wage
f l ex ib i l i t y ,  he  the re fo re  sugges t s  t ha t  i n f l a t ion  r a t e  equa l i sa t ion  i s
eas i ly  accompl i shed .  Th i s  a rgument ,  i f  va l id ,  wou ld  t end  to  de -
emphas i s e  t he  p rob lem o f  d ive rgen t  i n f l a t i on  r a t e s .
3 . 1 . 1 . 7 .  D e g r e e  o f  p o l i c y  i n t e g r a t i o n
Po l i cy  i n t eg ra t i on  can  go  f rom s imp le  coo rd ina t ion  o f  economic  po l i c i e s
among  the  va r ious  pa r tne r  coun t r i e s  to  a  s i tua t ion  in  wh ich  these
su r r ende r  t he i r  mone ta ry  and  f i s ca l  sove re ign ty  to  a  s ing l e  sup rana t iona l
mone ta ry  au thor i ty  (which  i s  necessa ry  fo r  cons i s t en t ly  manag ing  the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s e r v e s  o f  t h e  a r e a  a n d  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s  o f  t h e  p a r t n e r
coun t r i e s  v i s - à -v i s  t he  r e s t  o f  t he  wor ld ,  fo r  ach iev ing  an  appropr i a t e
d i s t r ibu t ion  o f  the  money  supp ly  wi th in  the  a rea ,  e t c )  and  a  s ing le
sup rana t iona l  f i s ca l  au tho r i t y  (neces sa ry  to  coo rd ina t e  t hose  worke r s
who  remain  employed  no twi ths tand ing  fu l l  l abour  mobi l i ty ,  e t c ) .  I t  i s
c l ea r  tha t  t h i s  idea l  s i tua t ion  p resupposes  comple te  economic
in t eg ra t ion ,  wh ich ,  i n  t u rn ,  canno t  be  ach ieved  wi thou t  some  fo rm o f
po l i t i ca l  in teg ra t ion .
F leming  (1971)  d i scusses  t he  r equ i r emen t  o f  symmet ry  be tween  r eg ions .
I f  p rob lems  do  no t  complemen t  each  o the r  -  fo r  example  a  -
dep re s sed /de f i c i t  r eg ion  and  an  i n f l a t i on / su rp lus  r eg ion  -  t hen  po l i cy
c l a shes  may  r e su l t ,  even tua l ly  exace rba t ing  cond i t i ons .  Then ,  i t  w i l l  no t
be  poss ib le  to  look  more  c lose ly  a t  po l i cy  in teg ra t ion .
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Fina l ly ,  I sh iyama  (1975)  r a i s e s  t he  i s sue  o f  t he  po l i t i c a l  a spec t s  o f
po l i cy  coo rd ina t ion .  The  su r r ende r  o f  po l i t i c a l  power  r equ i r ed  t o  make
mone ta ry  and  f i s ca l  un i f i ca t ion  work  i s  o f t en  cons ide red  too  seve re  by
na t iona l  au thor i t i e s .  Th i s  i s  why  a  fu l l  mone ta ry  un ion  i s  o f t en  fo rgone
in  f avour  o f  an  exchange  r a t e  un ion ,  wh ich  o f t en  p roves  to  be  a  sub -
op t ima l  op t ion .
3 . 1 . 2 .  T h e  C o s t - b e n e f i t  a p p r o a c h
Par t i c ipa t ing  in  a  cu r rency  a rea  invo lves  bene f i t s  bu t  a l so  cos t s ,  so  tha t
to  t ake  the  bes t  cou r se  o f  ac t ion  a  ca re fu l  de t e rmina t ion  o f  bo th  i s
neces sa ry ,  by  we igh ing  t he se  cos t s  and  bene f i t s  t h rough  some  k ind  o f
soc i a l  p r e f e rence  func t ion .  De  Grauwe  (1992)  a rgues  t ha t  t he  cos t s  o f  a
common cur rency  have  much  to  do  wi th  the  macroeconomic  management
o f  the  economy,  whi l e  the  benef i t s  a re  mos t ly  s i tua ted  a t  the
mic roeconomic  l eve l .  I t  i s  ev iden t  t ha t  t he  f i na l  dec i s ion  wi l l  depend  on
the  se t  o f  we igh t s  chosen ,  a s  these  may  va ry  f rom coun t ry  to  coun t ry .
3 . 1 . 2 . 1 .  C o s t s  o f  a  c o m m o n  c u r r e n c y
Accord ing  to  De  Grauwe  (1992) ,  t he  cos t s  o f  a  common cu r rency  de r ive
f rom the  fac t  tha t  when  a  coun t ry  re l inqu i shes  i t s  na t iona l  cu r rency ,  i t
a l so  r e l i nqu i shes  an  in s t rumen t  o f  economic  po l i cy .  Th i s  can  be
bene f i c i a l  fo r  an  ind iv idua l  na t ion  in  the  sense  tha t  t he  use  o f  an
exchange  ra t e  a s  a  po l i cy  ins t rument ,  fo r  example ,  i s  u se fu l  because
coun t r i e s  a r e  d i f f e ren t  i n  some  impor t an t  s enses ,  r equ i r ing  changes  in
the  exchange  r a t e  t o  occu r .
Re ly ing  on  t he  work  o f  De  Grauwe ,  t he  cos t s  o f  a  common  cu r r ency  can
be  showed  a s  fo l l ows :
3 . 1 . 2 . 1 . 1 .  S h i f t s  i n  d e m a n d  ( M u n d e l )
Assume  tha t  consumers  f rom coun t ry  A  sh i f t  t he i r  p r e fe rences  f rom
coun t ry  B’s  p roduc t s .  Th i s  i s  p re sen ted  in  agg rega te  demand  in  F ig .3 .1 :
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Figure  3 .1  Aggrega te  demand  and  supp ly  in  countr i e s  A  and  B .
  SA:  Supp ly  cu rve  i n  coun t ry  A S B : Supp ly  cu rve  in  coun t ry  B
  DA:  Demand  cu rve  i n  coun t ry  A DB:  Demand  cu rve  i n  coun t ry  B
The  demand  cu rve  i s  t he  nega t ive ly  s loped  l ine  ind ica t ing  tha t  when  the
domes t i c  p r i ce  l eve l  i nc reases ,  t he  demand  fo r  domes t i c  ou tpu t  dec l ines .
The  supp ly  cu rve  exp res ses  t he  i dea  tha t  when  the  p r i ce  o f  t he  domes t i c
ou tpu t  i nc reases ,  domes t i c  f i rms  wi l l  i nc rease  the i r  supp ly ,  so  a s  to
prof i t  f rom the  h igher  p r i ce .  The  supp ly  curve  i s  d rawn under  the
as sumpt ion  tha t  t he  nomina l  wage  r a t e  and  the  p r i ce  o f  o the r  i npu t s
rema in  cons t an t .  An  upward  movemen t  o f  t he  demand  cu rve  in  coun t ry
B,  and  a  downward  movement  in  coun t ry  A ,  r ep re sen t  t he  demand  sh i f t .
The  r e su l t  i s  t ha t  ou tpu t  dec l ines  in  coun t ry  A  and  tha t  ou tpu t  inc reases
in  count ry  B .  This  i s  ve ry  l ike ly  to  l ead  to  add i t iona l  unemployment  in
coun t ry  A  and  a  dec l ine  o f  unemployment  in  coun t ry  B .
The re  a r e  two  mechan i sms  tha t  w i l l  au toma t i ca l ly  b r ing  back
equ i l ib r ium in  the  two  coun t r i e s .  One  i s  based  on  wage  f l ex ib i l i ty ,  the
o the r  on  the  mob i l i t y  o f  l abour  ( see  sec t ion  3 .1 .1 .1 ) .  Suppose  now tha t
wages  in  coun t ry  A  do  no t  dec l ine  desp i t e  the  unemployment  s i tua t ion ,
and  tha t  the  workers  in  coun t ry  A do  no t  move  to  coun t ry  B;  the
ad jus tmen t  t o  t he  d i sequ i l i b r i a  w i l l  t ake  the  fo rm o f  i n f l a t i on  in  coun t ry
B.  I f  au thor i t i e s  in  coun t ry  B  ca re  abou t  in f l a t ion ,  they  wi l l  wan t  to
r e s i s t  t he se  i n f l a t i ona ry  p r e s su re s  ( e . g .  by  impos ing  r e s t r i c t i ve  mone t a ry
and  f i sca l  po l i c i e s ) .  I f  t hey  wan t  to  e l imina te  them,  they  wi l l  have  to
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accep t  t he  h ighe r  i n f l a t i on .  Th i s  d i l emma  can  on ly  be  so lved  by
reva lu ing  the  cu r rency  o f  coun t ry  B  aga ins t  t ha t  o f  coun t ry  A .  The
e f fec t s  o f  t h i s  exchange  r a t e  ad jus tmen t  a re  shown  in  F ig .  3 .2 .  The
reva lua t ion  o f  t he  cu r rency  A  reduces  aggrega te  demand  in  coun t ry  B ,  so
tha t  t he  demand  cu rve  sh i f t s  back  to  the  l e f t .  I n  coun t ry  A  the  oppos i t e
occur s .  The  deva lua t ion  o f  t he  cu r rency  o f  A  inc reases  the
compe t i t i veness  o f  coun t ry  A’s  p roduc t s .  Th i s  sh i f t s  t he  agg rega te
demand  curve  o f  coun t ry  A  upwards .
Figure  3 .2 .  E f f ec t s  o f  deva lua t ion  o f  the  country  B .
I f  coun t ry  A  has  r e l i nqu i shed  t he  con t ro l  ove r  i t s  exchange  r a t e  by
jo in ing  a  mone ta ry  un ion  wi th  coun t ry  B ,  i t  w i l l  be  sadd led  wi th  a
sus t a ined  unemploymen t  p rob lem,  and  a  cu r r en t  accoun t  de f i c i t  ( cu r r en t
accoun t  =  domes t i c  ou tpu t  –  domes t i c  spend ing )  t ha t  c an  on ly  d i s appea r
by  de f l a t ion  in  coun t ry  A .  In  th i s  s ense  one  can  say  tha t  a  mone ta ry
un ion  has  a  cos t  fo r  coun t ry  A when  i t  i s  f aced  wi th  a  nega t ive  demand
shock .  S imi la r ly ,  coun t ry  B  wi l l  f ind  i t  cos t ly  to  be  in  mone ta ry  un ion
wi th  coun t ry  A because  i t  wi l l  have  to  accep t  more  in f l a t ion  tha t  i t
would  l ike .
3 . 1 . 2 . 1 . 2 .  D i f f e r e n c e  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  c o u n t r i e s  r e g a r d i n g  i n f l a t i o n  a n d
u n e m p l o y m e n t
The  impor tance  o f  these  d i f f e rences  in  p re fe rences  be tween  coun t r i e s  i s
deve loped  by  De  Grauwe  (1975) .  He  a rgues  tha t  some  coun t r i e s  a re  l e s s
a l l e rg i c  t o  in f l a t ion  than  o the r s .
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Cons ide r  two  coun t r i e s ,  A  and  B .  In  F ig .3 .3 ,  t he  Ph i l l i p s  cu rves  o f  two
coun t r i e s  a re  r ep resen ted  in  the  r igh t -hand  pane l s .  The  ve r t i ca l  ax i s
shows  the  r a t e  o f  change  o f  t he  wage  r a t e ,  wh i l e  t he  ho r i zon ta l  ax i s
p re sen t s  t he  unemploymen t  r a t e  ( a s sume  tha t  t he se  Ph i l l i p s  cu rves  a r e
s t ab l e ,  i . e .  t hey  do  no t  sh i f t  a s  a  r e su l t  o f  changes  i n  expec t a t i ons  o f
in f l a t i on ) .  I n  t he  l e f t -hand  s ide  pane l s ,  t he  r e l a t i on  be tween  wage
changes  and  p r i ce  changes  i s  p r e sen t ed .  Th i s  r e l a t i onsh ip  can  be  wr i t t en
as  fo l lows  fo r  the  two  coun t r i e s  r e spec t ive ly :
P’ A = W A - q A ( )1
P’ B = W B - q B ( )2
where  P’ A  and  P ’ B  a r e  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  WA  a n d  WB  a r e  t he
ra t e s  o f  wage  inc reases ,  and  q A  and  q B  a re  the  ra tes  o f  g rowth  o f  l abour
p roduc t iv i ty  in  the  two  coun t r i e s  (A  and  B) .
Figure  3 .3 .  In f la t ion -employment  cho ice s  in  country  A  and  B .
Equa t ions  (1 )  and  (2 )  can  be  cons ide red  t o  de f ine  t he  r a t e  o f  p r i ce
changes  t ha t  keep  p ro f i t s  unchanged  ( a s  a  pe rcen t age  o f  va lue  added ) .
These  two  equa t ions  a re  r ep resen ted  by  the  s t r a igh t  l i nes  in  the  l e f t -
hand  s ide  pane l s .  No te  tha t  t he  in t e rcep t  i s  g iven  by  q A  and  q B
r e spec t ive ly .  Thus ,  when  the  r a t e  o f  p roduc t iv i ty  inc reases  in  coun t ry  A ,
the  l ine  sh i f t s  upwards .
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The  two  coun t r i e s  a r e  l i nked  by  the  pu rchas ing  power  pa r i t y  cond i t i ons ,
f o r m u l a t e d  a s
e ’=  P’ A - P ’ B ( )3
where  e ’  i s  t he  r a t e  o f  dep rec i a t ion  o f  cu r r ency  A  re l a t ive  to
currency B.
Equa t ion  (3 )  shou ld  be  i n t e rp re t ed  a s  an  equ i l i b r ium cond i t i on .  I t  s t a t e s
tha t  i f  coun t ry  A has  a  h igher  r a t e  o f  in f l a t ion  than  coun t ry  B ,  i t  w i l l
have  to  deprec ia t e  i t s  cu r rency  to  ma in ta in  the  compe t i t iveness  o f  i t s
p roduc t s  unchanged .  I f  coun t r i e s  A  and  B  dec ide  to  fo rm a  mone ta ry
un ion ,  t he  exchange  r a t e  i s  f ixed  ( e ’=0) ,  so  tha t  t he  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t ion
mus t  be  equa l .  I f  t h i s  i s  no t  the  case ,  e .g .  in f l a t ion  in  coun t ry  A  i s
h ighe r  than  in  B ,  coun t ry  A  wi l l  i nc reas ing ly  lose  compe t i t iveness .
Suppose  now tha t  coun t r i e s  A  and  B  have  d i f f e r en t  p re fe rences  abou t
in f l a t i on  and  unemploymen t .  Coun t ry  A  chooses  po in t  A  on  i t s  Ph i l l i p s
cu rve ,  whereas  coun t ry  B  chooses  po in t  B .  I t  i s  now c l ea r  t ha t  t he
in f la t ion  ra tes  wi l l  be  d i f fe ren t  in  the  two  coun t r i es ,  and  tha t  a  f ixed
exchange  ra t e  wi l l  be  unsus ta inab le .  The  cos t  o f  a  mone ta ry  un ion  fo r
the  two  coun t r i e s  now cons i s t s  in  the  f ac t  tha t  i f  t hey  wan t  to  keep  the
exchange  r a t e  f ixed ,  t hey  wi l l  have  to  choose  ano the r  ( l e s s  p re fe r r ed )
po in t  on  t he i r  Ph i l l i p s  cu rves ,  so  t ha t  an  equa l  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i on  becomes
poss ib l e .  Such  an  ou tcome  i s  g iven  by  the  po in t s  C  and  C’  on  the
re spec t i ve  Ph i l l i p s  cu rves .  Coun t ry  A  now has  to  accep t  l e s s  in f l a t ion
and  more  unemployment  than  i t  wou ld  do  o the rwise ,  wh i l e  coun t ry  B  has
to  accep t  more  in f l a t ion  and  l e s s  unemployment .
Ano the r  impor t an t  sou rce  o f  a  pos s ib l e  d i f f e r ence  be tween  coun t r i e s  i s
t he  g rowth  r a t e  o f  p roduc t i v i t y .  Suppose  t ha t  t he  g rowth  r a t e  o f
p roduc t iv i ty  a lpha  i s  h ighe r  i n  coun t ry  B  than  in  coun t ry  A .  I f  bo th
coun t r i e s  dec ide  to  fo rm a  mone ta ry  un ion  th i s  impl ies  tha t  the  nomina l
wage  inc reases  in  coun t ry  A  mus t  be  lower  than  in  coun t ry  B .  Th i s  can
be  seen  by  se t t ing  e ’=0  in  equa t ion  (3 ) ,  so  tha t  P ’ B = P’ A .
F rom equa t ion  (1 )  and  (2 )  i t  t hen  fo l lows  tha t
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W B  –  q B  =  W A  –  q A  o r
W B  –  W A  =  q B  –  q A
Figure  3 .4 .  Monetary  un ion  in  a  wor ld  o f  ver t i ca l  Ph i l l ips  curves
I f ,  fo l lowing  mone ta ry  un i f i ca t ion ,  the  two  coun t r i e s ’  l abour  un ions
shou ld  cen t ra l i se  the i r  wage  ba rga in ing  and  a im fo r  equa l  nomina l  wage
inc reases  desp i t e  t he  d i f f e r ences  i n  p roduc t iv i t y  g rowth ,  t h i s  wou ld
spe l l  t roub le .  The  indus t ry  in  coun t ry  A would  become inc reas ing ly  l e s s
compe t i t ive .  There fo re ,  a  cond i t ion  fo r  a  success fu l  mone ta ry  un ion  i s
tha t  l abour  un ions  shou ld  no t  cen t r a l i s e  t he i r  wage  ba rga in ing  when
produc t iv i ty  g rowth  r a t e s  d i f f e r .
3 . 1 . 2 . 1 . 3 .  D i f f e r e n c e  i n  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  i n s t i t u t i o n s
Bruno  and  Sachs  (1985)  a rgue  tha t  supp ly  shocks ,  such  a s  t he  one  tha t
occur red  du r ing  1979-80  in  Europe ,  have  ve ry  d i f f e ren t  macroeconomic
e f f ec t s  depend ing  upon  the  deg ree  o f  cen t r a l i s a t i on  o f  wage  ba rga in ing .
When  wage  ba rga in ing  i s  cen t ra l i sed ,  l abour  un ions  t ake  in to  accoun t
the  in f l a t iona ry  e f f ec t  o f  wage  inc reases .  In  o the r  words  they  know tha t
excess ive  wage  c la ims  wi l l  l ead  to  more  in f l a t ion ,  so  tha t  r ea l  wages
wi l l  no t  inc rease .  Th ings  a re  qu i t e  d i f f e ren t  in  coun t r i e s  wi th  l e s s
cen t r a l i s ed  wage  ba rga in ing .  In  these  coun t r i e s  i nd iv idua l  un ions  tha t
ba rga in  fo r  h ighe r  nomina l  wages  know tha t  t he  e f f ec t  o f  t hese  nomina l
29
wage  inc reases  on  the  aggrega te  p r i ce  l eve l  i s  sma l l ,  because  un ions
on ly  rep resen t  a  smal l  f r ac t ion  o f  the  l abour  fo rce .  Each  un ion  has  an
in te res t  in  inc reas ing  the  nomina l  wage  of  i t s  members  ( i f  i t  does  no t  do
so ,  t he  r ea l  wages  o f  i t s  members  wou ld  dec l ine ) .  I t  i s  t he re fo re
d i f f i cu l t  t o  a r r i ve  a t  wage  modera t ion  a f t e r  a  supp ly  shock  in  coun t r i e s
wi th  decen t r a l i s ed  wage  ba rga in ing .
Ca lmfor s  and  Dr i f f i l  ( 1988)  a l so  show the  impor t ance  o f  l abour  marke t
ins t i tu t ions  in  a  common cur rency .  They  no ted  tha t  the  r e l a t ionsh ip
be tween  cen t r a l i s a t ion  o f  wage  ba rga in ing  and  ou tcomes  i s  no t  a  l i nea r
p rocess .  In  a  ve ry  decen t r a l i s ed  sys t em o f  wage  ba rga in ing ,  wage  c l a ims
wi l l  have  a  d i r ec t  e f f ec t  on  the  compe t i t i veness  o f  a  f i rm ,  and  the re fo re
on  the  unemploymen t  p rospec t s  o f  i nd iv idua l  un ion  members .  Excess ive
wage  c l a ims  by  an  ind iv idua l  un ion  wi l l  l ead  to  a  l a rge  r educ t ion  o f
employment .  Thus ,  when  faced  wi th  a  supp ly  shock ,  un ions  in  such  a
decen t ra l i sed  sys t em may  exh ib i t  a  cons ide rab le  degree  o f  wage
res t r a in t .  Hence ,  coun t r i e s  wi th  ve ry  d i f f e ren t  l abour  marke t  i n s t i t u t ions
may  f ind  i t  cos t ly  to  fo rm a  mone ta ry  un ion .  Wi th  each  supp ly  shock ,
wages  and  p r i ce s  i n  t he se  coun t r i e s  may  be  a f f ec t ed  d i f f e r en t ly ,  mak ing
i t  d i f f i cu l t  t o  co r rec t  fo r  these  d i f f e rences  when  the  exchange  r a t e  i s
i r r evocab ly  f ixed .
3 . 1 . 2 . 1 . 4 .  G r o w t h  r a t e s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t
Dif fe rences  in  g rowth  r a t e s  cou ld  l ead  to  a  p rob lem when  coun t r i e s  fo rm
a  mone ta ry  un ion .  For  example ,  coun t ry  A’s  GDP i s  g rowing  a t  5% pe r
yea r  and  coun t ry  B’ s  GDP a t  3% pe r  yea r .  Suppose  t ha t  t he  i ncome
e las t i c i ty  o f  A’s  impor t s  f rom B i s  one ,  and  tha t  s imi la r ly  B’s  income
e las t i c i ty  o f  impor t s  f rom A i s  equa l  to  one .  Then  coun t ry  A’s  impor t s
f rom B wi l l  g row a t  5% per  yea r ,  whereas  B’s  impor t s  f rom A wi l l  g row
at  on ly  3% per  yea r .  Th i s  wi l l  l ead  to  a  t r ade  ba lance  p rob lem fo r  the
fas t e r -g rowing  coun t ry  A ,  whose  impor t s  t end  to  g row fas t e r  than  i t s
expor t s .  To  avo id  tha t  s i tua t ion ,  coun t ry  A  wi l l  have  to  r educe  the  p r i ce
of  i t s  expor t s  to  coun t ry  B ,  so  tha t  the  l a t t e r  coun t ry  inc reases  i t s
pu rchases  o f  goods  f rom coun t ry  A .  In  o the r  words ,  coun t ry  A’s  t e rms  o f
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t rade  mus t  be  dec reased  so  a s  to  make  i t s  p roduc t s  more  compe t i t i ve .
Count ry  A can  do  th i s  in  two  ways :  by  a  d e p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  c u r r e n c y  o r
by  a  lower  r a t e  o f  domes t i c  p r i ce  inc reases  than  in  coun t ry  B .  I f  i t  j o ins
a  mone ta ry  un ion  wi th  coun t ry  B ,  however ,  on ly  the  second  op t ion  wi l l
be  ava i l ab le .  Th i s  wi l l  r equ i re  coun t ry  A  to  fo l low re la t ive ly
de f l a t iona ry  po l i c i e s ,  wh ich  in  tu rn  wi l l  cons t r a in  the  g rowth  p rocess .
Thus ,  a  mone ta ry  un ion  has  a  cos t  fo r  the  fas t e r -g rowing  coun t ry .  I t  w i l l
f ind  i t  more  advan tageous  to  keep  i t s  na t iona l  cu r rency ,  so  a s  to  have
the  op t ion  o f  deprec ia t ing  i t s  cu r rency  when  i t  f i nds  i t s e l f  cons t r a ined
by  unfavourab le  deve lopmen t s  in  i t s  t r ade  accoun t .
3 . 1 . 2 . 1 . 5 .  D i f f e r e n t  f i s c a l  s y s t e m s  a n d  t h e  s e ign iorage  p rob lem
Dif fe ren t  f i s ca l  sys t ems  l ead  coun t r i e s  t o  u se  d i f f e r en t  combina t ions  o f
deb t  and  mone ta ry  f i nanc ing  o f  t he  gove rnmen t  budge t  de f i c i t .  When
those  coun t r i es  jo in  a  mone ta ry  un ion ,  they  wi l l  be  cons t ra ined  in  the
way  they  f inance  the i r  budge t  de f i c i t s .
The  equa t ion  be low i s  t he  gove rnmen t  budge t  cons t r a in t :
G –  T + rB = 
dt
dB
 +  
dt
dM ( )4
where  G i s  the  l eve l  o f  government  spend ing  (exc lud ing  in te res t
payments  on  the  government  deb t ) ,  T  i s  the  t ax  revenue ,  r  i s  the  in te res t
ra t e  on  the  government  deb t  B ,  and  M i s  the  l eve l  o f  h igh-powered
money  (mone ta ry  base ) .
The  l e f t -hand  s ide  o f  equa t ion  (4 )  i s  t he  gove rnmen t  budge t  de f i c i t .  I t
cons i s t s  o f  t he  p r imary  budge t  de f i c i t  (G-T)  and  the  i n t e r e s t  paymen t s
o n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  d e b t  (rB) .  The  r igh t -hand  s ide  i s  the  f inanc ing  s ide .
T h e  b u d g e t  d e f i c i t  c a n  b e  f i n a n c e d  b y  i s s u i n g  d e b t  (
dt
dB
)  o r  by  i s su ing
h igh-powered  money  (
dt
dM
) .  The  changes  pe r  un i t  o f  t ime  a re  r ep resen ted
by  pu t t ing  an  accen t  on  a  va r i ab le ,  t hus  (
dt
dB
)  =  B’  and  (
dt
dM
)  =  M’ .
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In  the  fo l lowing ,  va r i ab le s  a re  expres sed  a s  r a t io s  to  GDP,  thus




where  Y i s  GDP,  so  tha t  b  i s  the  deb t  to  GDP ra t io .
Then ,  b ’  =  
Y
B'
 –  BY’ Y2
or  u s ing  (5 )  and  man ipu la t ing :
B’  = b ’ Y  +  b Y ’ ( )6
Subs t i tu t ing  (6 )  in to  (4 )  y ie lds
b ’  =  (g - t )  +  ( r+x )b  –  m ( )7
where  g  =  
Y
G
,  t  =  
Y
T
,  x  =  
Y
Y '




Equa t ion  (7 )  can  be  in t e rp re t ed  a s  fo l lows .  When  the  in t e re s t  r a t e  o f
gove rnmen t  deb t  exceeds  the  g rowth  r a t e  o f  GDP,  t he  deb t  t o  GDP ra t io
wi l l  i nc r ea se  w i thou t  l im i t a t i on .  The  dynamics  o f  deb t  accumula t i on  can
be  s topped  on ly  i f  t he  p r imary  budge t  de f i c i t  ( a s  pe r  cen t  o f  GDP)  tu rns
in to  a  su rp lus  ( (g - t )  t hen  becomes  nega t ive ) .
A l t e rna t ive ly ,  l a rge  deb t  accumula t ion  can  be  s topped  by  a  s u f f i c i e n t l y
la rge  revenue  f rom money  c rea t ion .  The  l a t t e r  i s  a l so  ca l l ed  se ign io rage .
I t  i s  c l ea r ,  however ,  t ha t  t he  sys t ema t i c  use  o f  th i s  source  o f  f inance
wi l l  l ead  to  in f l a t ion .  The  ques t ion  remains  under  wha t  cond i t ions  the
deb t  to  GDP ra t io  wi l l  s t ab i l i se  a t  a  cons tan t  va lue .  Equa t ion  (7 )  g ives
the  answer .
Se t  b ’  =  0 .  Th is  y ie lds  ( r  -  x )  b  =  ( t  –  g )  +  m.
Thus ,  i f  the  in te res t  ra te  exceeds  the  g rowth  ra te  o f  the  economy,  i t  i s
neces sa ry  t ha t  e i t he r  t he  p r imary  budge t  shows  a  su f f i c i en t ly  l a rge
su rp lus  o r  t ha t  money  c rea t ion  i s  su f f i c i en t ly  ex tens ive  to  s t ab i l i s e  the
deb t  to  GDP ra t io .
The  theory  o f  op t imum pub l i c  f inance  (F i sche r ,  1982)  now te l l s  u s  tha t
r a t i ona l  gove rnmen t s  w i l l  u se  t he  d i f f e r en t  sou rce s  o f  r evenue  so  t ha t
the  marg ina l  cos t  o f  r a i s ing  revenue  th rough  these  d i f f e ren t  means  i s
equa l i sed .  Thus  i f  t he  marg ina l  cos t  o f  r a i s ing  revenue  by  inc reas ing
t axes  exceeds  t he  marg ina l  co s t  o f  r a i s i ng  r evenue  by  i n f l a t i on
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(se ign io rage) ,  i t  w i l l  be  op t ima l  to  r educe  t axes  and  to  inc rease
inf la t ion .
The  p reced ing  a l so  means  t ha t  coun t r i e s  w i l l  have  d i f f e r en t  op t ima l
in f l a t i on  r a t e s .  In  gene ra l ,  coun t r i e s  w i th  an  unde rdeve loped  t ax  sys t em
wi l l  f i nd  i t  more  advan tageous  to  r a i se  r evenue  by  in f l a t ion
( se ign io rage ) .  Pu t  d i f f e r en t ly ,  a  coun t ry  w i th  an  unde rdeve loped  f i s ca l
sys t em expe r i ences  a  l a rge  cos t  i n  r a i s ing  r evenue  by  inc reas ing  t ax
ra tes .  I t  w i l l  be  l e s s  cos t ly  to  inc rease  government  r evenue  by  in f l a t ion .
Th is  r eason ing  l eads  to  the  fo l lowing  impl ica t ion  fo r  the  cos t s  o f  a
mone ta ry  un ion .  Les s  deve loped  coun t r i e s ,  wh ich  jo in  a  mone ta ry  un ion
wi th  more  deve loped  coun t r i e s  t ha t  have  a  l ow ra t e  o f  i n f l a t ion ,  w i l l
a l so  have  to  lower  the i r  r a te  o f  in f l a t ion .  Th is  then  means  tha t ,  fo r  a
g iven  budge t  de f i c i t ,  t hey  wi l l  a l so  have  to  inc rease  t axes .  The re  wi l l  be
a  lo s s  o f  we l f a re .  Th i s  was  a  pa r t i cu l a r ly  acu te  p rob lem fo r  t he  Sou the rn
European  economic  coun t r i e s  in  the  EU.  Because  they  have  jo ined  the
low- in f la t ion  nor the rn  mone ta ry  zone ,  they  had  to  inc rease  t axes ,  o r  l e t
t he  de f i c i t  i nc rea se  fu r the r .  Fo r  t he se  coun t r i e s  t he  cos t  o f  a  mone ta ry
un ion  s t ems  f rom the  f ac t  tha t  they  had  to  r e ly  too  much  on  a  cos t ly  way
of  r a i s ing  r evenue .
3 .1 .2 .2 .  Bene f i t s  o f  common currency
The  ma jo r  bene f i t  o f  common  cu r rency  conce rns  t he  r educ t ion  o f  t he
t r ansac t i on  cos t s  o f  cu r r ency  conve r s ion  and  t he  e l im ina t i on  o f  r i sk  due
to  the  unce r t a in ty  abou t  exchange  r a t e  f l uc tua t ion ,  and  th i s  enhances
a l loca t ive  e f f i c i ency .  Fo l lowing  the  a l r eady  c i t ed  work  o f  De  Grauwe
(1992) ,  t h i s  s ec t ion  wi l l  ana lyse  in  de t a i l  t he  bene f i t s  o f  j o in ing  a
mone ta ry  un ion  fo r  a  coun t ry .
3 . 1 . 2 . 2 . 1 .  D i r e c t  g a i n s  f r o m  t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s
The  mos t  v i s ib le  and  eas i ly  quan t i f i ab le  ga in  o f  mone ta ry  un ion  i s  the
e l imina t ion  o f  t he  cos t s  o f  exchang ing  one  cu r r ency  in to  an  o the r .
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However ,  t hese  ga ins  tha t  acc rue  to  the  gene ra l  pub l i c  have  a
coun te rpa r t  i n  t he  banks ’  r evenues .  Su rveys  i n  t he  European  Communi ty
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  a b o u t  5 %  o f  t h e  b a n k s ’  r e v e n u e s  c o m p r i s e  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n
pa id  t o  banks  i n  t he  exchange  o f  na t iona l  cu r r enc i e s .  I n  t he  s i t ua t i on  o f
a  common cur rency ,  banks  wi l l  have  to  look  fo r  o the r  p ro f i t ab le
ac t iv i t i e s  and  the i r  employees  who  were  p rev ious ly  engaged  in
exchang ing  money ,  wi l l  now be  f ree  to  pe r fo rm more  use fu l  t a sks  fo r  the
banks .
De  Grauwe  (1992)  a rgues  t ha t  t he  ga in  f rom the  e l imina t ion  o f  t r ans i t i on
cos t s  can  on ly  be  r eaped  when  na t iona l  moneys  a re  r ep laced  by  a
common cur rency .  The  reason  fo r  th i s  a rgument  i s  tha t  a s  long  as
na t iona l  cu r renc ie s  r ema in  in  ex i s t ence ,  even  i f  t he  exchange  r a t e  i s
“ i r r evocab ly”  f i xed ,  doub t  w i l l  con t inue  to  ex i s t  a s  t o  t h i s  f i x i t y .  I n
o the r  words ,  na t iona l  cu r renc ie s  wi l l  no t  be  pe r fec t  subs t i t u t e s .
3 . 1 . 2 . 2 . 2 .  I n d i r e c t  g a i n s  f r o m  e l i m i n a t i n g  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s
The  ind i r ec t  ga ins  f rom e l imina t ing  t r ansac t ion  cos t s  de r ive  f rom the
reduc t ion  o f  t he  s cope  fo r  p r i ce  d i s c r imina t ion  be tween  na t iona l
marke t s .  Ev idence  f rom the  European  Communi ty  (1988)  shows  tha t ,
a l though  the re  was  ag reemen t  on  a  s ing le  marke t ,  i n  the  UK the  same
au tomobi l e s  were  abou t  60% more  expens ive  than  in  Denmark  and  30%
more  expens ive  than  in  Be lg ium (ne t  o f  t axes ) .  In  the  case  o f  a  common
cur rency ,  consumers  would  no t  hes i t a t e  to  purchase  these  goods  in  the
coun t r i e s  whe re  t hey  a r e  cheape r .  Of  cou r se ,  t he r e  a r e  many  sou rces  o f
t r ansac t ion  cos t s  ( admin i s t r a t i ve  r egu la t ions ,  d i f f e r ences  i n  t axa t ion ) ,
and  e l im ina t i ng  t he  cos t  o f  buy ing  and  s e l l i ng  fo r e ign  cu r r enc i e s  may
no t  even  be  the  mos t  impor tan t  one .
3 . 1 . 2 . 2 . 3 .  W e l f a r e  g a i n  f r o m  l e s s  u n c e r t a i n t y
Unce r t a in ty  abou t  fu tu re  exchange  r a t e  changes  i n t roduces  unce r t a in ty
abou t  the  fu tu re  incomes  o f  f i rms .  De  Grauwe  a rgues  tha t  i t  i s  gene ra l ly
accep ted  tha t  unce r t a in ty  l eads  to  a  lo s s  o f  we l fa re  in  a  wor ld  popu la t ed
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by  r i sk -ave r se  ind iv idua l s .  These  wi l l ,  gene ra l ly  speak ing ,  p re fe r  a
fu ture  re tu rn  tha t  i s  more  ce r ta in  than  one  tha t  i s  l e ss  so ,  a t  l eas t  i f  the
expec t ed  va lue  o f  t he se  r e tu rns  i s  t he  s ame .  Pu t  d i f f e r en t ly ,  t hey  wi l l
on ly  wan t  to  t ake  the  more  r i sky  re tu rn  i f  t hey  a re  p romised  tha t  i t  w i l l
be  g rea t e r  t han  the  l e s s  r i sky .  E l imina t ing  the  exchange  r i sk  r educes  a
source  o f  unce r t a in ty  and  the re fo re  inc reases  we l f a re .
3 . 1 . 2 . 2 . 4 .  E x c h a n g e  r a t e  u n c e r t a i n t y  a n d  p r i c e  m e c h a n i s m
Economic  agen t s  base  t he i r  dec i s ions  conce rn ing  p roduc t ion ,
inves tmen t ,  and  consumpt ion  on  the  i n fo rma t ion  tha t  t he  p r i ce  sys t em
prov ides  fo r  t hem.  I f  t he se  p r i ce s  become  more  unce r t a in  t he  qua l i t y  o f
the se  dec i s ions  w i l l  dec l i ne .  A  we l l -known  example  i s  t he  app rec i a t i on
o f  t he  do l l a r  du r ing  1980-85 ,  wh ich  was  l a rge ly  unp red i c t ed  and  wh ich
went  much  fa r the r  than  the  in f l a t ion  d i f fe ren t i a l  be tween  the  US and  the
o the r  indus t r i a l  coun t r i e s .  Th i s  “misa l ignment”  l ed  to  l a rge  and
unpred i c t ed  changes  i n  t he  p ro f i t ab i l i t y  o f  many  Amer i can  i ndus t r i a l
f i rms ,  wh ich  were  ob l iged  to  compe te  in  wor ld  marke t s .  A  few yea r s
l a t e r  t he  do l l a r  dep rec ia t ed  subs tan t i a l ly  and  more  than  co r rec t ed  the
rea l  app rec i a t ion  o f  t he  f i r s t  ha l f  o f  t he  1980s .  These  l a rge  r ea l
exchange  r a t e  movemen t s  l ed  to  l a rge  ad jus tmen t  cos t s  fo r  t he  Amer ican
economy.  Thus ,  a  dec l ine  i n  r ea l  exchange  r a t e  unce r t a in ty ,  due  fo r
example  to  t he  in t roduc t ion  o f  a  common  cu r rency ,  cou ld  r educe  these
ad jus tmen t  cos t s .
I t  i s  a l so  known tha t  an  inc rease  in  r i sk ,  due  to  p r i ce  unce r t a in ty ,  wi l l  i n
genera l  inc rease  the  rea l  in te res t  r a te .  Th i s  fo l lows  f rom the  fac t  tha t
when  the  expec t ed  r e tu rn  on  inves tmen t  p ro j ec t s  becomes  more
unce r t a in ,  r i sk -ave r se  i nves to r s  w i l l  r equ i r e  a  h ighe r  r i sk  p remium to
compensa te  them fo r  the  inc reased  r i sk iness  o f  t he  p ro jec t s .  In  add i t ion ,
in  a  r i sk i e r  economic  env i ronmen t ,  economic  agen t s  wi l l  i nc rease  the
d i scoun t  r a t e  a t  wh ich  they  d i scoun t  fu tu re  r e tu rns .  Thus ,  exchange  r a t e
unce r t a in ty ,  wh ich  l eads  t o  t h i s  k ind  o f  i nc reased  sys t emic  r i sk ,  a l so
inc reases  the  rea l  in te res t  r a te .
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Highe r  in t e re s t  r a t e s ,  however ,  l ead  to  inc reased  p rob lems  in  se l ec t ing
inves tmen t  p ro j ec t s  i n  an  e f f i c i en t  way .  E l imina t ing  the  exchange  r i sk
by  mov ing  towards  a  common  cu r r ency  wi l l  r educe  t he  amoun t  o f  r i sky
pro jec t s  t ha t  a re  se l ec t ed  by  the  marke t  and  l ead  to  a  more  e f f i c i en t
func t ion ing  o f  t he  p r i ce  mechan i sm.
3 .1 .2 .2 .5 .  Exchange  ra t e  uncer ta in t y  and  economic  g rowth
The  e l imina t ion  o f  exchange  r i sk  can  the re fo re  l ead  to  an  inc rease  in
economic  g rowth .  Th i s  can  be  i l l u s t r a t ed  by  us ing  the  neoc la s s i ca l
g rowth  mode l ,  and  i t s  r ecen t  ex tens ion  to  a  s i t ua t ion  o f  dynamic
economies  o f  sca l e .  The  mode l  i s  p resen ted  in  F ig .3 .5 .
Figure  3 .5 .  The  neoc la s s i ca l  growth  mode l
Where  K  =  cap i t a l  s t ock  pe r  worke r
  Y  =  ou tpu t  pe r  worker
Equ i l ib r ium in  the  mode l  i s  ob ta ined  where  the  marg ina l  p roduc t iv i ty  o f
cap i t a l  f  (k ) ,  i s ,  equa l  to  the  in t e res t  r a t e  consumers  use  to  d i scoun t
fu tu re  consumpt ion  ( r r ) .  Th i s  i s  r ep resen ted  by  the  po in t  A  in  F ig .  3 .5 ,
where  the  l ine  r r  i s  t angen t i a l  t o  the  p roduc t ion  func t ion .  Suppose  tha t
t he  e l imina t ion  o f  t he  exchange  r i sk  r educes  t he  sys t emic  r i sk  so  t ha t
the  r ea l  i n t e re s t  r a t e  dec l ines  (F ig .3 .6 ) .  The  r educ t ion  o f  t he  r i sk -
ad jus tmen t  r a t e  o f  d i scoun t  makes  the  r r  l ine  f l a t t e r .  As  a  resu l t ,  the
equ i l i b r ium moves  f rom A to  B .  The re  w i l l  be  an  accumula t ion  o f  cap i t a l
and  an  inc rease  in  the  g rowth  ra te  whi le  the  economy moves  f rom A to
B .  In  t he  new equ i l i b r ium,  t he  ou tpu t  pe r  worke r  and  the  cap i t a l  s t ock  he
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has  a t  h i s  d i sposa l  w i l l  have  inc reased .  No te ,  however ,  t ha t  t he  g rowth
ra te  o f  ou tpu t  then  re tu rns  to  i t s  in i t i a l  l eve l ,  which  i s  de te rmined  by  the
exogenous  r a t e  o f  t echno log ica l  change  and  the  r a t e  o f  g rowth  o f  t he
popu la t ion .  Thus ,  in  th i s  neoc lass ica l  g rowth  mode l ,  the  reduc t ion  o f  the
in t e re s t  r a t e  due  to  t he  mone ta ry  un ion  t empora r i l y  i nc reases  t he  r a t e  o f
g rowth  o f  ou tpu t .  In  t he  new equ i l i b r ium,  the  ou tpu t  l eve l  pe r  worke r
wi l l  have  inc reased :  no te  a l so  tha t  t he  p roduc t iv i ty  o f  cap i t a l  has
dec l ined .
Figure  3 .6 .  The  e f f ec t  o f  l ower  r i sk  in  the  neoc la s s i ca l  growth  mode l
3 . 1 . 2 . 2 . 6 .  B e n e f i t s  o f  m o n e t a r y  u n i o n  a n d  t h e  o p e n n e s s  o f  c o u n t r i e s
The  we l fa re  ga ins  o f  a  common cur rency  tha t  have  been  iden t i f i ed  in  the
above  chap te r  a r e  l i ke ly  t o  i nc rease  w i th  t he  deg ree  o f  openness  o f  an
economy.  For  in s t ance ,  t he  e l imina t ion  o f  t r ansac t ion  cos t s  wi l l  we igh
more  heav i ly  in  coun t r i e s  where  f i rms  and  consumers  buy  and  se l l  a
l a rge  f r ac t ion  o f  goods  and  se rv ices  in  fo re ign  coun t r i e s .  S imi l a r ly ,  t he
consumers  and  f i rms  in  these  coun t r i e s  a re  more  sub jec t  t o  dec i s ion
e r ro r s  because  they  f ace  l a rge  fo re ign  marke t s  w i th  d i f f e ren t  cu r renc ie s .
E l imina t ing  these  r i sks  wi l l  l ead  to  a  l a rge r  we l fa re  ga in  (pe r  cap i t a )  in
sma l l  and  open  economies  than  in  l a rge  and  r e l a t ive ly  c losed  coun t r i e s .
The  r e l a t i onsh ip  be tween  the  bene f i t s  o f  a  common  cu r r ency  and  the
openness  o f  coun t r i e s  t ha t  a r e  cand ida t e s  fo r  a  un ion  can  be  r ep re sen ted
g raph ica l ly  (F ig .3 .7 ) .
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Figure  3 .7 .  Bene f i t s  o f  a  monetary  un ion  and  openness  o f  the  country
On the  hor i zon ta l  ax i s  i s  shown the  openness  o f  the  coun t ry  r e l a t ive  to
i t s  po ten t i a l  pa r tne r s  i n  a  mone ta ry  un ion  (measu red  by  the  sha re  o f
the i r  b i l a t e ra l  t r ade  in  the  GDP o f  the  coun t ry  cons ide red ) .  On  the
ve r t i c a l  ax i s  a r e  r ep re sen t ed  t he  bene f i t s  ( a s  a  pe rcen t age  o f  GDP) .  Wi th
an  inc reas ing  openness  towards  the  o the r  pa r tne r s  in  the  un ion ,  t he  ga ins
f rom a  mone ta ry  un ion  (pe r  un i t  o f  ou tpu t )  inc rease .
3 . 2 .  C o s t s  a n d  b e n e f i t s  c o m p a r e d
Fig .3 .8  combines  t he  f i gu res  r e l a t i ng  bene f i t s  and  cos t s  t o  t he  openness
of  a  coun t ry .  The  in te r sec t ion  po in t  o f  the  benef i t  and  the  cos t  l i nes
de te rmines  the  c r i t i ca l  l eve l  o f  openness  tha t  makes  i t  wor thwhi l e  fo r  a
coun t ry  to  jo in  a  mone ta ry  un ion  wi th  i t s  t r ad ing  pa r tne r s .  To  the  l e f t  o f
tha t  po in t ,  t he  coun t ry  i s  be t t e r  o f f  keep ing  i t s  na t iona l  cu r rency .  To  the
r igh t ,  i t  i s  be t t e r  o f f  when  i t  r e l inqu i shes  i t s  na t iona l  money  and
rep laces  i t  wi th  the  money  o f  i t s  t r ad ing  pa r tne r s .
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Figure  3 .8 .  Cos t s  and  bene f i t s  o f  a  monetary  un ion
There  a re  two  in t e rp re t a t ions  o f  F ig .3 .8 ;  a t  one  ex t r eme ,  the re  i s  a  v i ew,
t e rmed  “mone ta r i s t ” ,  c l a iming  tha t  exchange  r a t e  changes  a re  ine f f ec t ive
as  i n s t rumen t s  t o  co r r ec t  f o r  t he se  d i f f e r en t  deve lopmen t s  be tween
coun t r i e s .  And  even  i f  t hey  a re  e f f ec t ive ,  t he  use  o f  t he  exchange  r a t e
po l i c i e s  typ ica l ly  makes  coun t r i e s  worse  o f f .  In  th i s  mone ta r i s t  v i ew the
cos t  cu rve  i s  ve ry  c lose  to  the  o r ig in  (F i g . 3 . 9 ( a ) ) .  T h e  c r i t i c a l  p o i n t  t h a t
makes  i t  wor thwhi le  to  fo rm a  un ion  i s  c lose  to  the  o r ig in .  Thus ,  in  th i s
v iew,  many  coun t r i e s  in  the  wor ld  wou ld  ga in  by  r e l inqu i sh ing  the i r
na t iona l  cu r renc ies ,  and  by  jo in ing  a  mone ta ry  un ion .
(a )  The  monetar i s t  v iew (b)  The  Keynes ian  v iew
Figure  3 .9 .  Cos t s  and  benef i t s  o f  a  monetary  un ion:  d i f f erent  v i ews
At  the  o the r  ex t r eme ,  the re  i s  t he  Keynes ian  v iew tha t  t he  wor ld  i s  fu l l
o f  r ig id i t i e s  (wages  and  p r i ces  a re  r ig id ,  l abour  i s  immobi le ) ,  so  tha t  the
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exchange  r a t e  i s  a  power fu l  i n s t rumen t  i n  e l imina t ing  d i sequ i l i b r i a .  I n
th i s  v i ew,  the  cos t  cu rve  i s  f a r  away  f rom the  o r ig in ,  so  tha t  r e l a t ive ly
few coun t r i e s  shou ld  f ind  i t  t o  be  in  the i r  i n t e re s t  t o  jo in  a  mone ta ry
union.
The  above  ana lys i s  l eads  us  t o  t he  ques t ion  abou t  t he  i s sue  o f  whe the r  a
coun t ry  wou ld  bene f i t  f rom a  mone ta ry  un ion .  One  can  answer  tha t  the
cos t -benef i t  ca lcu lus  i s  l i ke ly  to  p roduce  ve ry  d i f f e ren t  r e su l t s  fo r  the
d i f f e r en t  coun t r i e s  t ha t  wou ld  j o in  a  mone t a ry  un ion .  Fo r  some  coun t r i e s
wi th  a  l a rge  degree  o f  openness  r e l a t ive  to  the  o the r  coun t r i e s  who  a re
the i r  pa r tne r s ,  t he  cos t -bene f i t  c a l cu lus  i s  l i ke ly  t o  t i l t  t owards  j o in ing  a
mone ta ry  un ion .  Fo r  o the r  coun t r i e s  t ha t  have  a  r e l a t i ve ly  low openness
toward  the  res t  o f  the  zone ,  the  case  fo r  jo in ing  a  mone ta ry  un ion  does
no t  appea r  t o  be  ove rwhe lming .  However ,  some  coun t r i e s  w i th  a  l ow
t rade  sha re  in  the  zone  may  never the les s  f ind  i t  advan tageous  to  jo in  a
mone ta ry  un ion .  The  case  o f  c red ib i l i ty  i s sues  makes  i t  c l ea r  tha t  h igh-
in f la t ion  coun t r i e s  migh t  dec ide  tha t  i t  i s  in  the i r  in te res t  to  jo in  a
mone ta ry  un ion  desp i t e  the  f ac t  tha t  the i r  sha re  o f  t r ade  wi th  the
members  o f  the  un ion  i s  r e l a t ive ly  low.  The  “mone ta r i s t ”  v i ew a rgues
tha t  fo r  coun t r i e s  w i th  such  a  l ow deg ree  o f  openness ,  t he  bene f i t s  cou ld
a l so  make  sense  fo r  them f rom an  economic  po in t  o f  v iew.
The  cos t -bene f i t  ca l cu lus  o f  a  mone ta ry  un ion  i s  a l so  g rea t ly  in f luenced
by  the  degree  o f  wage  and  p r i ce  r ig id i t i e s .  Coun t r i e s  in  wh ich  the  degree
o f  wage  and  p r i ce  r ig id i t i e s  i s  l ow,  expe r i ence  lower  cos t s  when  they
move  towards  a  mone ta ry  un ion  (F ig .3 .10) .
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Figure  3 .10 .  Cos t s  and  bene f i t s  w i th  increas ing  r ig id i t i e s
A dec l ine  in  wage  and  p r i ce  r ig id i t i e s  has  the  e f f ec t  o f  sh i f t i ng  the  cos t -
l i ne  in  F ig .3 .10  downwards .  As  a  r e su l t ,  t he  c r i t i ca l  po in t  a t  wh ich  i t
becomes  advan tageous  fo r  a  coun t ry  t o  r e l i nqu i sh  i t s  na t i ona l  cu r r ency
i s  l owered .  More  coun t r i e s  become  cand ida te s  fo r  a  mone ta ry  un ion .  In  a
s imi la r  way ,  an  inc rease  in  the  degree  o f  mobi l i ty  o f  l abour  sh i f t s  the
cos t  cu rve  to  the  l e f t  and  makes  a  mone ta ry  un ion  more  a t t r ac t ive .
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CHAPTER IV. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA
4 . 1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many  Af r i can  coun t r i e s  have  changed  s ince  the  end  o f  the i r  s t rugg les  fo r
independence .  Af r i ca ’ s  economies  have  expanded ,  modern
communica t ions  have  speeded  up  the  acqu i s i t i on  o f  knowledge  and
conduc t ing  o f  bus ines s ,  and  a  s i zeab l e  e l i t e  en joys  a  s t anda rd  o f  l i v ing
on  a  pa r  w i th  any  o the r s  i n  t he  r i che r  wor ld  (Kay izz i ,  1999 ) .  Howeve r ,
s ince  the  1980s  Af r i can  s t a t e s ,  l i ke  o the r  deve lop ing  a reas ,  have  had  to
f ace  t he  c r i s e s  o f  dec l i n ing  l i v ing  s t anda rds ,  i nadequa t e  soc i a l  s e rv i ce s
and  educa t ion ,  weak  ins t i tu t ions ,  low vo lumes  o f  fo re ign  inves tmen t ,
h igh  ex te rna l  deb t ,  h igh  in f l a t ion ,  weak  cu r renc ies ,  po l i t i ca l  and
economic  in s t ab i l i t y .  Ove r - r e l i ance  on  the  pub l i c  s ec to r  fo r  economic
deve lopmen t ,  war  and  insu r rec t ion ,  r ap id  popu la t ion  g rowth ,
de te r io ra t ing  t e rms  o f  t r ade  fo r  r aw ma te r i a l s ,  mass ive  unemployment ,
g rowing  u rban i sa t i on ,  env i ronmen ta l  deg rada t ion  and  HIV/AIDS a re
typ i ca l  a r ea s  o f  conce rn  fo r  Af r i can  coun t r i e s .  Economic  and  mone ta ry
in t eg ra t i on  i s  more  complex  i n  Af r i ca ,  due  t o  t he  d i f f e r en t  s t ages  o f
deve lopmen t  w i th in  t he  con t inen t .
K imuyu  (1999)  s t a t e s  t ha t ,  i n  t e rms  o f  economic  a r r angemen t s ,  t he  f ea r
o f  Af r i can  coun t r i e s  i s  t ha t ,  wh i l e  t hey  a r e  t oo  weak  to  r e s i s t  ex t e rna l
p re s su re  fo r  concess ions ,  t hey  a re  equa l ly  unab le  t o  exe r t  much
in f luence  on  the  emerg ing  conf igu ra t ions .  He  a rgues  tha t ,  i n  r ecen t
ga the r ings ,  coun t r i e s  i n  Af r i ca  have  emphas i s ed  economic  coope ra t i on
as  t he  ba s i s  o f  t he i r  i nd iv idua l  and  co l l ec t i ve  p rospe r i t y .  Th i s  change  o f
a t t i t ude ,  coup led  w i th  r ap id ly  chang ing  domes t i c  economic  s t ruc tu re s ,
may  p rov ide  the  con t inen t  w i th  a  be t t e r  ba rga in ing  pos i t i on  in  i t s  e f fo r t s
to  de r ive  more  bene f i t  f rom the  expand ing  g loba l  economy.
Economic  coope ra t ion  ve ry  o f t en  focuses  on ly  on  t r ade  r e l a t ed  top ic s ,
bu t  fo r  Af r i ca  in  genera l ,  i n t eg ra t ion  can  a l so  be  seen  as  “a  veh ic le  fo r
r educ t ion  o f  economic  and  po l i t i c a l  dependence  upon  coun t r i e s”  (Weeks ,
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1996 :7 ) .  The  pu rpose  o f  t h i s  chap te r  i s  t o  ana lyse  t he  r eg iona l
in t eg ra t ion  schemes  in  Af r i ca  in  the  pe r spec t ive  o f  the  r ap id ly  chang ing
g l o b a l  e c o n o m y .  T h e  c h a p t e r  r e v i e w s  t h e  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n
expe r i ence  i n  Af r i ca ,  d i s cus se s  imped imen t s  t o  t he  succes s  o f
reg iona l i sm in  Af r i ca  and  cons ide r s  r equ i remen t s  tha t  cou ld  make  i t
more  e f f ec t ive  unde r  Af r i can  cond i t ions .
4 .2 .  Prerequ i s i t e s  for  economic  in tegra t ion  in  Afr i ca
In  1991 ,  gove rnmen t s  o f  t he  Organ i sa t ion  o f  Af r i can  Un i ty  (OAU)
recogn i sed  tha t  the  economic  in t eg ra t ion  o f  the  con t inen t  i s  a  p re -
r equ i s i t e  fo r  t he  r ea l i s a t i on  o f  t he  OAU and  s igned  the  T rea ty
es tab l i sh ing  the  Af r ican  Economic  Communi ty  ( the  Abuja  Trea ty ) .  The
ob jec t ives  o f  t he  communi ty  t ha t  was  e s t ab l i shed  ( in  p r inc ip l e )  by  the
Abu ja  T rea ty  a r e  t o :  i nc r ea se  economic  s e l f - r e l i ance ,  p romote  an
endogenous  and  s e l f - su s t a ined  deve lopmen t ,  and  r a i s e  t he  s t anda rd  o f
l i v ing  o f  Af r i c an  peop l e ,  i n  o rde r  t o  p romo te  economic  deve lopmen t  on
the  con t inen t .
The  Abu ja  T rea ty  emphas i s e s  soc i a l ,  cu l t u r a l  and  economic  i n t eg ra t i on
as  t he  means  by  wh ich  economic  deve lopmen t  w i l l  be  ach ieved  on  the
con t inen t ,  bu t  i t  downplays  po l i t i ca l  i n t eg ra t ion  a s  a  necessa ry  f ac to r  in
the  sea rch  fo r  soc ia l ,  cu l tu ra l  and  economic  in t eg ra t ion  and ,  u l t ima te ly ,
economic  deve lopmen t .  Muk i sa  and  Thompson  (1995)  s t a t e  t ha t  t he
Trea ty  men t ions  t he  concep t  o f  po l i t i c a l  i n t eg ra t i on  on ly  once ,  and  even
then ,  on ly  i n  pas s ing .  They  add  tha t  by  downp lay ing  the  impor t ance  o f
po l i t i ca l  in t eg ra t ion  on  the  con t inen t ,  t he  Trea ty  f a i l s  to  mee t  the
requ i r emen t s  fo r  t he  a t t a inmen t  o f  i t s  ob j ec t i ve s .  So  much  depends  on
po l i t i ca l  i n t eg ra t ion  tha t  any  mode l  ignor ing ,  o r  even  downplay ing ,  t he
impor tance  o f  tha t  f ac to r  i s  bound  to  be ,  in  the  f ina l  ana lys i s ,  o f  l imi ted
use  to  p roponen t s  o f  economic  deve lopmen t  on  the  con t inen t .
The  Un i t ed  Na t ions  Economic  Commiss ion  fo r  Af r i ca  (ECA) ,  a long  wi th
the  OAU member  s t a t e s ,  has  he ld  tha t  economic  deve lopment  on  the
con t inen t  can  bes t  be  ach ieved  th rough  economic  in t eg ra t ion .  Th i s
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pos i t i on  i s  based  on  the  be l i e f  t ha t  many  Af r i can  s t a t e s  a re  too  sma l l  t o
be  economica l ly  v iab le .  Accord ing  to  Adede j i  (1992) ,  the  head  o f  ECA,
“more  than  eve r  be fo re ,  Af r i ca  needs  fundamen ta l  change  and
t r ans fo rma t ion  -  po l i t i c a l ,  e conomic ,  soc i a l  and  cu l tu r a l ” .
The  Abuja  Trea ty  inc luded  in  the  moda l i t i e s  e s t ab l i sh ing  the  AEC “ the
f ree  movement  o f  peop le ,  goods ,  cap i t a l  and  se rv ices ,  a s  we l l  a s  the
p rov i s ions  he re in  r ega rd ing  the  r i gh t s  o f  r e s idence  and  e s t ab l i shmen t”
and  the  “ in t eg ra t ion  o f  a l l  s ec to r s  namely  economic ,  po l i t i ca l ,  soc ia l  and
cu l tu ra l ” .  Th i s  h igh l igh t s  t he  r e l evance  o f  soc i a l  i n t eg ra t ion  to  t he  goa l
o f  economic  in tegra t ion .
Mukisa  and  Thompson  (1995)  a s sume  tha t  f r equen t  con tac t  and
communica t ion  l ead  peop le  t o  ge t  t o  know one  ano the r  be t t e r  and ,
hope fu l ly ,  t o  abandon  s t e r eo types  and  ca r i ca tu re s  o f  one  ano the r .  Th i s
may  merge  them toge the r  po l i t i c a l l y  and  then  encourage  soc i a l
in t eg ra t ion  th rough  remova l  o f  ba r r i e r s  t o  such  in t eg ra t ion .
Othe r  f ac to r s  l ead ing  to  soc ia l  and  cu l tu ra l  d i s in t eg ra t ion  inc lude
ins t i tu t iona l i sed  r ac i sm (as  in  apa r the id  Sou th  Af r i ca ) ,  r e l ig ious
con f l i c t ,  ex t r eme  na t i ona l i sm ,  na t i ona l  bounda r i e s ,  i gno rance  (na r row
wor ld  v i ews) ,  unen l igh tened  po l i t i ca l  l eade r sh ip ,  e t c .
The  r e so lu t i on  o f  t he se  p rob l ems  r equ i r e s  a  c e r t a in  deg ree  o f  po l i t i c a l
i n t eg ra t i on .  Wi thou t  t h i s ,  i t  i s  d i f f i cu l t  t o  s ee  how soc i a l  and  cu l tu ra l
in t eg ra t ion  wi l l  be  ach ieved ,  s ince  the  l a t t e r  w i l l  a lways  be  he ld  hos tage
to  t he  po l i t i c a l  r e l a t i ons  among  the  pa r tne r  s t a t e s .  Fu r the rmore ,  po l i t i c a l
in t eg ra t ion  can  l ead  to  i n t e rna t iona l  peace  by  r educ ing  the  number  o f
po ten t i a l  con te s t an t s  i n  the  po l i t i ca l  and  mi l i t a ry  a renas ,  and  to
economic  sav ing  by  r educ ing  the  number  o f  s t and ing  a rmies  on  the
con t inen t  and  poo l ing  s ecu r i t y  cos t s .
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4 . 3 .  A f r i c a n  i n t e g r a t i o n  s c h e m e s
Dur ing  the  OAU summi t  i n  1973 ,  a  dec l a r a t i on  on  economic
independence ,  deve lopmen t  and  coope ra t i on  was  adop ted ,  wh ich
compe l l ed  member  coun t r i e s  t o  e s t ab l i sh  p rocedures  and  mechan i sms  fo r
co-o rd ina t ing  t r ade  po l i c i e s  in  o rde r  to  move  the  con t inen t  towards
economic  g rowth ,  v i a  j o in t  t r ade  and  deve lopmen t  i n s t i t u t ions .  Fu r the r ,
a  “Lagos  P lan  o f  Af r i ca”  was  d rawn  up  in  1980  under  which  Af r i can
gove rnmen t s  commi t t ed  t hemse lves  t o  pu r su ing  co l l ec t i ve  s e l f - r e l i ance
and  the  s t r eng then ing  o f  ex i s t i ng  g roup ings ,  a s  we l l  a s  i n i t i a t i ng  new
ones .  The  u l t ima te  goa l  was  the  c rea t ion  o f  an  Af r i can  Economic
Communi ty  (AEC)  by  the  yea r  2000 .
Af r i can  r eg iona l  i n t eg ra t ion  schemes  have  e i the r  f a i l ed  o r  have  s t ayed  in
ex i s t ence  on ly  on  pape r ,  w i th  ve ry  l i t t l e  p rogres s  towards  t ak ing  the
measures  tha t  would  be  necessa ry  to  make  them happen .   The  AEC i s
ve ry  spec i f i c  in  i t s  goa l s  to  accompl i sh  i t s  ob jec t ives ,  bu t  i t  i s  f ac ing
the  same  obs t ac l e s  t ha t  t he  o the r  r eg iona l  a t t empt s  expe r i enced .  The re  i s
a l so  no  guaran tee  tha t  Af r i can  l eade r s  wi l l  p l ace  con t inen ta l  in t e res t
above  na t iona l s ’  in te res t .  There  i s  genera l ly  a  f ea r  among  member
c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  b e n e f i t s  d e p e n d s  o n
the  l eve l  o f  each  coun t ry ’ s  economic  deve lopmen t  and  the  s i ze  o f  t he i r
domes t i c  economy.  The  AEC wi l l  add res s  t h i s  p rob lem by  g ran t ing
spec ia l  a s s i s t ance  to  t he  l ea s t  deve loped ,  l and locked ,  s emi - l and locked
and  i s l and  coun t r i e s .
Recen t ly ,  t he  New Pa r tne r sh ip  fo r  Af r i ca ’ s  Deve lopmen t  (NEPAD)  was
presen ted  to  Af r i can  l eade r s  a t  t he  OAU Summi t  in  Lusaka  in  Ju ly  2001 ,
and  was  endorsed  by  the  Summi t .  NEPAD i s  a  ho l i s t i c ,  i n t eg ra t ed
sus t a inab le  deve lopmen t  i n i t i a t i ve  fo r  t he  economic  and  soc i a l  r ev iva l  o f
Af r i ca  (NEPAD progres s  r epo r t ,  2002) .  Accord ing  to  t h i s  r epo r t ,  i t
cons t i t u t e s  a  p l edge  by  Af r i can  l eade r s ,  based  on  a  common  v i s ion  and  a
f i rm  and  sha red  conv ic t ion  tha t  t hey  have  a  p re s s ing  du ty  to  t he  Af r i can
p e o p l e  t o  e r a d i c a t e  p o v e r t y  a n d  t o  p l a c e  t h e i r  c o u n t r i e s ,  b o t h
ind iv idua l ly  and  co l l ec t ive ly ,  on  a  pa th  o f  sus t a inab le  g rowth  and
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deve lopment  and ,  a t  t he  same  t ime ,  to  pa r t i c ipa te  ac t ive ly  in  the  wor ld
economy and  body  po l i t i c .  NEPAD i s  t he  soc io -economic  deve lopmen t
b luepr in t  fo r  the  Af r ica  Union  to  implement  i t s  ob jec t ives ,  and  i t  i s  the
mechan i sm fo r  acce le ra t ing  the  implemen ta t ion  o f  the  Abu ja  Trea ty .
4 .3 .1 .  The  Economic  Communi ty  o f  Wes t  Afr i can  S ta te s  (ECOWAS)
4 . 3 . 1 . 1 .  B a c k g r o u n d
ECOWAS i s  an  impor t an t  g roup ing  tha t  i nc ludes  F rench  and  Eng l i sh
speak ing  coun t r i e s .  I t  was  founded  in  1975  wi th  four t een  members ,
name ly  Ben in ,  Burk ina -Faso ,  Co te  d ’ Ivo i r e ,  Gu inea -B i s sau ,  Ma l i ,  N ige r ,
Senega l ,  Togo ,  N ige r i a ,  Ghana ,  Gu inea ,  L ibe r i a ,  S i e r r a -Leone  and
Gambia .  Cape  Verde  jo ined  in  1977 .
The  goa l  o f  ECOWAS i s  t o  p romote  g rea t e r  adop t ion  o f  a  common
indus t r i a l  po l i cy ,  and  ensu re  a  f a i r  d i s t r i bu t ion  o f  bene f i t s  f rom
economic  in teg ra t ion .
In  Apr i l  2000 ,  s ix  o f  t he  ECOWAS coun t r i e s  (Gambia ,  Ghana ,  Gu inea ,
L i b e r i a ,  N i g e r i a  a n d  S i e r r a - L e o n e )  d e c l a r e d  t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n  t o  a d o p t  a
common  cu r rency  by  Janua ry  2003  and  to  work  towards  merg ing  the i r
p l anned  mone ta ry  un ion  wi th  the  Wes t  Af r i can  Economic  Un ion
(WAMU)  by  Janua ry  2004 .  The  ob j ec t i ve  o f  t he  Wes t  Af r i can  Mone ta ry
Zone  (WAMZ)  i s  to  merge  wi th  the  CFA (Communau te  F i n a n c i e r e
Af r i ca ine ) .  The  CFA zone  has  been  in  ex i s t ence  s ince  the  co lon ia l
pe r iod  and  was  the  f i r s t  mone ta ry  zone ,  fo rmed  by  f rancophone
coun t r i e s ,  in  the  r eg ion .  The  reg ion  i s  the  mos t  popu lous  and
economica l ly ,  a s  we l l  a s  cu l tu ra l ly ,  t he  mos t  d ive r s i f i ed  o f  t he  Sub-
Saha ra  Af r i can  g roup ings  (Wor ld  Bank ,  2002) .
4 . 3 . 1 . 2 .  O b j e c t i v e s  o f  E C O W A S
The  ove ra l l  ob jec t ive  o f  ECOWAS i s  to  p romote  coopera t ion  and
in teg ra t ion  in  o rde r  to  c rea t e  an  economic  and  mone ta ry  un ion  fo r
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encourag ing  economic  g rowth  and  deve lopmen t  i n  Wes t  Af r i ca .  I n  o rde r
to  do  t h i s ,  t he  fo l l owing  ac t i ons  a r e  env i saged :
·  t he  supp re s s ion  o f  cus toms  du t i e s  and  equ iva l en t  t axes ;
·  t he  e s t ab l i shmen t  o f  a  common  ex t e rna l  t a r i f f ;
·  t he  ha rmon i sa t ion  o f  economic  and  f inanc ia l  po l i c i e s ;
·  the  c rea t ion  o f  a  mone ta ry  zone .
However ,  t he  s lowness  o f  t he  r ea l i s a t ion  o f  t hose  ac t ions  has  l ed
ECOWAS member  s t a t e s  t o  r ev i s e  t he  1975  Trea ty .  The  p r inc ip l e s  o f
sup rana t iona l i t y  i n  t he  app l i ca t ion  o f  dec i s ions  and  the  au tonomous
fund ing  o f  t he  budge t s  o f  t he  in s t i t u t ions  have  been  in t roduced .
Fur the rmore ,  t he  c r ea t ion  o f  sup rana t iona l  i n s t i t u t i ons  o f  con t ro l  and
a rb i t r a t i on  has  been  env i saged  in  t he  app l i ca t ion  o f  dec i s ions ,  r ega rd ing
a  cou r t  o f  j u s t i ce ,  a  pa r l i amen t  and  an  economic  and  soc i a l  counc i l .
4 . 3 . 1 . 3 .  C o n v e r g e n c e  c r i t e r i a
In  o rder  to  re f l ec t  the  wish  to  ha rmonise  the  ECOWAS economic
po l i c i e s  w i th in  t he  f r amework  o f  t he  ob j ec t i ve s  o f  t he  r ev i sed  T rea ty
and  to  acce le ra t e  the  c rea t ion  o f  an  ECOWAS mone ta ry  zone ,  member
s t a t e s  spe l t  ou t  i n  1997  some  ob jec t ives  r ega rd ing  conve rgence
ind ica to r s .
The  convergence  c r i t e r i a ,  wh ich  wi l l  be  c lose ly  moni to red  wi th in  the
f r amework  o f  t he  mone ta ry  coope ra t ion  p rog ramme,  have  been  expanded
as  fo l lows :
4 . 3 . 1 . 3 . 1 .  P r i m a r y  c r i t e r i a
Member  s t a t e s  shou ld  adhe re  s t r i c t l y  t o  t he  fo l l owing  fou r  c r i t e r i a  wh ich
have  been  chosen  fo r  the i r  u se fu lness  in  the  a s ses smen t  o f  t he  degree  o f
mac roeconomic  s t ab i l i t y  a t t a ined  and ,  pa r t i cu l a r ly ,  f o r  t he  ach i evemen t
o f  t he  in t e rna l  and  ex te rna l  ba l ance  o f  t he  economies  o f  member  s t a t e s .
These  w i l l  r ende r  t he  p roposed  s ing le  cu r r ency  more  v i ab l e :
47
·  r a t io  o f  budge t  de f i c i t  ( exc lud ing  g ran t s )  t o  GDP.  Th i s  w i l l  be
c a l c u l a t e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  c o m m i t m e n t  a n d  s h o u l d  b e  l o w e r  t h a n  4
pe r  cen t  by  the  yea r  2002 ;
·  i n f l a t ion  r a t e :  5  pe r  cen t  by  2003 ;
·  cen t ra l  bank  f inanc ing  o f  budge t  de f i c i t  l imi t ed  to  10  pe r  cen t  o f  the
prev ious  yea r ’ s  t ax  r evenue .  Member  s t a t e s  to  comply  by  2003 ;
·  gros s  r evenues :  g ros s  ex t e rna l  r e se rves  shou ld  r ep re sen t  no  l e s s  t han
s ix  months  o f  impor t s  by  2003 .
Accord ing  to  Anon  (2001) ,  up  un t i l  2000 ,  on ly  Gambia  had  met  a l l
c r i t e r i a ,  N ige r i a ,  t he  dominee r ing  economy,  had  me t  t h ree ,  Gu inea  two
and  Ghana  and  S ie r ra  Leone  one .  Fa i lu re  to  mee t  the  c r i t e r i a  was
appa ren t ly  due  to  ex t e rna l  f ac to r s  l i ke  sha rp  dec l ines  i n  t he  p r i ce s  o f
cocoa  and  go ld  du r ing  1999  and  inc reases  in  o i l  p r i ce s .  Th i s  e spec ia l ly
a f f ec t ed  Ghana  nega t ive ly .  Howeve r ,  N ige r i a  and  Gambia  have  bo th  now
sa t i s f i ed  the  convergence  c r i t e r i a  fo r  jo in ing  the  WAMZ.
4 . 3 . 1 . 3 . 2 .  S e c o n d a r y  c r i t e r i a
Member  s t a t e s  shou ld  a l so  adhe re  t o  t he  s econda ry  c r i t e r i a ,  wh ich  a r e
des igned  to  sus t a in  the  p r imary  c r i t e r i a  and  f ac i l i t a t e  ach ievemen t  o f  t he
c o n v e r g e n c e  t a r g e t s :
·  proh ib i t i on  o f  new domes t i c  a r r ea r s  and  l i qu ida t i on  o f  a l l  ex i s t i ng
a r rea r s ;
·  t ax  r evenue /GDP ra t i o  equa l  t o  o r  more  t han  20  pe r  cen t ;
·  wage  b i l l / t ax  r evenue  equa l  t o  o r  l e s s  than  35  pe r  cen t ;
·  rea l  exchange  ra te  s t ab i l i ty ;
·  i n t e re s t  r a t e s :  coun t r i e s  mus t  ma in ta in  pos i t ive  r ea l  i n t e re s t  r a t e s ;
·  pub l i c  cap i t a l  expend i tu re /  t ax  r evenue  r a t i o :  equa l  t o  o r  more  t han
20  pe r  cen t .
In  sp i t e  o f  t he  d i f f i cu l t i e s ,  ECOWAS has  cha lked  up  r emarkab le
progress  in  ce r t a in  a reas ,  l i ke  the  f r ee  movement  o f  pe r sons ,
t e l ecommunica t i on ,  and  roads  (Wor ld  Bank ,  2000 ) .  I t  i s  i n  t he  a r ea  o f
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economic  in t eg ra t ion  tha t  t he  e f fo r t s  o f  t he  communi ty  have  been  mos t
f rus t r a t ing .  In  f ac t ,  t he  t r ade  l ibe ra l i sa t ion  schemes  a re  no t  ye t
opera t iona l ,  a s  shown by  the  lower  l eve l  o f  the  i n t r a r eg iona l  t r ade ,
which  i s  on ly  11  pe r  cen t  a s  compared  to  t r ade  wi th in  the  th i rd
coun t r i e s .  Bes ides ,  t he  common ECOWAS ex te rna l  t a r i f f  has  s t i l l  no t
seen  the  l igh t  o f  day  and  the  economic  and  f inanc ia l  po l i c i e s  have  no t
been  ha rmon i sed  a l though  a  f r amework  has  been  e s t ab l i shed  fo r  t h i s .
4 . 3 . 1 . 4 .  A c h i e v e m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t s  o f  E C O W A S
As sa id  above ,  ECOWAS has  made  r emarkab le  p rogres s  in  the  a rea  o f
f r ee  movemen t  o f  pe r sons ,  cons t ruc t ion  o f  r eg iona l  roads ,  deve lopmen t
o f  t e l ecommunica t ion  l i nks  be tween  the  s t a t e s  and  ma in tenance  o f  peace
and  r eg iona l  s ecu r i t y .  Howeve r ,  numerous  p rob l ems  have  been
encoun te r ed  by  ECOWAS in  t he  enhancemen t  o f  t he  p roces s  o f  r eg iona l
in t eg ra t ion  o f  Wes t  Af r i ca .  Among  the  mos t  impor t an t  o f  t hose  p rob lems
a re :  t he  po l i t i ca l  i n s t ab i l i t y  and  bad  gove rnance  tha t  have  p l agued  many
of  the  coun t r i e s ;  t he  weakness  o f  the  na t iona l  economies  and  the i r
i n su f f i c i en t  d ive r s i f i c a t i on ;  t he  i n su f f i c i en t  po l i t i c a l  w i l l  exh ib i t ed  by
some  member  s t a t e s ;  t he  mu l t i p l i c i t y  o f  o rgan i sa t ions  fo r  r eg iona l
in teg ra t ion  wi th  the  same  ob jec t ives ;  t he  f a i lu re  to  invo lve  c iv i l  soc ie ty ,
the  p r iva t e  s ec to r  and  mass  movemen t s  i n  t he  p rocess  o f  i n t eg ra t ion ;  and
the  economic  and  po l i t i c a l  dominance  o f  F rance  ove r  i t s  f o rmer  co lon ie s
i s  add ing  to  in t r a - r eg iona l  conf l i c t s  ( Danso ,  1995 ) .
The re  a r e ,  however ,  p romis ing  s igns  wh ich  ind ica t e  be t t e r  p rospec t s  fo r
the  fu tu re .  Among  these  a re :  t he  adven t  o f  democracy  in  mos t  ECOWAS
coun t r i e s ,  pa r t i cu l a r ly  in  N ige r i a  wh ich  i s  t he  dominan t  economy in  the
reg ion ;  t he  g radua l  w i thd rawa l  o f  t he  s t a t e s  f rom the  s ec to r s  o f
p roduc t ive  ac t iv i ty ,  and  the  r ea l i s a t ion  tha t  t he  p r iva t e  sec to r  mus t  be
the  ma inspr ing  o f  g rowth  and  economic  in t eg ra t ion ;  the  adop t ion  o f  a
s t r a t egy  fo r  acce le ra t ing  the  ECOWAS process  o f  i n t eg ra t ion  in  o rde r  t o
c r ea t e  a  s i ng l e  r eg iona l  marke t  ba sed  on  t r ade  l i be r a l i s a t i on ,  t o  e s t ab l i sh
a  common  ex t e rna l  t a r i f f  and  ha rmon i se  economic  and  f i nanc i a l  po l i c i e s ;
the  ha rmon i sa t ion  o f  t he  p rogrammes  o f  ECOWAS and  UEMOA in
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connec t ion  wi th  t he  acce l e ra t i on  o f  t he  p roces s  o f  i n t eg ra t ion  in  Wes t
Af r i ca ;  t he  common  cha l l enge  tha t  i s  t h rown  down  by  the  c r ea t ion  o f
t r ade  b locs  i n  o the r  r eg ions  o f  t he  wor ld  and  by  g loba l i s a t i on ,  wh ich
r i sks  marg ina l i s ing  Af r i ca ;  th i s  makes  i t  necessa ry  to  acce le ra te  the
t r ans i t i ons  t owards  an  au tonomous  and  s e l f - f i nanced  deve lopmen t  w i th in
the  f ramework  o f  Af r ican  in tegra t ion .
4 .3 .2 .  The  Common Market  for  Eas tern  and  Southern  Afr i ca
 (COMESA) .
4 . 3 . 2 . 1 .  B a c k g r o u n d
COMESA was  e s t ab l i shed  in  November  1983  by  a  t r ea ty  wh ich  en t e r ed
in to  fo rce  in  1984 .  I t s  membersh ip  compr i sed  a  to ta l  o f  twen ty - two
s ta t e s :  Ango la ,  Burund i ,  The  Comoros ,  D j ibou t i ,  E th iop ia ,  Kenya ,
Leso tho ,  Madagasca r ,  Ma lawi ,  Maur i t i u s ,  Mozambique ,  Namib i a ,
Rwanda ,  The  Seyche l l e s ,  Soma l i ,  Sudan ,  Swaz i l and ,  Tanzan ia ,  Uganda ,
Zambia  and  Z imbabwe .  The  p reamble  o f  the  COMESA Trea ty  makes
p rov i s ion  fo r  bo th  Bo t swana  and  Sou th  Af r i ca  t o  j o in  t he  r eg iona l
g roup ing  upon  fu l f i lmen t  o f  such  cond i t i ons  a s  may  be  de t e rmined  by
the  COMESA Author i ty .  As  o f  now,  Sou th  Af r i ca  r ema ins  a  non-member
o f  COMESA.  Th i s  o rgan i sa t i on  was  s e t  up  t o  r ep l ace  t he  P re fe r en t i a l
Trade  Area  (PTA)  fo r  Eas t e rn  and  Sou the rn  Af r i ca ,  t he  ob jec t ives  o f
wh ich  were :  t o  c r ea t e  t r ade  wi th in  t he  Eas t e rn  and  Sou the rn  Af r i can
reg ion  and  to  d ive r t  t r ade  away  f rom the  t hen  apa r the id  Sou th  Af r i ca .
The  p rocess  o f  economic  in t eg ra t ion  unde r  t h i s  r eg iona l  i n t eg ra t ion
scheme  has  now progressed  f rom a  p re fe ren t i a l  t r ade  a rea  and  i s
des igned  to  have  th ree  phases .  The  f i r s t  phase  re la tes  to  the
es t ab l i shmen t  o f  a  p re fe ren t i a l  t r ade  a rea .  Th i s  i s  fo l lowed  by  the
convers ion  in to  a  common marke t .  F ina l ly ,  i t  i s  expec ted  tha t  the
common marke t  wi l l  become  an  economic  communi ty .
4 . 3 . 2 . 2 .  O b j e c t i v e s  o f  C O M E S A
Art i c l e  3  o f  t he  COMESA Trea ty  s t a t e s  t he  fo l lowing  a s  t he  ma in
o b j e c t i v e s :
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·  To a t t a in  the  sus t a inab le  g rowth  and  deve lopmen t  o f  t he  Member
S ta t e s  by  p romot ing  a  more  ba l anced  and  ha rmon ious  deve lopmen t
o f  t he i r  p roduc t ion  and  marke t ing  s t ruc tu re ;
·  To  p romote  j o in t  deve lopmen t  i n  a l l  f i e ld s  o f  economic  ac t i v i t i e s
and  jo in t  adop t ion  o f  macro -economic  po l i c i e s  and  p rogrammes  to
ra i se  the  s t anda rd  o f  l i v ing  o f  the i r  peop le  and  fos t e r  c lose r
r e l a t i ons  among  the i r  Member  S t a t e s ;
·  To  co -ope ra t e  i n  t he  c r ea t ion  o f  an  enab l ing  env i ronmen t  fo r
fo re ign ,  c ros s  bo rde r  and  domes t i c  i nves tmen t ,  i nc lud ing  the  j o in t
p romot ion  o f  r e sea rch  and  adap t a t i on  o f  s c i ence  and  t echno logy  fo r
deve lopmen t ;
·  To  co -ope ra t e  i n  t he  p romo t ion  o f  peace ,  s ecu r i t y  and  s t ab i l i t y
among  Member  S t a t e s  i n  o rde r  t o  enhance  economic  deve lopmen t  i n
the  r eg ion ;
·  T o  c o - o p e r a t e  i n  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  C o m m o n
Marke t  and  t he  r e s t  o f  t he  Wor ld  and  t he  adop t ion  o f  common
pos i t i ons  in  the  in t e rna t iona l  s cene ;
·  To  con t r i bu t e  t owards  t he  e s t ab l i shmen t ,  p rog re s s ,  and  r ea l i s a t i on  o f
the  ob jec t ives  o f  t he  Af r i can  Economic  Communi ty .
In  add i t ion  to  the  above  ob jec t ives ,  t he  COMESA Trea ty  dea l s  w i th  the
need  fo r  COMESA Member  S ta t e s  to  ha rmoni se  the i r  mone ta ry  and  f i sca l
po l i c i e s  so  tha t  a  much  more  e f f i c i en t  a l loca t ion  o f  r e sources  wi th in  the
Common Marke t  can  be  r ea l i sed .  The  Trea ty  a l so  spe l l s  ou t  the  need  fo r
s t a t e s  t o  e s t ab l i sh  cu r r ency  conve r t i b i l i t y .  The  accompl i shmen t  o f  t h i s
ob jec t ive  by  COMESA Member  S ta t e s  wou ld  g rea t ly  f ac i l i t a t e  the
se t t i ng  up  o f  a  r eg iona l  s tock  exchange  and  a t  t he  same  t ime  encourage
the  founda t ion  o f  a  cu r rency  un ion .
4 .3 .2 .3 .  Mone ta ry  and  F i sca l  Po l i c i e s  Harmoni sa t i on  Programme
I n  1 9 9 2 ,  C O M E S A  M e m b e r  S t a t e s  a d o p t e d  a  M o n e t a r y  a n d  F i s c a l
Po l i c i e s  Ha rmon i sa t i on  P rog ramme  towards  t he  e s t ab l i shmen t  o f  a
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mone ta ry  un ion  in  the  yea r  2025 .  Th i s  p rogramme has  the  fo l lowing
s t a g e s :
S t age  one  (1992 -1996 ) :  conso l i da t i on  o f  ex i s t i ng  i n s t rumen t s  o f
mone ta ry  coope ra t ion  and  imp lemen ta t ion  o f  po l i cy  measu res  a imed  a t
ach iev ing  macroeconomic  convergence .  To  gauge  p rogress  towards  th i s
ob jec t ive ,  conve rgence  c r i t e r i a  were  fo rmula t ed ;
S t age  two  (1997 -2000) :  i n t roduc t i on  o f  l im i t ed  cu r r ency  conve r t i b i l i t y
and  an  i n fo rma l  exchange  r a t e  un ion;
S t age  t h r ee  (2000-2004) :  f o rma l  exchange  r a t e  un ion  and  coo rd ina t i on  o f
economic  po l i c i e s  by  a  common  mone ta ry  in s t i t u t ion ;  and
Stage  four  (2025) :  fu l l  mone ta ry  un ion  invo lv ing  the  use  o f  one  common
cur rency  i s sued  by  a  common  cen t r a l  bank .
The  u l t ima te  ob jec t ive  o f  t he  above  p rogramme i s  t o  e s t ab l i sh  a
mone ta ry  un ion  a s  shown  a t  s t age  fou r ,  and  thus  enab le  t he  common
marke t  to  a t t a in  the  s t a tus  o f  an  Economic  Communi ty .
To  ach ieve  the  even tua l  goa l  o f  a  fu l l  mone ta ry  un ion ,  the re  i s  a  need
fo r  member  s t a t e s  t o  beg in  p repa r ing  themse lves  now fo r  t h i s  even tua l i t y
by  deve lop ing  a  coo rd ina t ed  managemen t  s t r a t egy  and  p romot ing
na t iona l  ac t ions  t owards  po l i cy  coo rd ina t ion  and  ha rmon i sa t ion .  I t  i s ,
t he re fo re ,  e s sen t i a l  fo r  t he  member  s t a t e s  t o  inc rease  in t e rac t ion  among
themse lves  on  po l i cy  ma t t e r s  by  exchang ing  in fo rma t ion  on  economic
deve lopmen t s  i n  i nd iv idua l  member  coun t r i e s  and  on  the  po l i cy
ins t ruments  used  to  in f luence  them.
4 . 3 . 2 . 4 .  M a c r o e c o n o m i c  C o n v e r g e n c e  C r i t e r i a
In  o rde r  t o  a s ses s  t he  p rogres s  be ing  made  towards  an  Mone ta ry  and
F i sca l  Harmon i sa t ion  P rog ramme,  a  number  o f  conve rgence  c r i t e r i a  were
fo rmula ted ,  wi th  a  v iew of  gaug ing  the  p rogress  be ing  made  by  the
member  s t a t e s  i n  t he  imp lemen ta t ion  o f  t he  p rog ramme.  The  ob jec t ive  o f
th i s  i s  t o  de t ec t  obs t ac l e s  t ha t  cou ld  s t and  in  t he  way  o f  imp lemen ta t ion
and  to  a l low fo r  t he  exped i t ious  imp lemen ta t ion  o f  r emed ia l  measu res ,
so  tha t  the  member  s t a t e s  wou ld  have  ach ieved  su f f i c i en t
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macroeconomic  convergence  to  se t  t he  s t age  fo r  mov ing  to  mone ta ry
union.
These  mac roeconomic  ind i ca to r s  a r e :
U s e  o f  m a r k e t  d e t e r m i n e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s :  r a t e  o f  t he  pa ra l l e l  t o  t he
o f f i c i a l e x c h a n g e  r a t e ,  t h e  r e a l  e f f e c t i v e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e ,  a n d  i n f l a t i o n
r a t e s ;
Harmon i sa t ion  o f  f i s ca l  po l i c i e s :  ( a )  a  max imum leve l  o f  the  pe rcen tage
of  f i s ca l  de f i c i t  t o  GDP o f  4 .5  pe r  cen t ,  annua l ly  dec reas ing  to  3  pe r
cen t  by  the  end  o f  1996 ;  (b )  a  l imi t  o f  10  pe r  cen t  GDP o f  c l a ims  by  the
cen t r a l  gove rnmen t ;  ( c )  a  cen t r a l  bank  f inanc ing  o f  t he  budge t  de f i c i t
l imi ted  to  no t  more  than  20  pe r  cen t  o f  the  p rev ious  yea r ’ s  f i sca l
r evenue ,  i n  o rde r  t o  ha rmon i se  l imi t s  on  in f l a t i ona ry  f inanc ing ;  (d )  an
inc rease  in  t ax  revenue  to  a t  l eas t  10  pe r  cen t  to  GDP by  1996 ,  i nc reas ig
the rea f t e r  by  one  pe rcen t age  po in t  annua l ly ;
Other  i nd i ca to r s  o f  macroeconomic  convergence :  ( a )  mode ra t e  mone ta ry
expans ion  invo lv ing  se t t i ng  o f  pe r iod ic  t a rge t s  fo r  t he  g rowth  o f  money
supp ly ,  money  (M1)  and  quas i  money  (M2) ,  w i th  an  ind ica t ive  g rowth
ra t e  fo r  money  supp ly  de r ived  f rom mul t ip ly ing  the  r a t e  o f  g rowth  o f
GDP by  one  p lus  t he  cons ide red  to l e r ab l e  i n f l a t i on  r a t e  p lu s  a  marg in
no t  exceed ing  f ive  pe r  cen t ;  (b )  adequa te  f low o f  c red i t  t o  t he  p r iva t e
sec to r ;  ( c )  e l imina t ing  o f  d i r ec t  c r ed i t  con t ro l s  on  bank  l end ing ;
(d )  de regu la t i on  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and  p rog re s s ive  d i sman t l i ng  o f  i n t e r e s t
r a t e  ce i l ings ;  ( e )  use  o f  ind i rec t  in s t rument s  o f  mone ta ry  con t ro l  such  as
re se rve  r equ i r emen t s ,  changes  in  d i scoun t  r a t e s  and  open  marke t
ope ra t ions ,  acco rd ing  to  the  s t ance  o f  t he  cu r ren t  mone ta ry  po l i cy .
4 . 3 . 2 . 5 .  O b s t a c l e s  t o  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  C O M E S A  a s  a n  e c o n o m i c  a n d
m o n e t a r y  b l o c
T h e  e c o n o m i c  r a t i o n a l e  b e h i n d  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a  r e g i o n a l  A f r i c a n
t rade  zone  i s  based  on  the  expec ta t ion  tha t  f r ee  t r ade  wi l l  he lp  ensu re
reg iona l  marke t  acces s  fo r  l oca l  p roduce r s ,  t he reby  enab l ing  the  r eg ion
to  deve lop  w i th  a  g r ea t e r  deg ree  o f  economic  p red i c t ab i l i t y .  I t  i s  a l so  a
s t ep  away  f rom dependency  on  nor the rn  marke t s ,  wh ich  con t inue  to
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presen t  Af r i can  expor t s  w i th  numerous  imped imen t s  desp i t e  s eve ra l
ag reement s  wi th  the  f i r s t  wor ld  (C o t o n o u  A g r e e m e n t ,  Lome
Conven t ion…) .
By  no  means  exhaus t ive ,  t he  l i s t  o f  f ac to r s  be low p rov ides  a  g l impse  o f
the  number ,  magn i tude  and  complex i ty  o f  imped imen t s  to  an  in t eg ra t ed
economic  and  mone ta ry  b loc .
4 .3 .2 .5 .1 .  T h e  c h a l l e n g e  o f  a n  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  e c o n o m i c  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e
Ndulo  (1993)  a rgues  tha t  t he  economic  in f r a s t ruc tu re  in  Af r i ca  i s
inadequa te  to  suppor t  economic  in t eg ra t ion .  He  obse rves  tha t  one  o f  the
ma jo r  cons t r a in t s  on  the  g rowth  and  deve lopmen t  o f  i n t e r -Af r i can  t r ade
has  been  the  i nadequacy  o f  paymen t  and  f inanc i a l  sy s t ems :  “ Inc reased
Af r i can  t r ade  wi l l  need  f inance  and  f inanc ia l  i n s t rumen t s  such  a s
bank ing  ne tworks  p rov id ing  l e t t e r s  o f  c r ed i t ,  expor t  c r ed i t s  and  o the r
f i nanc i a l  s e rv i ce s” .  I n  add i t i on ,  t he  po l i t i c a l  w i l l  amongs t  COMESA
member  s t a t e s  mus t  be  s t rong  be fo re  the  o rgan i sa t ion  can  beg in  to  th ink
of  ach iev ing  i t s  goa l s .
4 .3 .2 .5 .2 .  T h e  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  a g e n d a  a s  a  c o n s t r a i n t  t o  i n t e g r a t i o n
In  many  pa r t s  o f  the  wor ld ,  d i f f e ren t  s t a t e s  have  d i f f e ren t  ideo log ies  and
o f t en  pu r sue  d i f f e r en t  e conomic  po l i c i e s  a t  d i f f e r en t  t imes .  S t rong
commi tmen t  t o  pu r sue  d i f f e ren t  na t iona l  goa l s  mi l i t a t e s  aga ins t  t he  idea
of  reg iona l  in tegra t ion .
The  se l f - in t e re s t  p rob lem,  wh ich  i s  unde r s t andab ly  widesp read  in
COMESA member  s t a t e s ,  has  inc reas ing ly  become  acu te  in  the  l i gh t  o f
t h e  I M F  a n d  t h e  W o r l d  B a n k  S t r u c t u r a l  A d j u s t m e n t  P r o g r a m s  (S A P s ) .
The  s imi l a r i t y  o f  IMF and  Wor ld  Bank  po l i cy  s t r i ngs ,  c a l l ed
cond i t iona l i ty ,  a t t ached  to  the  loans  g iven  to  many  COMESA coun t r i e s
has  l ed  to  iden t i ca l  measures  and  p rogrammes  in  these  coun t r i e s .
P r iva t i s a t i on  ( a s  pa r t  o f  cond i t i ona l i t y )  i s  now be ing  embarked  upon  a t  a
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compe t i t i ve ly  hu r r i ed  pace  in  many  COMESA member  s t a t e s .  Fo re ign
inves tmen t  i s  be ing  sough t  ambi t i ous ly .
I t  i s  hence  ev iden t  t ha t  t he  ha rmon i sa t ion  o f ,  s ay ,  na t iona l  f i s ca l
po l i c i e s  i n  t he  r eg ion  wi l l  no t  be  ea sy  to  ach ieve  because  o f  t he
unwi l l i ngness  o f  many  COMESA member  s t a t e s  t o  fo rgo  some  o f  t he i r  so
ca l l ed  “na t iona l  p r io r i t i e s” .  Ye t  na t iona l  p r io r i t i e s  mus t  be  s een  a s
complementa ry  to  r eg iona l  in t e res t  i f  r eg iona l  in t eg ra t ion  i s  to  succeed
in  Afr ica .
4 . 3 . 2 . 5 . 3 .  L a c k  o f  a  s u p r a - n a t i o n a l  s t a t e  p o l i c i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n
Anothe r  p rob lem fac ing  the  COMESA reg iona l  i n t eg ra t ion  scheme  i s  t he
absence  o f  a  sup ra -na t iona l  s t a t e  po l i c ing  sys t em.  I t  i s  we l l  e s t ab l i shed
tha t  i n t e rna t iona l  l aw has  l imi t ed  mechan i sms  fo r  po l i c ing  s t a t e s
(Cassese ,  1994) .  The  l ack  o f  a  sup ra -na t iona l  i n s t i t u t ion  to  en fo rce
t r ea ty  ob l iga t ions  and  to  po l i ce  member  s t a t e s  i s  a  ma jo r  sho r t coming  o f
many  reg iona l  in t eg ra t ion  schemes .  The  COMESA in teg ra t ion  scheme  i s
no t  f ree  f rom th i s  p rob lem.
4 . 3 . 2 . 6 .  P o l i t i c a l  t r a n q u i l l i t y  a s  a  p r e r e q u i s i t e  t o  r e g i o n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n
Ndulo  (1993)  a rgues  tha t  no  ma t t e r  how good  the  a rgumen t s  l ook  on
paper ,  t he  po l i t i ca l  env i ronmen t  fo r  t he i r  imp lemen ta t ion  and
prese rva t ion  mus t  be  r igh t  fo r  t he  e f fo r t  t o  succeed .  He  obse rves  fu r the r
tha t  e conomic  coope ra t i on  and  in t eg ra t i on  f l ou r i sh  be t t e r  i n  an
env i ronmen t  t ha t  i s  po l i t i ca l ly  peace fu l  and  s t ab l e .  Bu t  some t imes
po l i t i ca l  t r anqu i l l i t y  wi l l  no t  f ac i l i t a t e  e f f ec t ive  r eg iona l  i n t eg ra t ion .  To
i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s ,  t he  end ing  o f  apa r the id  i n  Sou th  Af r i ca  ha s  p romoted  a
pe r iod  o f  in t ense  in s t ab i l i t y  in  the  e s t ab l i shed  r eg iona l  t r ad ing
a r rangement s ,  a  po in t  t ha t  C ibb  (1997)  makes  when  he  s t a t e s :  “ In  May
1994 ,  Sou th  Af r i ca  was  fo rma l ly  inv i t ed  to  jo in  COMESA.  However ,
Sou th  Af r i ca  dec l ined  the  inv i t a t ion  and ,  a s  a  consequence ,  o the r  SADC
member  s t a t e s  t ha t  a r e  a l so  member s  o f  COMESA de l ayed  r a t i f i c a t i on  o f
t h e  1 9 9 3  C O M E S A  T r e a t y ” .  S o u t h  A f r i c a ’ s  r e f u s a l  t o  j o i n  C O M E S A
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prompted  the  t hen  Sec re t a ry -Gene ra l  o f  COMESA to  warn  Sou th  Af r i ca
tha t  i t  cou ld  f ace  pun i t ive  economic  t a r i f f s .  Neve r the l e s s ,  a t  t he
Sep tember  1995  SADC Summi t  mee t ing  he ld  in  Johannesburg ,  member
s t a t e s  (o f  t he  SADC)  dec ided  tha t  dua l  membersh ip  o f  SADC and
COMESA was  incompa t ib l e  and  tha t  SADC s t a t e s  shou ld  r e s ign  the i r
membersh ip  o f  COMESA.
4 .3 .3 .  The  Southern  Afr i can  Deve lopment  Communi ty  (SADC)
4 . 3 . 3 . 1 .  B a c k g r o u n d
The  Sou the rn  Af r i can  Deve lopmen t  Coord ina t i on  Commi t t ee  (SADCC)
was  founded  in  1980  to  ga lvan i se  the  “ f ron t - l ine  s t a t e s”  in  the i r  s t rugg le
aga ins t  apa r the id  Sou th  Af r i ca ,  and  was  l a t e r  b roadened  to  inc lude  the
fo rmer  enemy i t se l f  (Kimuyu ,  1999) .  I t  was  a l so  c rea ted  wi th  the
pu rpose  o f  r educ ing  t he  dependence  o f  t he  r eg ion  on  Sou th  Af r i ca  and  o f
seek ing  fo re ign  f inanc ia l  suppor t  fo r  deve lopmen t  p ro j ec t s  t ha t  cou ld
no t  be  unde r t aken  by  any  o f  t he  ind iv idua l  coun t r i e s  a lone .
K imuyu  (1999)  po in t s  ou t  t ha t  t r e a t i e s  t o  upg rade  i n t e r ac t i on  be tween
member  coun t r i e s  were  s igned ,  an  ove r r id ing  conce rn  be ing  to  ensu re
tha t  soc io -economic  d i f f e rences  among  coun t r i e s  d id  no t  l ead  to
po l i t i c a l  i n s t ab i l i t y .  He  adds  t ha t  coope ra t ion  was  e s t ab l i shed  in  a  vas t
number  o f  a r ea s  and  t he  g roup ing  was  r enamed  the  Sou the rn  Af r i can
Deve lopmen t  Communi ty  (SADC) .  I t  i s  a l so  a rgued  by  h im tha t  w i th  the
en t ry  o f  the  Democra t i c  Repub l i c  o f  Congo ,  SADC has  one  o f  the
wor ld ’ s  h ighes t  concen t ra t ions  o f  non-o i l  mine ra l  p roduce r s  and  thus
some  se r ious  g loba l  l eve rage .
SADC was  founded  wi th  the  a ims  o f  e s t ab l i sh ing  a  f r ee  t r ade  a rea  and
moving  towards  an  economic  communi ty .  When  Sou th  Af r i ca  j o ined
SADC in  1994 ,  the  p rospec t  o f  Sou the rn  Af r i can  in t eg ra t ion  became
rea l i sab le  (Morna ,  1994 ) .  Member  s t a t e s  i nc lude  Ango la ,  Bo t swana ,
Democra t i c  Repub l i c  o f  Congo ,  Leso tho ,  Ma lawi ,  Maur i t i u s ,
Mozambique ,  Namib ia ,  Seyche l l e s ,  Sou th  Af r i ca ,  Swaz i l and ,  Tanzan ia ,
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Zambia  and  Z imbabwe .  The  new o rgan i sa t ion  focuses  on  p roduc t ion ,
i n v e s t m e n t  a n d  i n t r a - r e g i o n a l  t r a d e  (Morna ,  1994) .  Coopera t ion  in  the
a r ea s  o f  s ecu r i t y ,  peace ,  democracy  and  con f l i c t  r e so lu t i on  ha s  become  a
major  goa l .
The  co rne r s tone  o f  r eg iona l  economic  in t eg ra t ion  in  SADC i s  t he  Trade
Pro toco l ,  wh ich  has  the  goa l  o f  inc reas ing  in t ra - reg iona l  t r ade  to  35  pe r
cen t  by  2004  f rom the  25  pe r  cen t  in  2000 ,  wi th  an  u l t ima te  goa l  o f  85
per  cen t  by  2008 .  As  a  r e su l t ,  Sou th  Af r i ca  has  d ropped  i t s  in t r a -
r eg iona l  t a r i f f s  by  76  pe r  cen t  i n  2001 ,  Maur i t i u s  by  51  pe r  cen t ,  Ma lawi
by  41  pe r  cen t ,  and  Z imbabwe  by  30  pe r  cen t  (Anon ,  2001) .  However ,
t r ade  p romot ion  and  the  ab i l i t y  t o  a t t r ac t  fo re ign  d i r ec t  i nves tmen t
depends  on  a  coun t ry ’ s  and  r eg ion ’ s  mac roeconomic  pe r fo rmance .
4 . 3 . 3 . 2 .  M a c r o e c o n o m i c  e n v i r o n m e n t  o f  t h e  S A D C  r e g i o n
Accord ing  to  Anon  (2001) ,  t he re  a re  some  190  mi l l ion  peop le  in  the
fou r t een  SADC coun t r i e s  and ,  a t  cu r r en t  r a t e s  o f  g rowth  ( ave rage  o f  2 .5
pe r  cen t  annua l ly ) ,  a lmos t  a l l  o f  t he se  w i l l  doub le  t he i r  popu la t i ons
wi th in  the  f i r s t  two  decades  o f  the  21 s t  cen tu ry .  As  economic  g rowth  i s
un l ike ly  to  ave rage  more  than  2  to  2 .5  pe r  cen t  annua l ly  ac ross  the
reg ion ,  t h i s  imp l i e s  a  s t ead i ly  dec l in ing  r a t e  o f  pe r  cap i t a  i ncome .
The  i s sue  o f  HIV/AIDS wi l l  be  o f  i nc rea s ing  r e l evance  t o  bo th
demograph i c  and  economic  deve lopmen t .  Many  au tho r s  a rgue  t ha t ,  wh i l e
i t  w i l l  s ign i f i can t ly  cu r t a i l  popu la t ion  g rowth ,  i t  w i l l  a l so  ho ld  back
increases  in  GDP.  Thus ,  popu la t ion  g rowth  wi l l  be  lower  in  the  fu tu re
due  to  the  impac t  o f  AIDS,  and  mor ta l i ty  r a t e s  a re  a l so  expec ted  to
inc rease  in  ch i ld ren  under  the  age  o f  f ive ,  due  to  the  t r ansmiss ion  o f  the
HIV/AIDS v i rus  f rom mother  to  ch i ld  (Du  To i t ,  2000) .
The  a rea  occup ie s  abou t  9 .3  mi l l i on  squa re  k i lome t re s ,  w i th  enormous
re se rves  o f  go ld ,  d i amonds ,  coppe r ,  u r an ium,  n i cke l  and  coba l t .  R ive r s
cover  a lmos t  ha l f  o f  the  r eg ion  and  th i s  c rea tes  huge  po ten t i a l  fo r  the
deve lopment  o f  i r r iga t ion ,  hydropower ,  f i she r i e s  and  tour i sm.
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By  the  ea r ly  1980s ,  a l l  member  s t a t e s  had  expe r i enced  t he  S t ruc tu ra l
Ad jus tmen t  po l i c i e s ,  sponso red  p r imar i l y  by  the  Wor ld  Bank  and  the
IMF.  These  invo lved  a  r educ t ion  o f  s t a t e  con t ro l  ove r  economies ,  t he
l ibe ra l i s a t i on  o f  i n t e rna l  marke t s ,  an  open ing  to  i n t e rna t iona l
compe t i t i on ,  t he  marke t  ad jus tmen t  o f  cu r r ency  exchange  mechan i sm,  a
pos i t i ve  a t t i t ude  towards  fo re ign  inves tmen t ,  t he  p r iva t i s a t i on  o f  s t a t e -
owned  en te rp r i s e s  and  the  p romot ion  o f  p r iva t e  en t e rp r i s e  i n  gene ra l .
Bu t  r e su l t s  have  thus  fa r  t ended  to  be  d i sappo in t ing .  Rea l  annua l  GDP
has  ba re ly  inc reased  by  1 .5  pe r  cen t  be tween  1980-90 ,  t he  g rowth  o f  t he
manufac tu r ing  indus t ry  has  no t  s ign i f i can t ly  improved ;  expor t s  con t inue
to  con ta in  mos t ly  p r imary  commodi t i e s  (Anon ,  2001) .
However ,  r ecen t  pe r iods  show an  inc rease  o f  g rowth  fo r  t he  SADC
reg ion  genera l ly .  In  2002 ,  the  reg iona l  g rowth  ra te  r eached  3 .4  pe r  cen t
compared  to  1 .8  pe r  cen t  in  2000 .
Anon  (2001)  a rgues  tha t  wh i l e  the  vo lume  o f  expor t s  has  inc reased
subs tan t i a l ly ,  t he i r  va lue  has  dec l ined  d ras t i ca l ly ,  l ead ing  to  weak  and
d i sadvan taged  pa r t i c ipa t ion  in  t he  g loba l  economy.  In  t he  s ame  pe r iod ,
the  r eg iona l  ex te rna l  deb t  was  more  than  US  $  79  b i l l i on  in  2000 .
I t  i s  be l i eved  t ha t  SADC cou ld  be  more  succes s fu l  t han  o the r  Af r i can
group ings  due  to  Sou th  Af r i ca ’ s  i nvo lvemen t  (Harvey ,  2000) .  Harvey
s ta t e s  tha t  Sou th  Af r i ca ’ s  GDP makes  up  45  pe r  cen t  o f  the  to t a l  Sub-
Saha ran  Af r i ca  GDP and  74  pe r  cen t  o f  SADC’s  GDP.  Howeve r ,  Sou th
Af r i ca  l ags  beh ind  Maur i t i u s  and  Bo t swana  in  t e rms  o f  GDP pe r  cap i t a .
In  2000 ,  Maur i t i u s  had  a  GDP pe r  cap i t a  o f  $  3500 ,  wh i l e  Sou th  Af r i ca ’ s
was  l e s s  t han  $  3000 .
A re l a t ive ly  good  in f ra s t ruc tu re  i s  p re sen t  i n  the  r eg ion ,  w i th  r e l a t ive ly
advanced  t e l ecommunica t ions ,  r a i lways ,  po r t s  and  road  t r anspor t
sys t ems .  Howeve r ,  cos t - e f f ec t i ve  t e l ecommunica t i ons  need  to  be
deve loped .  Deve lop ing  coun t r i e s  spend  on ly  2  pe r  cen t  o f  t he i r  annua l
budge t  on  r e sea rch  and  deve lopmen t ,  a s  compared  t o  more  t han  10  pe r
cen t  in  the  f i r s t  wor ld  coun t r i e s  (Hough  and  Neu land ,  2000) .
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Governmen t  and  p r iva t e  sec to r  fund ing  in  r e sea rch  and  deve lopmen t  wi l l
have  to  be  mobi l i sed  in  o rde r  to  inc rease  the  r eg ion’s  compe t i t ive
advan tage .
Tour i sm i s  r ea sonab ly  deve loped  in  the  a rea  wi th  0 .9  pe r  cen t  o f  t he
to t a l  wor ld  tou r i sm income  in  1997 ,  bu t  71  pe r  cen t  o f  t ha t  o f  Sub-
Saharan  Af r ica  (Du  To i t ,  2000) .  Sou th  Af r i ca  en joys  a  cons ide rab le
borde r  t r ade  in  tou r i sm in  the  SADC reg ion .  However ,  po l i t i ca l  fo rces
l ike  the  h igh  c r ime  in  Sou th  Af r i ca ,  and  the  po l i t i ca l  d i s tu rbance  in
Z imbabwe  in f luence  the  pe rcep t ions  o f  t he  i n t e rna t iona l  t r ave l l e r .
4 . 3 . 3 . 3 .  O b s t a c l e s  t o  a n d  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  S A D C  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n
The  ma jo r  cons t r a in t s  o f  advanced  indus t r i a l i s a t i on  i n  t he  SADC reg ion
inc lude  t he  r e s t r i c t ed  s i ze  o f  domes t i c  demand ,  compara t i ve ly  h igh
fac to r  cos t ,  a  s ca rc i t y  o f  fo re ign  exchange ,  t he  l ack  o f  f i nanc i a l
r e sources  and  the  l imi t ed  number  o f  indus t r i a l  en t rep reneurs .  La rge
l o c a l  m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d  e n t e r p r i s e s  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  c o n s t r a i n e d  b y
l imi t ed  domes t i c  pu rchas ing  power ,  l a ck  o f  i n t e rna t i ona l
compe t i t i veness  and  a  se r ious  sho r t age  o f  fo re ign  exchange ,  and  thus
wi l l  p robab ly  r emain  modes t  i n  number  and  canno t  be  the  base  fo r  a
dynamic  indus t r i a l i s a t ion  wi th  d ive r s i f i ca t ion  and  loca l  i n t eg ra t ion .  The
lower  l eve l  o f  deve lopmen t  o f  some  SADC economies  i n  t e rms  o f
t echno logy ,  in f ra s t ruc tu re ,  t echn ica l  and  manager i a l  sk i l l s  i nc reases  the
r i sk  o f  marg ina l i sa t ion .
One  ma jo r  cha l l enge  i s  t o  deve lop  s t ruc tu res  and  adop t  appropr i a t e
po l i c i e s  t ha t  t r ans fo rm the  r eg ion ’ s  p roduc t i ve  capac i t y  r ega rd ing
manufac tu red  p roduc t s  fo r  expor t .  The re  i s  s t i l l  a  heavy  r e l i ance  on
fo re ign  f inanc ing ,  p r imar i ly  in  the  fo rm o f  ex te rna l  bo r rowing  and
of f i c i a l  g ran t s ,  and ,  exc lud ing  Bo t swana  and  Maur i t i u s ,  t he  r eg ion  has  a
combined  ex t e rna l  deb t  o f  a round  45  pe r  cen t  o f  t he  combined  GDPs .
However ,  t he re  i s  much  po ten t i a l  fo r  economic  deve lopmen t  and
as soc i a t ed  soc i a l  enhancemen t .  SADC member  s t a t e s  r ecogn i se  t ha t  t he re
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are ,  fo r  ins tance ,  many  oppor tun i t i e s  fo r  fo re ign  inves to rs  to  improve
the  p roduc t iv i ty  o f  va lue -added  manufac tu r ing  th rough  app ly ing  new
techno logy .  Abundan t  ag r i cu l tu ra l  and  o the r  na tu ra l  r e sou rces ,  mine ra l s ,
wa te r ,  hydropower ,  f i she r i e s  and  human  re sources  a re  ye t  t o  be  t apped
and  the i r  e f fec t ive  exp lo i t a t ion  cou ld  g ive  the  r eg ion  a  compe t i t ive  edge
over  o the r  marke t s .
As  remarked  above ,  ac ross  much  o f  the  SADC,  the re  i s  a  r e l a t ive ly  good
in f ra s t ruc tu re ,  wh ich  i s  a  p re requ i s i t e  fo r  an  emerg ing  r eg iona l  marke t
and  inves tmen t  des t ina t ion .  The  r eg ion  has  made  subs tan t i a l  i nves tmen t s
in  t e l ecommunica t ions ,  r a i lways ,  and  road  t r anspor t  sys t ems  and  these
a re  inc reas ing ly  be ing  en te red  in to  by  the  p r iva te  sec to r .
T h e  S A D C  d e v e l o p m e n t  c o r r i d o r s  a r e  u n d e r p i n n e d  b y  s t r o n g  p o l i t i c a l
commi tmen t ,  pub l i c -p r iva t e  pa r tne r sh ips  and  pos i t i ve  i nves tmen t
imp l i ca t i ons .  Se rv i ce  s ec to r  oppor tun i t i e s  a r e  eno rmous ,  e spec i a l l y  i n
tour i sm,  which  i s  r ap id ly  g rowing ,  and  a l so  l abour  in t ens ive .
Robson  (1998)  s t a t e s  t ha t  mone ta ry  in t eg ra t ion  in  t he  SADC reg ion
requ i r e s  t ha t  exchange  r a t e s  mus t  bea r  a  pe rmanen t ly  f i xed  r e l a t i onsh ip
to  each  o the r  and  tha t  fu l l  conver t ib i l i t y  ex i s t s  in  the  sense  tha t  t he re
a re  no  exchange  con t ro l s  on  the  cu r r en t  o r  cap i t a l  a ccoun t .  Howeve r ,
Khamfu la  and  Hu iz inga  (2004 )  sugges t ed  t ha t  t he r e  a r e  l ow  deg ree s  o f
symmet ry  o f  exchange  r a t e  shocks  ac ros s  mos t  members  o f  t he  SADC,  so
tha t  fo rming  a  mone ta ry  un ion  among  these  economies  wou ld  amass  h igh
cos t s  r e l a t i ve  t o  t he  bene f i t s .
Al l  in  a l l ,  Sou the rn  Af r i ca  i s  an  emerg ing  marke t ,  wh ich  shou ld  a t t r ac t
subs t an t i a l  domes t i c  and  fo re ign  inves tmen t  l ead ing  to  sus t a ined  g rowth
and  deve lopmen t ,  p rov ided  tha t  i t s  i ndus t r i e s  a r e  ab l e  t o  compe te
domes t i ca l l y ,  r eg iona l ly  and  in t e rna t iona l ly .
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4 .3 .4 .  The  Eas t  Afr i can  Communi ty  (EAC)
4 . 3 . 4 . 1 .  B a c k g r o u n d
Accord ing  to  K imuyu  (1999) ,  r eg iona l  coope ra t i on  i n  Eas t  Af r i ca  ha s  a
long  t r ad i t ion  go ing  back  to  the  fo rmat ion  o f  a  cus toms  un ion  in  1917 .
The  r eg ion  pos se s sed  a  common  cu r r ency  boa rd ,  common  r a i lways ,
ha rbou r s  and  a i r  s e rv i ce s .  The  educa t i on  sy s t em was  ba sed  on  common
cur r i cu la ,  and  un ive r s i t i e s  ma in ta ined  a  common  admiss ion  po l i cy .  The
Eas t  Af r i can  Communi ty  (EAC) ,  e s t ab l i shed  in  1967 ,  was  once  l auded  a s
the  be s t  example  o f  r eg iona l  coope ra t i on .  Th i s  communi ty  was  founded
b y  c o u n t r i e s  ( K e n y a ,  U g a n d a ,  a n d  T a n z a n i a )  t h a t  p o s s e s s e d  a  c o m m o n
cur rency ,  t he  Eas t  Af r i can  Sh i l l i ng ,  unde r  Br i t a in ’ s  co lon ia l  ru l e .
In  the  1960’s ,  a f t e r  independence ,  each  coun t ry  i s sued  i t s  own  cur rency ,
bu t  t he  EAC in  1967  spec i f i ed  f r ee  exchange  be tween  the  na t iona l
cu r r enc i e s  a t  pa r .  Af t e r  1966 ,  t he  ru l e s  o f  t he  cu r r ency  boa rd  we re
loosened ,  g iv ing  gove rnmen t s  more  in f luence  ove r  t he i r  cen t r a l  banks
and  r emov ing  the  f loo r s  on  o f f i c i a l  r e se rves .  L imi t s  on  advances  to
governmen t s  were  unde rmined  and  c red i t  was  channe l l ed  to  gove rnmen t s
and  pub l i c  s ec to r  en t i t i e s  i nd i r ec t ly  v i a  t he  commerc i a l  banks
(Gu i l l aume  and  S t a savage ,  2000 ) .  I n  add i t i on ,  po l i t i c a l  d i f f e r ences
be tween  governments  made  fu r the r  coopera t ion  imposs ib le  and  the  EAC
was  d i sbanded  in  1977 .
However ,  t he  a t t r ac t ion  o f  an  Eas t  Af r i can  marke t  compr i s ing  c lo se  t o
90  mi l l i on  peop le  and  more  than  100  mi l l i on ,  i f  Rwanda  and  Burund i
jo ined  the  Communi ty ,  con t inued  to  be  a  s t rong  a rgumen t  fo r  c lo se  t i e s .
Thus ,  a  f ew yea r s  ago ,  r eg iona l  l eade r s  dec ided  to  r e sume  coope ra t ion ,
even  th rough  in i t i a l ly  on  a  sma l l e r  s ca l e .
Fu l l  coope ra t ion  ope ra t ions  s t a r t ed  in  1996  when  the  Sec re t a r i a t  o f  t he
pe rmanen t  T r ipa r t i t e  (Kenya ,  Tanzan ia ,  and  Uganda )  commiss ion  was
launched  in  Tanzan ia .  Cons ide r ing  the  need  to  conso l ida te  r eg iona l
coopera t ion ,  t he  th ree  government s  d i r ec t ed  the  ag reemen t  in to  a  Trea ty ,
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which  was  s igned  in  Arusha  in  1999 .  The  Trea ty  en te red  in to  fo rce  in
2000 ,  so  tha t  t he  Eas t  Af r i can  Communi ty  came  in to  be ing  once  aga in .
In  2001 ,  t he  governmen t s  o f  Rwanda  and  Burund i  conf i rmed  the i r
commi tmen t  t o  r eg iona l  coope ra t i on  a s  a  way  o f  p romot ing  sus t a inab le
deve lopmen t .  They  exp res sed  the i r  des i r e  t o  j o in  t he  EAC and  r eques t ed
the  Sec re t a r i a t  t o  cons ide r  t he i r  app l i ca t ions  fo r  membersh ip .
4 . 3 . 4 . 2 .  O b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  E A C
The  broad  goa l  o f  the  EAC i s  to  enhance  coopera t ion  in  a l l  a reas  fo r  the
mutua l  bene f i t  o f  t he  Pa r tne r  S ta t e s .  To  ach ieve  th i s ,  t he  fo l lowing
o b j e c t i v e s  w e r e  s e t :
·  P r o m o t i o n  o f  t h e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  a n d  e q u i t a b l e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f
pa r tne r  s t a t e s ,  i nc lud ing  r a t iona l  u t i l i s a t ion  o f  t he  r eg ion ’ s  na tu ra l
r e sou rce s  and  p ro t ec t i on  o f  t he  env i ronmen t ;
·  St reng then ing  and  conso l ida t ing  the  longs t and ing  po l i t i ca l ,
economic ,  soc i a l ,  cu l tu ra l  and  t r ad i t i ona l  t i e s  amongs t  pa r tne r
s t a t e s ,  and  t he  a s soc i a t i ons  be tween  t he  peop le  o f  t he  r eg ion ,  t o
p romote  a  peop le -cen t r ed  mu tua l  deve lopmen t ;
·  Enhanc ing  and  s t r eng then ing  t he  pa r t i c i pa t i on  o f  t he  p r i va t e  s ec to r
and  c iv i l  soc ie ty ;
·  Mains t r eaming  o f  gende r  i n  a l l  i t s  p rog rammes  an  enhancemen t  o f
t he  ro l e  o f  women  in  deve lopmen t ;
·  Promot ing  o f  good  gove rnance  inc lud ing  adhe rence  to  the  p r inc ip l e s
o f  a  democra t i c  ru l e  o f  l aw ,  accoun tab i l i t y ,  t r anspa rency ,  soc i a l
j u s t i ce ,  equa l  oppor tun i t i e s  and  gende r  equa l i t y ;  and
·  Promot ion  o f  peace  and  s t ab i l i t y  wi th in  the  r eg ion ,  and  good
ne ighbour l i ne s s  among  the  pa r tne r  s t a t e s .
4 . 3 . 4 . 3 .  T h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  S t r a t e g y  o f  t h e  E A C
The  Deve lopmen t  S t r a t egy  s e t s  ou t  t he  p r io r i t y  p rog rammes  t o  be
implemen ted  du r ing  the  pe r iod  2001-2005 .  The  p rog rammes  a re  i n  l i ne
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wi th  the  b road  goa l  o f  the  EAC.  The  v i s ion  o f  reg iona l  in tegra t ion  in
Eas t  Af r i ca  i s  to  c rea te  wea l th ,  r a i se  the  l iv ing  s t andards  o f  a l l  peop le
o f  Eas t  Af r i ca  and  enhance  the  in t e rna t iona l  compe t i t i veness  o f  the
reg ion .  Th i s  wi l l  be  ach ieved  th rough  inc reased  p roduc t ion ,  t r ade  and
inves tmen t s  in  the  r eg ion .  Dur ing  the  implementa t ion  o f  th i s  s t r a t egy ,
the  focus  wi l l  be  on  ach iev ing  a  cus toms  un ion  and  a  common marke t .
The  Deve lopmen t  S t r a t egy  iden t i f i e s  twe lve  a r eas  o f  coope ra t ion ,
namely  macroeconomic  po l i c i e s  i nc lud ing  mone ta ry  and  f i s ca l  po l i c i e s ;
t r ade  l i be r a l i s a t i on  and  deve lopmen t ;  p roduc t i ve  s ec to r s  cons i s t i ng  o f
ag r i cu l tu re  and  food  secu r i ty ,  i nves tmen t  and  indus t r i a l  deve lopmen t ,
tou r i sm and  wi ld l i f e ,  and  env i ronmen t  and  na tu ra l  r e sources ;
in f r a s t ruc tu re  and  suppor t ive  s e rv i ce s ;  human  r e sou rce  deve lopmen t ,
and  tha t  o f  sc i ence  and  t echno logy ;  soc ia l  s ec to r s ,  immigra t ion  and
labour  po l i c i e s ;  l ega l  and  jud ic i a l  a f f a i r s ;  po l i t i ca l  ma t t e r s  i nc lud ing
peace ,  s ecu r i t y  and  de fence ;  b road  pa r t i c ipa t i on  o f  women ,  p r iva t e
sec to r  and  the  c iv i l  soc ie ty ;  r e l a t ions  wi th  o the r  r eg iona l  and
in t e rna t i ona l  o rgan i sa t i ons ;  i n s t i t u t i ona l  a r r angemen t s  a t  t he  l eve l  o f
the  Pa r tne r  S t a t e s  and  t he  EAC Sec re t a r i a t ;  manag ing  d i s t r i bu t ion  o f
bene f i t s  and  cos t s  a s  c ros scu t t i ng  i s sues .
4 .3 .4 .4 .  Ach ievements  and  prospec t s  o f  the  EAC
The  mos t  impor tan t  ach ievement  o f  the  EAC i s  the  upgrad ing  o f  the
1993  ag reemen t  e s t ab l i sh ing  the  Pe rmanen t  T r ipa r t i t e  Commiss ion  fo r
Eas t  Af r i can  Coope ra t ion  in to  a  T rea ty  fo r  t he  e s t ab l i shmen t  o f  t he  Eas t
A f r i c a n  C o m m u n i t y  i n  1 9 9 9 .  A m o n g  o t h e r  p r o m i s i n g  s i g n s  w h i c h
ind ica t e  be t t e r  p rospec t s  fo r  t he  fu tu re ,  t he re  a r e :  t he  e s t ab l i shmen t  o f
Sec to ra l  Counc i l s  and  S e c t o r a l  C o m m i t t e e s  t o  a r t i c u l a t e  p o l i c i e s  o n  e a c h
agreed  a rea  o f  coope ra t ion ;  t he  imp lemen ta t ion  o f  t a r i f f  r educ t ions
whe reby  Kenya  app l i e s  90  pe r  c en t ,  and  Tanzan i a  and  Uganda  80  pe r
cen t ,  t a r i f f  r educ t ions ;  t he  r emova l  o f  a l l  non - t a r i f f  ba r r i e r s  on  c ros s
bo rde r  t r ade ;  t he  ongo ing  ha rmon i sa t ion  o f  s t anda rds  and  spec i f i ca t ions
o f  goods  and  se rv i ces ;  t he  ongo ing  ha rmon i sa t ion  o f  t he  i nves tmen t
incen t ive s  and  codes  o f  t he  Pa r tne r  S t a t e s .
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Bes ides  these ,  ma jo r  ach ievements  o f  the  EAC can  be  found  in  the
ha rmon i sa t ion  o f  mone ta ry  and  f i s ca l  po l i c i e s ,  and  in  t he  f i e ld  o f  cap i t a l
marke t s .  The re  a r e  s igns  o f  p rog re s s  i n  t he  deve lopmen t  o f  a
macroeconomic  f r amework  fo r  the  r eg ion  to  be  gu ided  towards  economic
conve rgence  and  mac roeconomic  s t ab i l i t y ;  t he  conve r t i b i l i t y  o f  Pa r tne r
S ta te s ’  cu r renc ies ;  t he  ha rmonisa t ion  o f  VAT ra te s ,  wh ich  now range
be tween  16  pe r  cen t  and  20  pe r  cen t ;  t he  i n s t i t u t i ona l i s a t ion  o f  F inance
Min i s t e r s ’  p r e  and  pos t -budge t  consu l t a t i ons ,  r egu l a r  sha r i ng  o f
in fo rma t ion  on  budge t s ,  t ax  p roposa l s ,  t r ade  and  economic  pe r fo rmance ,
inc lud ing  the  r ead ing  o f  Budge t  S ta t emen t s  on  the  same  day ;  the
ha rmon i sa t ion  o f  po l i c i e s  and  t r ad ing  p rac t i ce s  and  r egu la t ions  in  t he
th ree  s tock  exchanges  unde r  the  ausp ices  o f  t he  Eas t  Af r i can  Secur i t i e s
Regu la to ry  Au tho r i t i e s  (EASRA) ;  and  the  e s t ab l i shmen t  o f  t he  Cap i t a l
Marke t s  Deve lopmen t  Commi t t ee  t o  ove r see  deve lopmen t  o f  t he  cap i t a l
marke t s ,  pa r t i cu l a r ly  c ros s  l i s t i ng  o f  s tocks .
However ,  t he  po l i t i c a l  i n s t ab i l i t y  i n  t he  r eg ion  and  the  mu l t i p l i c i t y  o f
o rgan i sa t ions  fo r  r eg iona l  i n t eg ra t ion  have  t h r ea t ened  t he  p roces s  o f
in t eg ra t ion  in  Eas t  Af r i ca .  In  add i t ion ,  t he  in su f f i c i en t  d ive r s i f i ca t ion  o f
the  na t iona l  economies  and  the  se l f - in t e re s t ed  agendas  o f  member  s t a t e s ,
e spec i a l l y  o f  Kenya ,  have  mi l i t a t ed  aga in s t  t he  economic  i n t eg ra t i on  o f
Eas t  Af r i ca .
4 .3 .5 .  The  New Par tnersh ip  for  Afr i ca ’ s  Deve lopment  (NEPAD)
4 . 3 . 5 . 1 .  B a c k g r o u n d
Accord ing  to  t he  NEPAD S tee r ing  Commi t t ee ,  NEPAD i s  a  ho l i s t i c ,
i n t eg ra t ed  sus t a inab le  deve lopmen t  in i t i a t ive  fo r  t he  economic  and
soc ia l  r ev iva l  o f  Af r i ca .  I t  i s  a  p l edge  by  Af r i can  l eade r s ,  based  on  a
common v i s ion  and  a  f i rm and  sha red  conv ic t ion  tha t  they  have  a
p re s s ing  du ty  t o  t he  Af r i can  peop le  t o  e r ad i ca t e  pove r ty  and  to  p l ace
the i r  coun t r i e s ,  bo th  i nd iv idua l l y  and  co l l e c t i ve ly ,  on  a  pa th  o f
sus t a inab le  g rowth  and  deve lopmen t  and ,  a t  t he  s ame  t ime ,  t o  pa r t i c ipa t e
ac t ive ly  in  t he  wor ld  economy and  body  po l i t i c .
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Ge lb  (2002)  s t a t e s  t ha t  NEPAD i s  a  b road - r ang ing  p rog ramme ,  bu t  t ha t
i t s  e s sen t i a l  focus  i s  t o  ove rcome  the  p rob lems  o f  weak  and  incapab le
s t a t e s .  He  con t inues  tha t  fo r  deve lopmen t  t o  t ake  p l a c e ,  s t a t e s  m u s t
c r e a t e  a  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s e n s u s  s u p p o r t i n g  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  a n d  p o v e r t y
reduc t ion ;  r ebu i ld  i n s t i t u t i ons ;  and  e s t ab l i sh  a  s t ab l e  env i ronmen t  fo r
the  economic  ac t iv i t y  o f  f i rms  and  househo lds .  In  Af r i ca ,  i nd iv idua l
s t a t e s  have  been  unab le  t o  ach i eve  t h i s ,  and  the  co l l ec t i ve  ac t i on  o f
s ta tes  i s  necessary .
NEPAD i s  the re fo re  p remised  on  Af r i can  s t a t e s  mak ing  commi tmen t s  to
good  gove rnance ,  democracy  and  human  r igh t s ,  wh i l e  endeavour ing  to
p reven t  and  r e so lve  s i tua t ions  o f  conf l i c t  and  in s t ab i l i t y  on  the
con t inen t .  Coup led  to  t he se  e f fo r t s  t o  c r ea t e  cond i t i ons  conduc t ive  t o
inves tmen t ,  g rowth  and  deve lopment  a re  in i t i a t ives  to  r a i se  the
neces sa ry  r e sou rces  t o  add res s  t he  deve lopmen t  chasm in  c r i t i c a l  s ec to r s
tha t  a r e  h igh l igh ted  in  the  P rogramme Ac t ion ,  such  a s  i n f r a s t ruc tu re ,
educa t ion ,  hea l th ,  ag r i cu l tu re  and  ICT.
Resources  wi l l  be  mob i l i s ed  by  way  o f  i nc reas ing  domes t i c  s av ings  and
inves tmen t ;  by  improv ing  the  managemen t  o f  pub l i c  r evenue  and
expend i tu re ;  and  by  inc reas ing  cap i t a l  i n f lows ,  v i a  fu r the r  deb t  r e l i e f ,
i nc reased  t a rge t ed  ODA f lows ,  FDI  and  p r iva t e  cap i t a l .  The  found ing
d o c u m e n t  o f  N E P A D  c o n t a i n s  b o t h  a  s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  f r a m e w o r k  a n d  a
programme of  ac t ion .
4 .3 .5 .2 .  Pr inc ip l e s  and  ob j ec t i v e s  o f  NEPAD
The  ma in  ob jec t ive  o f  NEPAD i s  to  g ive  impe tus  to  Af r i ca ’ s
deve lopmen t  by  b r idg ing  ex i s t ing  gaps  in  p r io r i ty  sec to r s  in  o rde r  to
enab le  t he  con t inen t  t o  ca t ch  up  wi th  deve loped  pa r t s  o f  t he  wor ld  by :
·  Ensu r ing  Af r i can  owner sh ip ,  r e spons ib i l i t y  and  l eade r sh ip ;
·  Making  Af r i ca  a t t r ac t i ve  t o  bo th  domes t i c  and  fo re ign  inves to r s ;
·  Unleash ing  the  vas t  economic  po ten t i a l  o f  t he  con t inen t ;
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·  Ach iev ing  and  sus t a in ing  an  ave rage  g ros s  domes t i c  p roduc t  g rowth
ra t e  o f  ove r  7  pe r  cen t  pe r  annum fo r  t he  nex t  f i f t een  yea r s ;
·  Ensu r ing  t ha t  t he  con t inen t  a ch i eves  t he  ag reed  In t e rna t i ona l
Deve lopment  Goa l s  ( IDGs) ;
·  Inc reas ing  inves tmen t  i n  human  r e sou rces  deve lopmen t ;
·  Promot ing  sub - r eg iona l  and  con t inen t a l  e conomic  i n t eg ra t i on ;
·  Deve lop ing  a  new pa r tne r sh ip  wi th  indus t r i a l i s ed  coun t r i e s  and
mul t i l a t e r a l  o rgan i sa t i ons  on  the  bas i s  o f  mu tua l  commi tmen t s ,
ob l iga t i ons ,  i n t e r e s t ,  con t r i bu t ions ,  and  bene f i t s ;
·  St reng then ing  Af r i ca ’ s  capac i ty  to  l ead  nego t i a t ions  on  beha l f  o f  t he
con t inen t  on  ma jo r  deve lopmen t  p rog rammes  tha t  r equ i r e
coord ina t ion  a t  a  con t inen ta l  l eve l ;
·  Ensur ing  tha t  t he re  i s  a  capac i ty  t o  acce l e ra t e  t he  imp lemen ta t ion  o f
ma jo r  r eg iona l  deve lopmen t  coope ra t i on  ag reemen t s  and  p ro j ec t s
a l r eady  approved  o r  in  the  p ipe l ine ;
·  St r eng then ing  Af r i ca ’ s  c apac i t y  t o  mob i l i s e  add i t i ona l  ex t e rna l
re sources  fo r  i t s  deve lopment .
4 .3 .5 .3 .  The  NEPAD f ramework
NEPAD i s  based  on  a  th ree -p ronged  s t r a t egy  fo r  the  sus ta inab le
deve lopmen t  o f  t he  con t inen t ,  name ly  p recond i t i ons  fo r  deve lopmen t ,
p r io r i t y  s ec to r s  and  mob i l i s ing  r e sou rces .
4 . 3 . 5 . 3 . 1 .  P r e c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  d e v e l o p m e n t
Afr ican  l eade r s  have  l ea rned  f rom the i r  own  exper i ences  tha t  p e a c e ,
secur i ty ,  democracy ,  good  governance ,  human  r igh t s  and  sound
economic  managemen t  a r e  cond i t i ons  fo r  su s t a inab l e  deve lopmen t .  They
a re  t he re fo re  p l edg ing  to  work ,  bo th  ind iv idua l ly  and  co l l ec t ive ly ,  t o
p romote  these  p r inc ip l e s  in  the i r  coun t r i e s  and  sub  r eg ions  and  on  the
con t inen t .
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Improv ing  governance  unde r  “Precond i t ions  fo r  deve lopmen t”  wi l l
s t r eng then  weak  s t a t e s  in  Af r i ca ,  wh i l e  r eg iona l  coopera t ion  and
in t eg ra t ion  wi l l  i nc rease  c ros s -bo rde r  t r ade  and  inves tmen t  w i th in
Af r i ca ,  a s  we l l  a s  improv ing  in t e rna t iona l  compe t i t i veness  th rough  the
poo l ing  o f  Af r i can  r e sou rces .
Governance  improvement s  shou ld  be  a t  t he  hea r t  o f  the  deve lopment
agenda  fo r  t h i s  con t inen t .  I n  t he  a r ena  o f  economic  gove rnance ,  t h i s
means  r educ ing  co r rup t i on ,  i nc r ea s ing  t r anspa rency  and  accoun tab i l i t y
in  the  co l l ec t ion  and  use  o f  pub l i c  r e sources ,  enhanc ing  r egu la t ion  in
the  f i nanc i a l  sy s t em,  and  p romot ing  sound  accoun tab i l i t y  and  aud i t i ng
prac t i ces  in  the  p r iva te  sec to r .  In  the  po l i t i ca l  governance  a rena ,  i t
means  r e so lv ing  v io l en t  con f l i c t  i n  coun t r i e s  and  e s t ab l i sh ing  peace  and
secu r i ty  fo r  c i t i zens ,  enhanc ing  democracy  and  the  r igh t  and  ob l iga t ions
o f  c i t i z ensh ip ,  and  e s t ab l i sh ing  r e spec t  fo r  human  r igh t s  and  the  ru l e  o f
l aw in  the  c r imina l  jus t i ce  sys tem.
4 . 3 . 5 . 3 . 2 .  P r i o r i t y  s e c t o r s
Deve lopmen t  in  the  “Pr io r i ty  sec to r s”  wi l l  r eve r se  Af r i ca ’ s
marg ina l i s a t ion  and  l ay  the  bas i s  fo r  sus t a inab le  l ong- t e rm deve lopmen t .
The  p r io r i t y  s ec to r s  a r e :  i n f r a s t ruc tu re ,  ICT ,  human  deve lopmen t  and
pove r ty  r educ t ion ,  focus s ing  on  hea l th  and  educa t ion ,  ag r i cu l tu r e ,
p r o m o t i n g  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  e x p o r t s ,  a n d  f o c u s s i n g  o n
marke t  access  fo r  Af r i can  expor t s  t o  indus t r i a l i s ed  coun t r i e s .
The  s t ruc tu ra l  gap  in  in f ra s t ruc tu re  cons t i tu t e s  a  ve ry  se r ious  hand icap
to  economic  g rowth  and  pove r ty  r educ t ion .  Improv ing  in f r a s t ruc tu re ,
i nc lud ing  the  cos t  and  r e l i ab i l i t y  o f  s e rv i ces ,  wou ld  bene f i t  bo th  Af r i ca
and  the  i n t e rna t iona l  communi ty ,  wh ich  wou ld  be  ab l e  t o  ob t a in  Af r i can
goods  and  se rv ices  more  cheap ly .
The  r ap id  advances  i n  t echno logy  and  the  d imin i sh ing  cos t  o f  acqu i r ing
the  new ICT too l s  have  opened  new windows  o f  oppor tun i ty  fo r  Af r i can
coun t r i e s  to  acce le ra t e  the i r  economic  g rowth  and  deve lopment .  The
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goa l s  o f  ach iev ing  a  common  marke t  and  an  Af r i can  Un ion  can  bene f i t
immense ly  f rom the  r evo lu t ion  in  in fo rma t ion  t echno logy .  In  add i t ion  to
fos t e r ing  in t r a - r eg iona l  t r ade ,  t he  use  o f  ICTs  cou ld  a l so  acce l e r a t e
Af r i ca ’ s  in t eg ra t ion  in to  the  g loba l  economy.
The  human  re source  deve lopmen t  and  pove r ty  r educ t ion  in i t i a t ives
inc lude  t he  r eve r s ing  o f  t he  b r a in  d r a in .  Coun t r i e s  shou ld  suppor t
ex i s t ing  pove r ty  r educ t ion  in i t i a t ives  to  deve lop  these  s t r a t eg ie s  a t  t he
mul t i l a t e r a l  l eve l ,  such  a s  t he  Comprehens ive  Deve lopmen t  F ramework
of  t he  Wor ld  Bank  and  the  Pove r ty  Reduc t ion  S t r a t egy  approach  l i nked
to  the  deb t  r e l i e f  i n i t i a t i ve  fo r  H igh ly  Indeb ted  Poor  Coun t r i e s  (HIPCs) .
I t  i s  a l so  necessa ry  to  c rea t e  po l i t i ca l ,  soc i a l  and  economic  cond i t ions  in
Af r i ca  t ha t  wou ld  se rve  a s  i ncen t ives  t o  cu rb  the  b ra in  d ra in  and  a t t r ac t
much-needed  inves tmen t .
Improvemen t  i n  ag r i cu l tu ra l  pe r fo rmance  i s  a  p re requ i s i t e  o f  economic
deve lopmen t  on  the  con t inen t  s i nce  t he  ma jo r i t y  o f  Af r i ca ’ s  peop le  l i ve
in  ru ra l  a r eas .  The  r e su l t ing  inc rease  in  ru ra l  pu rchas ing  power  wi l l  a l so
lead  to  h igher  e f fec t ive  demand  fo r  Af r i can  indus t r i a l  goods .  The
induced  dynamics  wou ld  cons t i t u t e  a  s ign i f i can t  sou rce  o f  economic
growth.
4 .3 .5 .3 .3 .  Mob i l i s ing  r e sources
Governance  improvements  a re  a l so  e s sen t i a l  to  inc rease  r e sources  fo r
(and  f lows  o f )  inves tmen t  in  deve lopment .  In  the  shor t  t e rm,  these  wi l l
focus  upon  expanded  deb t  r e l i e f  and  a id  f lows ,  bu t  in  the  longer  t e rm,
success  in  improv ing  governance  and  in  the  p r io r i ty  sec to r s  wi l l  l ower
r i sk  p remiums  and  the  cos t  o f  do ing  bus iness  in  Af r i ca ,  so  tha t  domes t i c
p r iva te  sav ings  and  p r iva te  cap i t a l  i n f lows  wou ld  be  expec ted  to  r i s e .
Grea t e r  acces s  t o  t he  i ndus t r i a l i s ed  coun t r i e s ’  marke t s  fo r  Af r i can
expor t s  w i l l  a l so  p rov ide  add i t iona l  r e sources  fo r  i nves tmen t  i n
domes t i c  p rog rammes .
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NEPAD seeks  the  ex t ens ion  o f  deb t  r e l i e f  beyond  i t s  cu r r en t  l eve l s
(based  on  deb t  “ sus t a inab i l i t y” ) ,  wh ich  s t i l l  r equ i r e  deb t  s e rv i ce
paymen t s  amoun t ing  to  a  s ign i f i can t  po r t ion  o f  t he  r e sources  gap .  The
long- t e rm ob jec t ive  o f  NEPAD i s  to  l i nk  deb t  r e l i e f  w i th  c o s t e d  p o v e r t y
r educ t ion  ou t comes .  Coun t r i e s  w i l l  engage  w i th  ex i s t i ng  deb t  r e l i e f
mechan i sms  -  t he  HIPC and  o the r  c r ed i to r s  -  be fo re  s eek ing  r e sou rces
th rough  NEPAD.  The  deb t  i n i t i a t i ve  w i l l  r equ i r e  ag reed  pove r ty
reduc t ion  s t r a t eg ie s ,  deb t  s t r a t eg ie s  and  pa r t i c ipa t ion  in  the  Economic
Governmen t  In i t i a t i ve  (EGI )  i n  o rde r  t o  ensu re  t ha t  coun t r i e s  a r e  ab l e  t o
abso rb  the  ex t r a  r e sou rces .
Domes t i c  r e sources  a re  needed  fo r  e f f ec t ive  pover ty  r educ t ion .  These
inc lude  na t iona l  s av ings  by  f i rms  and  househo lds ,  wh ich  need  to  be
subs tan t i a l ly  inc reased .  In  add i t ion ,  more  e f fec t ive  t ax  co l l ec t ion  i s
needed  to  inc rease  pub l i c  r e sources ,  a s  i s  t he  r a t iona l i s ing  o f
gove rnmen t  expend i tu re s .  A  s ign i f i can t  p ropor t ion  o f  domes t i c  s av ings
i s  l o s t  t o  Af r i can  coun t r i e s  a s  a  r e su l t  o f  cap i t a l  f l i gh t .  Th i s  s i t ua t ion
can  on ly  be  r eve r sed  i f  Af r i can  economies  become  a t t r ac t ive  l oca t ions  i n
which  re s iden t s  can  ho ld  the i r  wea l th .
NEPAD seeks  inc reased  ODA f lows  in  the  medium te rm,  as  we l l  a s
re fo rm o f  the  ODA de l ive ry  sys t em,  to  ensu re  tha t  f lows  a re  more
e f fec t ive ly  u t i l i s ed  by  r ec ip i en t  Af r i can  coun t r i e s .  The  l a t t e r  need  to
deve lop ,  w i th  donor s ,  a  cha r t e r  unde rp inn ing  t he  deve lopmen t
pa r tne r sh ip .
The  inc rease  o f  p r iva te  cap i t a l  f l ows  to  Af r i ca  i s  an  e s sen t i a l  componen t
o f  a  sus t a inab le  long- t e rm approach  to  f i l l i ng  the  r e source  gap .  NEPAD
wi l l  add res s  i nves to r s ’  pe rcep t ions  o f  Af r i ca  a s  a  “h igh - r i sk”  con t inen t ,
e spec i a l l y  w i th  r ega rd  t o  t he  s ecu r i t y  o f  p rope r ty  r i gh t s ,  r egu la to ry
f rameworks  and  marke t s .  Severa l  key  e l ement s  o f  NEPAD wi l l  he lp  to
lower  these  r i sks  g radua l ly ,  and  inc lude  in i t i a t ives  re la t ing  to  peace  and
secu r i t y ,  po l i t i c a l  and  economic  gove rnance ,  i n f r a s t ruc tu r e  and  pove r ty
reduc t ion ,  a s  we l l  a s  t he  p romot ion  o f  f inanc ia l  marke t s  w i th in
coun t r i e s ,  and  a l so  c ros s -bo rde r  ha rmon i sa t ion  and  in t eg ra t ion ,  v i a  a
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f inanc ia l  marke t  i n t eg ra t ion  t a sk  fo rce .  In i t i a l ly ,  t h i s  mus t  focus  on
se t t i ng  up  the  l eg i s l a t i ve  and  r egu la to ry  env i ronmen t  fo r  t he  f i nanc ia l
system.
Af r i can  economies  a r e  vu lne rab l e  because  o f  t he i r  dependence  on
p r imary  p roduc t ion  and  r e sou rce -based  s ec to r s ,  and  t he i r  na r row expor t s
bases .  The re  i s  consequen t ly  an  u rgen t  need  to  d ive r s i fy  p roduc t ion ,  and
the  log ica l  s t a r t ing  po in t  i s  t o  ha rness  Af r i ca ’ s  na tu ra l  r e source  base .
Va lue  added  by  means  o f  ag ro -p roces s ing  and  mine ra l  bene f i c i a t i on  mus t
be  inc reased  and  a  b roade r  cap i t a l  goods  sec to r  deve loped  th rough  a
s t r a t egy  o f  economic  d ive r s i f i ca t ion  based  on  in t e r sec to ra l  l i nkages .  To
ach ieve  th i s ,  gove rnmen t s  shou ld  suppor t  p r iva t e  en te rp r i se s ,  bo th  in  the
in fo rma l  and  t he  manufac tu r ing  s ec to r ,  wh ich  a r e  p r inc ipa l  eng ines  o f
g rowth  and  deve lopmen t ,  and  shou ld  r emove  a l l  cons t r a in t s  on  bus ine s s
ac t iv i ty .  Th i s  wi l l  encourage  the  c rea t ive  t a l en t  o f  Af r i can
en t r ep reneur s .
Ge lb  (2002)  s t a t e s  tha t  NEPAD i s  s t i l l  a  nascen t  p rocess  f ac ing  many
cha l l enges  to  i t s  success .  Pe rhaps  the  mos t  u rgen t  i s  the  need  to
mob i l i s e  suppor t  and  bu i ld  consensus  r ega rd ing  the  p l an  wi th in  t he
Afr ican  con t inen t .  He  adds  to  s t a t e  tha t  ind iv idua l s ,  f i rms  and
organ i sa t ions  shou ld  engage  wi th  i t ,  ne i the r  accep t ing  i t  unc r i t i ca l ly  no r
d i smis s ing  i t  ou t  o f  hand  a s  mi sd i r ec t ed ,  ove r - ambi t i ous  o r
exc lus iona ry ,  bu t  r a the r  s eek ing  to  i n f luence  and  shape  i t s  con ten t s .
NEPAD represen t s  the  bes t  oppor tun i ty  fo r  many  yea rs  to  sh i f t  Af r i ca
on to  a  new pa th ,  and  i f  i t  f a i l s  i t  wi l l  be  a  long  t ime  before  ano ther
chance  as  good  as  th i s  a r i ses .
4 . 4 .  C o n c l u s i o n
The  fa i lu re  o f  Af r i can  in t eg ra t ion  schemes  can  mos t ly  be  a t t r ibu ted  to
the  f ac t  tha t  r eg iona l  g roup ings  in  Af r i ca  were  c rea ted  in  the  f i r s t
i n s t ance  more  a s  an  exp re s s ion  o f  Af r i can  so l i da r i t y  t han  o f  economic
in t eg ra t i on  and  marke t  deve lopmen t .  Bu t ,  even  in  t he  enhancemen t  o f
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economic  in t eg ra t ion ,  many  f ac to r s  a f f ec t  t he  e f f i cacy  o f  t h i s
deve lopmen t .  Among  them a re :  d i f f e rences  in  t he  ba l ance  o f  paymen t
pos i t i ons ,  d i f f e r ences  i n  economic  po l i c i e s ,  t he  i s sue  o f  conve r t i b i l i t y
o f  cu r renc ie s  and  the  d i f f e rences  in  the  cu r rency  exchange  r a t e s .  Indeed ,
wi th  t he i r  marg ina l  compe t i t i ve  advan tage ,  Af r i can  coun t r i e s  a r e  a f r a id
tha t  r eg iona l  t r ade  l ibe ra l i sa t ion  may  have  the  r eve r se  e f fec t ,  i n
gene ra t i ng  ano the r  wave  o f  r eg iona l  de - indus t r i a l i s a t i on .
However ,  t he  r e su rgence  o f  r eg iona l i sm in  Af r i ca ,  w i th  a  s t rong
commi tmen t  to  economic  deve lopmen t ,  w i l l  he lp  coun t r i e s  in  Af r i ca  to
r e m o v e  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  b a r r i e r s  t h a t  h a v e  a f f e c t e d  c o o p e r a t i o n  b e t w e e n
s t a t e s  and  t o  improve  mac roeconomic  po l i c i e s ,  wh ich  w i l l  e s t ab l i sh
be t t e r  cond i t ions  fo r  t he  con t inen t ’ s  i nc reased  in t eg ra t ion  wi th  g loba l
marke t s .
